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Abstract 
Vietnam is a country dominated by agriculture. As in many other developing countries, 
land degradation has become serious in many places in rural Vietnam. Across the 
country from the north to the south, agricultural land has been degrading at an alarming 
rate, far beyond natural replenishment rates. In particular, in the midlands and highlands, 
soil erosion and deterioration of soil fertility have been serious problems due to 
unsustainable farming practices such as shifting cultivation with shortening fallow 
periods, monoculture, overuse of fertilisers, and excessive timber cutting and fuel wood 
collection. Scarcity of arable land has accelerated land degradation in the fragile areas. 
Often, investments in long-term improvement of land have not been undertaken in these 
areas, particular in the Collectivisation period. 
The underlying causes of land degradation problem have been highlighted as rapid 
population growth, market and policy failures, ineffective institutional arrangements 
including insecure land tenure structure, institutional weaknesses and inadequate 
enforcement. Among those causes, in Vietnam, insecure land tenure and inappropriate 
agricultural policies have been seen as the most critical issues affecting land-:use 
patterns and leading to unsustainable use of agricultural land. It encourages short-term :J 
exploitation of land rather than long-term sustainable use. 
This research, inspired by the concept of ecologically sustainable resource management, 
explored the relationship between the security of land tenure associated with other 
agricultural policies and the attitudes and practices of farmers towards land use in North 
Vietnam. This part of the country comprises 50% of the total national territory and of 
the total population, and represents the different social, cultural-, economic and ;,,-
biophysical characteristics of the country. The basic hypothesis of this research is that 
the more secure land tenure is, the more incentives there are for farmers' investment in 
land conservation. This hypothesis is examined here with reference to four sites of 
northern Vietnam: Vinh Phuc, Hoa Binh, Ha Tay and Hai Duong provinces. 
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The results show that the changes in the land tenure system and policies have affected , . 
• 
: ,£ 
farming practices from the Collectivisation stage to the Renovation stage, particularly on 
the propensity to invest in and practise land improvement. The current land tenure 
regime under the 1993 Land Law is preferred by farmers as it granted long-term land-
use rights as well as the rights to use, manage, transfer, inherit and mortgage land-use 
rights to individual households. The changes in land tenure security from the 
Collectivisation period to the Renovation period led to changes in farmers' attitudes 
towards long-term land improvement. Recently farmers have been applying many soil 
conservation measures on their farm as they have more confidence in the security level 
of the current land tenure regimes. 
However, there are a number of limitations in the 1993 Land Law and problems with its 
implementations such as difficulties in registering land certificates, constraint on land 
lease terms, the limitations on transferring and mortgaging land-use rights, and 
difficulties in enforcing these rights. These constraints that affect adversely the 
investment of farmers in land conservation need to be abolished or improved. 
:•ti 
While the finding of this study may not be fully applicable to all locations of the 
northern region, they should contribute to the development of principles for sustainable 
land management for the region and indeed the whole country. As a general conclusion 
of this study, it may be said that well-defining land-use rights and obligations of using ~': 
land will give incentives to farmers to invest in the long-term land improvement. 
:•ti 
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Chapter 1. Introduction - Land tenure and land management: A 
causative relationship 
1.1. Importance of the study 
In recent decades, land degradation has become serious in many places in the world. 
Arable lands are under increasing pressure from farmers as they try to increase 
production by intensifying farming practices. The increase in commercial logging and 
the over-exploitation of firewood and fodder has also induced serious degradation of 
forest and marginal lands (Gretton and Salma 1996; and World Bank 1998). The readily 
identifiable forms of land degradation include soil erosion, loss of organic matter 
content and natural fertility, the destruction of the soil's structure, and soil salinity and 
acidity. Despite the fact that the problems of soil degradation have been well-
documented worldwide, farmers in some regions are not practising sustainable farming. 
Across the world, there has been growing concern about the land degradation problem 
and the neglect of soil conservation practices (Otsuka and Place 2001). The underlying 
causes of this problem have been recognised and studied. They include market and 
policy failures, rapid population growth, and institutional weaknesses, including 
insecure land tenure structures. In most developing countries, insecure land tenure has 
been seen as the most critical issue affecting land-use patterns and leading to 
unsustainable use of agricultural land. It encourages short-term exploitation of land 
rather than long-term sustainable use (Brandon and Ramankutty 1993: 122). 
Vietnam is a country dominated by agriculture. Agricultural production is the major 
source of support for rural people, who account for over 80% of the total population. 
Moreover, 90% of Vietnam's poor also live in the rural areas. Thus, the gove~ent has 
been giving high priority to agricultural and rural development (Nguyen Q.H. 1997:1). 
However, in many rural areas in both the north and the south of the country, agricultural 
land have become degraded at an alarming rate, far beyond natural replenishment rates. 
In particular, in the midlands and highlands, soil erosion and deterioration of soil 
fertility have been serious problems due to unsustainable farming practices such as 
shifting cultivation with shortening fallow periods, monoculture, and excessive timber 
1 -' 
cutting and fuel wood collection. Often, investments in long-term improvement of land 
have not been undertaken in these areas. 
As in many other developing countries, in Vietnam, agricultural policy and institutional 
failures in the area of property rights have been identified as the important causes of 
land degradation and inappropriate farming practices, particularly in the northern part of 
the country. Through time, land tenure systems have been determined by the different 
political, socioeconomic, and legal institutions in existence. In the recent period of 
economic reform - the Doi moi process - which was launched in 1986, the Vietnamese 
Government clearly recognised the problems associated with the existing land tenure 
system. As a result, a new Land Law, which allocated land-use rights to farm 
households on a long-term basis, was promulgated in 1993. Under the law, land remains 
the property of the people and subject to administration by the State; basically, the 
ownership of land has not changed, but land-use rights can be privately held for long 
periods as well as being able to be transferred through sale or inheritance. This law 
granted long-term land leases in order to encourage farmer investments. 
Although the land law is a significant improvement over the previous land tenure 
·--
systems, problems remain in the major legislation and implementing regulations. 
Associated with these constraints, several agricultural policies, such as ceilings on farm 
size, fragmentation of farm plots, restrictions on what crops and livestock may be 
cultivated, also affect land holdings and farming practices. There have been several 
recent critiques of the strengths and weaknesses of the land law in terms of its support 
for sustainable agricultural development (Prosterman and Hanstad 1994; Le T.C. et al. 
1996; UNDP/UNICEF 1996; World Bank 1996; Chung C.H. 1997; Nguyen N·.H.1998). 
However, these studies have not deeply examined the relationships between the security 
of land tenure and the attitudes and practices of farmers towards land use, particularly 
investments in the long-term sustainability or improvement of this important asset. This 
research takes up this challenge. Inspired by the concept of ecologically sustainable 
resource management, it explores this issue in northern Vietnam, in areas which 
represent the different socio-cultural, economic and biophysical characteristics of the 
country. 
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The study focuses on the impacts of the changes in the land tenure system and policies 
affecting farming practices from the Collectivisation stage (1956-1986) to the 
Renovation stage (1986-present), particularly on the propensity to invest in and practise 
land improvement. The study also explores provisions of the land law and the legislative 
actions, which are essential for effective implementation of land use rights and the 
contributions that forms of land tenure security and land holding policies can make as 
incentives for land improvement through a study of the midland areas of North Vietnam. 
From these findings, policy implications for land tenure legislation, agricultural policy 
and ecologically sustainable land management are formulated to provide support for 
achieving sustainable agriculture. 
This chapter provides the background and rationale for the study. Based on the problems 
highlighted and the initial literature review in the second section, the research questions 
and objectives of the study are identified in the third and fourth sections. The next 
section addresses the methods that are used in searching for information, and the kinds 
of data collected for the case study. The scope of the study is also discussed in this 
chapter. The final section summarises the structures of the thesis. 
1.2. Causative relationships between problems of land tenure and land 
management 
1.2.1. Global scale 
Land degradation is a worldwide problem that can occur for many reasons;- some of 
which are associated with human activities. In particular, if degraded by agricultural use, 
land may inevitably become unproductive for that use (Gretton and Salma 1996:3). It 
was estimated that in 1989, 78 per cent of the earth's surface area was unsuitable for 
agricultural purposes; of the suitable land, 13 per cent had low productive capacity, 6 
per cent medium capacity, and only 3 per cent was characterised as having high capacity 
for intensive crop production (Lal and Stewart 1992: 4). 
According to F AO (1990), the agricultural land includes land under permanent crops 
and arable land that occupies 1475 million hectares Worldwide, 562 million hectares, or __ , 
38 per cent of the agricultural land is affected by human-induced land degradation as a 
result of agricultural mismanagement of the land and of industrial activities. Across th~ 
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world, in Central America almost 7 4 per cent, in Africa 65 per cent, in South America 
45 per cent, and in Asia 38 per cent of the agricultural land suffers from land 
degradation (see Table 1-1). It is also estimated that around 20 per cent of _the 
agricultural land worldwide is moderately degraded and 6 per cent is strongly degraded 
(Oldeman 1994: 115). 
Table 1.1. Global and continental extent of agricultural land, and the percentage of 
these areas affected by human-induced land degradation. 
Area Agricultural Land 
Total areas Degraded areas % 
(million hectares) (million hectares) 
Africa 187 121 65 
Asia 536 206 38 
South America 142 64 45 
Central America 38 28 74 
North America 236 63 26 
Europe 287 72 25 
Oceania 49 8 16 
World 1475 562 38 
Source: Oldeman, L.R. (1994). 
It is estimated that every year, five to seven million hectares are lost through soil 
degradation, equivalent to a rate of 0.3 to 0.5 per cent arable land loss in 1992 (Oldeman 
1994: 115). Lal and Stewart estimated that the projected loss by the year 2000 would be 
10 million hectares annually (0. 7 per cent of the area presently cultivated). In other 
words, by the year 2000, the productivity of about one-third of the world's arable land 
may be severely impaired due to degradation (1992: 4). Nearly 40 per cent of 
agricultural land worldwide has been estimated to be degraded. Degraded agricultural 
land amounts to 120 million hectares in Africa and slightly more than 200 million 
hectares in Asia (WRI 1998) 
In some countries, soil degradation is a serious problem in several ecologically sensitive 
regions; for example, 150 million hectares are subject to accelerated soil erosion in India 
and siltation of the reservoirs in northern India is about 200% more than predicted in 
their design. In China, the bed of the Yellow River has risen by as much as 10 cm 
annually due to the severe erosion of about 46 million hectares of the loess plateaus in 
the catchment area (Dent 1984). Here, uncontrolled and excessive grazing is responsible 
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for depleting vegetation and denuding the landscape, causing shifts in climax vegetation, _, 
soil compaction, and accelerated runoff and erosion. 
For example, many of degraded soil in Australia is accelerated by some agricultural 
practices, such as by the use of pastures based on grasses and by using certain 
nitrogenous fertilisers on crops. As SEAC (1996: 6-32) reported, major problems with 
induced acidity in Victoria, southern New South Wales and Western Australia, covering 
around 29 million hectares in total. The Land and Water Resources Research and 
Development Corporation estimated in 1993 that soil structure decline is costing 
Australian farmers around $200 million annually in terms of lost production (Industry 
Commission 1998: 40). 
The human-induced land degradation implies a social problem in terms of causative 
factors. Deforestation, or removing natural vegetation for agricultural purposes, 
commercial forestry and fuel needs, overgrazing, agricultural practices, and industrial 
activities are some of the kinds of human intervention that have caused the land to be 
degraded. Agricultural mismanagement is believed to be the most important causative 
factor of land degradation in North America, Asia and Africa, while deforestation is 
thought to be the dominant causative factor of land degradation in South America and 
Asia (Oldeman 1994: 113). 
This research addresses the root causes of human-induced land degradation. There are 
believed to be close links between farming systems and systems of land tenure that 
reflect a range of different factors. Environment, social organisation, population density 
and technology all influence the relationship between tenure and farming (Cleary and 
Eaton 1996: 17). Market failure, property rights arrangements, institutions and 
inappropriate regulations have been _regarded as impediments to productivity. In Asia as 
well as in many other developing countries, these underlying causes are identified as: ( a) 
market and policy failures - such as underpricing of land, input subsidies, and lack of 
information about viable technologies on marginal lands - that lead to land-degrading 
externalities;(b) a rapidly growing population that exerts pressure on land resources for 
both subsistence and commercial needs; ( c) a land tenure structure that encourages 
short-term exploitation rather than longer-term conservation; and ( d) institutional 
weaknesses that encourage mismanagement of land resources (Brandon and Ramankutty 
1993: 122). 
Clearly recognising these causes and understanding how they influence land use and 
farming practices can help answer the central question of why land managers, such as 
peasants, pastoralists, commercial farmers and so on, are so often unwilling or unable to 
prevent soil degradation. Land degradation is thus a multi-disciplinary issue that can be 
resolved by the combination of analytical tools of both the natural and social sciences 
1.2.2. North Vietnam 
1.2.2.1. Overview of agricultural development 
Agriculture is an important part of Vietnam's economy. Agriculture is the major source . __ 
of subsistence for the country and of exports. The Red River Delta (RRD) and the 
Mekong delta are the 'rice bowls' of the country. The agricultural sector accounts for 
70% of total employment and supports over 80 per cent of Vietnam's population. Thus 
the recent rapid growth of the agricultural sector has made a significant contribution to 
increasing incomes for the majority of the population. The share of agriculture in the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined from 34 per cent in 1992 to 27 per cent in 
1998, but agricultural GDP has still grown at 4 per cent to 5 per cent per annum. It is 
expected that this sector will continue to provide a solid base for growth of the related 
industries (World Bank 1997: 75; Nguyen 1998: 1; UNDP 1998: 26; Centre of 
Institution for Economic Management 1999: 7; VDC 1999: 4). 
The past 57 years from the August revolution in 1945 to the pre-renovation in 1986, and 
up until the present covers a transitional development process from small scale, 
monoculture, and self-sufficient agriculture to a larger-scale, multicultural, intensive and 
commercial approach. This change has been closely linked to the transformation in the 
nation's history, from the national democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, 
firstly occurring in the north and then spreading to the whole nation. This significant 
historical change laid the basis for Resolution No 10 on agricultural management 
renovation in conjunction with economic reform in 1986. Recent agricultural 
development in Vietnam can be thus historically divided into the following stages: 
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• Pre-1957: before agricultural collectivisation 
• 1957 - 1988 in the North and 1975-1988 in the whole country (Collectivisation): 
Agricultural collectivisation and introduction of Decree number 100 in 1981. 
• 1988 - present (Renovation): "Resolution number 10" and the Land Law 1993. 
1.2.2.2. Land degradation under farming practices 
In Vietnam land is being degraded at an alarming rate. Degradation of agricultural land 
is apparent in various forms in almost all areas of the country. Soil degradation is 
identified as soil erosion, the depletion of soil organic matter and nutrients, deterioration 
of soil structure, soil salinity, and acidification. 
It has been estimated that about 70 per cent of all land in Vietnam is seriously eroded. In 
the North, the amount of soil loss is estimated 124 tonnes/ha/year and every year 0.9 to 
2.1 cm of the soil surface is lost, equivalent to 1 tonne of humus, 50 kg of nitrogen, 50 
kg of phosphate and 500 kg ofkali (Quat 1994: 12). It is estimated that the hill-slopes of 
the midlands, soil losses of approximately 14 7 tonnes/ha/year are common from mono-
cropped cassava cultivation systems. Long-term mono-cultivation of tea crops has 
accelerated land degradation and soil nutrient impoverishment, soil tilth has decreased, 
and soil is gradually becoming more impacted. The lack of a dense understorey in 
introduced eucalyptus plantations on sloping hillsides has also resulted in severe soil 
erosion and a decline in soil fertility and soil physical properties (Le et al. 1996: 26-28). 
Saline soils occur along the coast of North Vietnam, including Hai Phong, Hai Hung, 
Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thai Binh and Quang Ninh provinces. The area of saline soils is 
reported to be over 75,000 hectares. Soil salinity is a problem arising because of saline 
water intrusion as well as from over-use of fertilisers and waterlogging. In the RRD, 
particularly in areas of extremely intensive market gardening near urban areas, fertiliser 
application is extremely high ( 400 kg/ha/year). It has been estimated · that 20,000 to 
28,000 hectares in the RRD are water-logged per year. An estimated 44,000 hectares of -0 
acid sulphate soils are in Hai Phong, Quang Ninh and Thai Binh provinces (Binnie and 
Partners 1995: 44). 
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In the highlands and some parts of the midlands, shifting cultivation with shortening 
fallow periods has resulted in serious erosion and declining soil fertility. Because of :'z 
population pressure and loss of forests, the fallow period in swidden farming is steadily 
declining. In many places fields are cultivated for three to four years then allowed to lie 
fallow only for a similar period, when a rest of 10 to 15 years is needed to fully restore 
productivity (Jamieson et al. 1998: 11). It is reported that every year 50,000 hectares of 
forest were lost due to unplanned agricultural clearance (Nguyen Q.H. 1993: 5), 
resulting in more than 13 million hectares of vacant land with barren hills widespread in 
the region (Be 1993: 131 ). 
Scarcity of arable land has accelerated land degradation in the fragile areas. Vietnam has 
a great shortage of arable land. Of the 33 million hectares of land in the country, only 
... 
about 7 million are used for agriculture, and there is little scope for expansion, except to 
less suitable agro-ecological zones and environmentally fragile areas. The per capita 
availability of cultivated land is 0.12 hectares; in order to increase this ratio, the :e., 
Government is moving people from the overcrowded lowlands to the barren up-lands 
which have poor soils, steep slopes, are ecologically fragile and erosion-prone. Thus the 
increased population pressure and unsuitable farming practices in the areas have led to 
further land degradation (World Bank 1998: 13). 
Improving the productive capacity of existing agricultural land is probably a better 
solution than attempting to expand agricultural land into the degraded land areas. : ,, 
Appropriate land policies and security of land-use rights is, however, vital if farmers are 
to be encouraged to protect and improve land productivity in the long-term. 
1.2.2.3. Land tenure systems in rural areas 
There is a close relationship between institutional arrangements and agricultural land 
management in Vietnam. In each recent historical period, land-use rights regimes have 
had crucial impacts on land-use patterns and farming practices, and hence influence the 
levels of land degradation and land improvement investments. Unsustainable farming 
practices have often resulted from the insecurity of the land tenure system. 
Pre-1957: In the centuries before the French period, there were two classes of 
Vietnamese: large landowners and landless peasants. The Kings paid their officials. for 
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their services and rewarded their servants for their loyalty with large domains of rice 
. 
land. In addition to the growth of these landholdings, the policy of transforming a great 
number of peasants into serfs made many of them landless. The great reformers before 
the arrival of the French decreed that all salaries, pensions and other awards be paid only 
in money and rice; however, limiting landholdings of everyone but royalty to no more 
than 8.8 acres; distributing excess land to landless peasants in order to reduce landlord 
power, and allowing permanent ownership of new lands given to the landless were 
legalised to encourage a village economy. However, the feudal exploitation of landless 
peasants and smallholders by rich landowners remained, because the execution of the 
new decrees was usually controlled by the mandarins and the rich (Callison 1983: 36). 
In the colonial period, the French administration sold large concessions of land cheaply 
to the French and to cooperative Vietnamese. In the Northern part, land temporarily < 
abandoned by peasants fleeing areas ravaged by fighting was directly expropriated. 
Under the French regime, unequal land distribution increased in all areas of the country. 
Small landholders, a large percentage of all landowners, held only a small amount of the 
total private and communal land area; only a small number of landowners held the 
remaining large proportions of this land. This inequity was exacerbated because of the 
practice of usury and the ability of the wealthy to foreclose on the property of debtors 
who could not repay loans. In this period, many landlords preferred the urban life and 
conspicuous consumption to the more rigorous life of managing farm operations. The 
growth of absentee landlordism meant an increase in the area of land cultivated by 
tenants. Landlords' wealth was not reinvested in land development since these 
landlords-by-inheritance cared little about agricultural matters and provided almost no 
technical direction in the form of capital investment assistance to their tenants. 
Collecting rents was their only concern (Callison 1983: 39). 
Following the defeat of the French, the new government rapidly attempted to eliminate 
feudalism and promote democracy. The policy meant that land owned by the French and 
the largest Vietnamese landlords, those who owned more than 50 hectares of'land, was 
confiscated for redistribution, while contributions in the form of finance were taken 
from lesser landowners. This policy remained in effect until 1953. The redistribution 
was intended to give each peasant enough rice land to provide a little more than 
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subsistence for him and his family. Reallocated plots were usually less than one hectare, 
but in some areas families received 2 or 3 hectares (Donovan et al. 1997: 15). 
1957 to 1988 (Collectivisation): From late 1955, agricultural cooperatives were 
established in North Vietnam. The regime of low-rank cooperatives preserved individual 
ownership of crop land, animals, and farm equipment, but each family's share of output 
was tied to the amount of land, animals and machinery they had contributed. In the late 
1960s, the government organised these low-rank cooperatives into high-rank 
cooperatives. As an economic unit, the cooperative periodically distributed paddy land 
for cultivation, granted land to households for houses and home gardens, organised the 
tasks of the production brigades, determined the remuneration of labour, controlled 
agricultural inputs and products, provided information and technical advice, granted 
loans for special needs, and collected taxes (Le T.C. et al. 1996: 38). Land and tools 
formerly belonging to members were pooled and all work was done collectively under 
unified management. The output was distributed based on a work point system, which 
was calculated in terms of the amount of time spent working on the farm, but not on the 
value of the labour or the value of land and other assets contributed to the cooperative. 
Collectivisation did not have the desired effect on rice production in the North. 
Production of cereal grains per capita dropped. In 1961 the North was producing 318 kg 
per capita, but by 1980 output had fallen to 215 kg per capita, despite the fact that 
during the 1970s the double-cropping of rice and improved rice varieties had been 
introduced and had become common in the RRD. Moreover, under collectivisation, in 
the 1970s only 30 to 40 per cent of farm household, income came from work performed , 
on collectively farmed land, which accounted for 95 per cent of the land. The remaining 
60 to 70 per cent of farmer income came from the 5 per cent of the land reserved for 
household plots (Prosterman and Hanstad 1994: 5). Especially in the north upland areas, 
where the existence of customary land tenure persisted (as this area was· sparsely 
populated and had not been exploited by the French until the very late part of this 
colonial era), the effects of the resettlement prograr_n from the more densely populated ." 
RRD area, in conjunction with the State-owned resources regime, were serious. Land 
resources, as well as other related resources, have deteriorated severely as a result 
(Donovan et al. 1997: 11). 
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In 1981, decree No.100 of the Government introduced a new agricultural production 
management system in Vietnam: the 'product contract' system, under which the state :·., 
allotted use of land plots directly to cooperative member families for a period of 2 to 3 
years. Management and investment responsibilities still resided with the cooperatives. 
Land was contracted to households based on the amount of labour in the households 
rather than the total number of family members. This inequitable distribution of land 
and the short-term nature of the contract resulted in land deterioration and declining 
agricultural productivity because with no incentive to take care of the land, farmers 
mined its soil productivity (Le T.C. et a/.1996:39). 
1988 to present (Renovation): Since 1986, cooperatives have been gradually abolished 
as the basic administrative unit in rural organisation. Peasant households were made the 
·-
basic unit of decision-making. Until January 1988, the State Council promulgated the 
country's first land law (Resolution No 10), which reaffirmed existing systems of land 
ownership, so that the State could assign land to land users under 15 to 20 year 
inheritable leases. The land law also legitimised the rights to transfer, cede and sell the 
fruits of the farmer's labour and the results of investment in the assigned land when this 
land was assigned to other users. However, it strictly prohibited the purchase, sale, or 
lease of the land. Thus, this system of land tenure 'did not yet ensure long-term tenure 
security, a guarantee for any productive investment decision, nor did it pave the way for 
the establishment of proper land and credit markets' (UNDP 1996: 38). 
The 1993 Land Law and its related implementation decrees were meant to complete the 
land reform process by establishing longer-term and secure land-use rights. Under this 
law, which specified rights and obligations of users, land-use rights may be transferred, 
mortgaged, rented, exchanged, or inherited. Leaseholders are given land-use certificates, 
through which they are assured of their right to the land. However, implementation of 
this law has revealed several constraints with respect to efficiency, equity and : j 
sustainability. A common observation has been that many households still have doubts 
regarding the security of their land holdings. There is a lack of transparency in the land-
certificates such as the length of land-use tenure. The conditions for the use of land as 
collateral are also unclear. Many have reported that they were unwilling to mortgage 
their land because of the risk of losing it. Land-transfer taxes discourage land sales, 
thereby inhibiting an efficient market in land rights and causing administrative 
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problems. Particularly in upland areas, the allocation of land is facing challenges: by the 
end of 1995, only 7 percent of forest land had titles issued (UNDP 1996: 42). 
Experiences in other countries show that insecure land-use rights can affect the 
behaviour of farmers in land improvement activities. For example, a cultivator would 
not be able to capture all of the benefits from land conservation if the government can 
evict him/her without compensation for the costs incurred in establishing and 
maintaining land improvements; if the rent or taxes are increased without compensation 
for the costs incurred; if the cultivator lacks the power to exclude others from 
encroaching on the improved land; and if the cultivator as tenant is unable to bequeath 
or sell the improved land. Insecure ownership will also affect a farmer's access to credit 
and thereby, affect improvements in land quality (Templeton 1994: 73). 
It is therefore clear that a study of the land allocation and management regime in 
Vietnam is necessary in attaining sustainable agricultural development, in general, and 
soil conservation in particular. 
1.3. Research questions 
Overall question: How do the rights and obligations of farm households in North 
Vietnam, with respect to land tenure, affect farmers' -attitudes and practices towards land 
improvement in the context of sustainable agricultural development? 
Question 1. How does a change of land tenure systems (change in security levels) affect 
farmers' perceptions and practices of land management? 
• What have been the arrangements (security levels) of the different land tenure 
systems (Collectivisation and Reform) and their related land management in 
North Vietnam ? 
• Has the change of land tenure system from Collectivisation to _ Land Reform 
significantly influenced farmers ' attitudes and practices towards land 
management? 
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Question 2. D·o security of land-use rights, the obligations imposed and other policies 
affecting land use serve long-term land improvement purposes? 
•· What is the security level of land tenure in the Land Reform period? 
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• Does the difference between perceptions of land management and practices of a 
farmer depend significantly on these aspects of land tenure? 
• Will obligations of land protection imposed on farmers' use rights encourage 
them to manage their land in a sustainable manner? 
Question 3. What would be the changes in land tenure policy that would encourage land 
improvement as a contribution to development of sustainable agriculture based on the 
lessons learned from the research? 
• To what extent will well-defined land-use rights and effectives implementation of 
these rights and obligations give incentives for adopting land conservation 
practices, and relieving constraints on land conservation? 
• What changes should be made to the policy framework affecting land-use rights 
to enhance sustainable land management. In particular, what obligations might 
be imposed on land-use rights in particular areas to ensure good land 
management? 
1.4. Objectives of the study 
The study aims to analyse the impact of land tenure regimes and agricultural policy on 
land management and assess the contribution of the security of land tenure to farmers' 
incentives to invest in long-term land improvement in order to develop an appropriate 
policy framework for sustainable.land management. 
Specifically, the objectives of this study are to: 
• evaluate the security levels of the different land tenure systems in the different 
historical periods of North Vietnam 
• analyse the impact of changes in the land-use rights regime from the Collectivisation 
to the Renovation stage on the attitudes and practices of farmers in land 
improvement investments. 
• address the influence of the duration of the current land tenure system on the 
adoption of long-term land improvement. 
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• assess the advantages and shortcomings of the rights to transfer land-use rights and 
of the rights to use land as collateral. Hence, examine the impacts of those rights on 
land improvement investments. 
• investigate the mechanism for protection of land-use rights and enforcement through 
assessment of the strengths and the limitations of the administrative system in 
implementing the land law. 
• recommend an appropriate policy framework for land-use rights and agricultural 
land management regimes based on the lessons derived from the above research. 
1.5. Research Methodology 
1.5.1. Research sites 
The study area is the northern part of Vietnam, which covers 25 provinces from Quang 
Binh province of the north-central-coast region to Cao Bang province of the northern 
highland region. The changes in land tenure systems from the French peri?d to the 
present were similar in all of these provinces but there are differences in biophysical and 
cultural conditions between the provinces. Thus, within this region, four study sites were 
chosen as case study areas: Bai Yen village in Hoa Binh province, Lap Thach district of ": 
Vinh Phu Province, Phuc Tho district of Ha Tay Province, and Viet Hong district of Hai 
Duong province. These sites were selected because their features meet the necessary 
criteria of the research outlined below: 
Different topography: Bai Yen is a highland area comprising forestlands and valley 
lands. Lap Thach is located in the uplands of the Midland area comprising mountains 
and rolling hillsides interspersed with flat valley lands. This district has poor soil 
fertility, although some forest remains at higher elevations; however many hilltops are 
barren rocky wastelands displaying deep erosional gullies. Phuc Tho and Viet Hong, in 
contrast, are located in a lowland area and are comprised mostly of plains, with old and 
young alluvial soils of moderate to good fertility; only a small proportion of the land 
area is saline or acid sulphate. 
Different farming practices: In Bai Yen and Lap Thach, paddy rice is the main crop in 
the flat land valleys; other crops such as cassava, sweet potato, maize, tea and peanuts 
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have been cultivated on the hill-slopes, while shifting cultivation is the farming system 
in the upland and forestland areas. About a half of the forest area is cleared and the 
remainder consists primarily of eucalyptus and acacia plantations. In Phuc Tho and Viet 
Hong, paddy rice and other crops such as soybeans, maize and vegetables are cultivated 
in almost all areas of the district. However, the typical feature of the farming system in 
Viet Hong district is a range of fruit tree gardens such as lychee, jack fruit, longan, and 
oranges. Vegetable gardens are more common in Phuc Tho which is located very close 
to Ha Noi city. 
Different cultures and land tenures: Before 1954, Bai Yen and Lap Thach were 
occupied by ethnic minorities who have a long settlement history with customary rights ; 
over the land. After 1954, the Kinh people were settled in those districts, and they 
brought their lowland production technology with their own knowledge and beliefs to 
the uplands. Nevertheless, Bai Yen retains the typical culture of its ethnic minorities. In 
contrast, Phuc Tho and Viet Hong districts, in a typical lowland area in the RRD, have 
been occupied only by the Kinh people. who are by age-long tradition skilled paddy 
farmers. 
These research sites are also different in some other respect such as information 
availability, local willingness to participate, and availability of people who know the 
area well. 
1.5.2. Methods of collection and information collected 
The information collected included primary data, secondary data and case studies at :'., 
local, regional and national levels. Primary data was obtained from interviews, 
questionnaires, participant observation, experiments and surveys. Secondary data 
included census statistics and reports, government publications, institutional documents, 
books and journals, newspapers, and television and radio programs (Blaxter et-al. 1996: 
141-166). 
The data collected was in a number of forms, including interview notes, responses to 1 
questionnaires, recordings, copies of documents, notes of readings, notes of 
observations, measurements of behaviour, charts, maps, tables and diagrams. Among 
these different kinds of data, two major categories can be recognised: the quantitative 
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(numbers) and the qualitative (words). These kinds of data have a tendency to merge 
into each other. Qualitative data may be quantified, and quantitative data qualified. 
Qualitative data was obtained through interviews with farmers, administrators at local 
and regional levels, bank officers and scientists. Quantitative data was obtained by using 
household questionnaires, documents from government departments, such as the 
National Archives, National Library, the General Bureau of Statistics, General 
Department of Land Administration (GDLA), the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD), the Institute of Soil and Fertiliser, the Institute of Agricultural 
Planning, the Agricultural Bank of Vietnam, the Ministry of Science Technology and 
Environment (MoSTE), and a number of foreign-aid development projects and 
programs. 
The data/information requirements under each objective and their sources and methods 
of collection are presented in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: Information requirements, sources and methods used 
Objectives 
1. Evaluate the 
security levels 
of the different 
land tenure 
systems m the 
different 
historical 
periods 
Information requirement 
General information on the North 
Vietnam: biophysical and 
socioeconomic characteristics 
General information on agricultural 
sector of the North: agricultural 
development and its contribution to 
Vietnam's economy, agricultural 
land management or land 
degradation m three historical 
periods 
Data sources 
Secondary 
Secondary 
Information on historical land Secondary 
tenure systems or institutional Primary 
arrangements related to agricultural 
productivity in three periods. 
2. Analyse General social econormc and Secondary 
impacts of political changes of these period 
changes in land-
use rights 
regnne from 
Collectivisation 
to Renovation 
stage on the 
Institutional arrangements: land Primary 
ownership; land-use rights regimes, Secondary 
the changes in land laws and its 
influence on farmers. 
attitudes and Land management: soil fertility, Primary and 
Secondary practices of water quality, the use of fertilisers; 
and 
Collection methods 
Literature review 
Literature review 
Literature review 
Farm-household survey 
Literature review 
Interviews and literature 
review 
Discussions with scientists 
Literature review 
Farm-household survey 
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farmers in land Farmers' preference and practices 
conservation. in land conservation. 
3. Address the 
influence of 
duration of the 
current land 
tenure system 
on the adoption 
of land 
conservation 
4. Assess the 
advantages and 
shortcomings of 
the rights to 
transfer and 
mortgage land-
use rights on 
land 
conservation 
investment. 
5. Investigate 
the mechanism 
for protection 
rights and 
enforcement 
through 
assessment of 
the strength and 
limitations of 
the 
administrative 
system m 
implementing 
the land law 
5. Recommend 
and develop an 
appropriate 
policy 
framework for 
land-use rights 
regrme and 
agricultural land 
management. 
Additional 
agricultural 
mcomes, 
information on 
production, farmers' 
labour and other 
socioeconomic information. 
Secondary 
General information on econotruc Secondary 
and political conditions social of Primary 
the period of Renovation 
Land registration system, process of Primary 
land certificates issuance, land secondary 
redistribution 
Preferences and practices of Primary 
farmers on land improvement 
General information on land tenure 
system related to sell or rent 
agricultural land in the region 
Information on implementing the 
rights to transfer land-use rights and 
use it as collateral 
Secondary 
Primary 
Preferences and practices of Primary 
farmers on land conservation 
related to these rights 
Operation of the administrative 
system in implementing the land 
law; decision making process; 
enforcement mechanism m 
protecting land-use rights for 
farmers. 
Imposed obligations of protecting 
land rights and land conservation 
Farmers' attitudes on these 
obligations and the enforcement 
Primary 
Secondary 
and 
and 
and 
Summary of fmdings from the 
above studies of changes in land 
tenure arrangements, its impacts on 
farmers' land management. 
Studies of above 
sections 
Perspective of the policy framework 
for security of land tenure and 
sustainable land use 
Literature review 
Interviews 
Literature review and 
interviews 
Farm-household survey 
Farmers and scientists 
interviews 
Literature review 
Farm household survey 
Farm household survey 
Scientists interviews 
Farm-household survey 
Government official 
interviews 
Analyse and conclude : , 
from studies of above 
sections 
.,-
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1.6. Scope and limitations of the study 
The research focuses on the northern part of the country, which is characterised by its 
wide physical, socioeconomic and cultural diversity, particularly from highlands to 
midlands and to lowland areas. However, only some villages of the highlands, midlands 
and the RRD could be chosen for the case study and since field study is inevitably 
restricted, the collected information may be biased in terms of where the study sites are 
located. Hence, the outcomes of this study may not be fully applicable to all locations of 
the northern region, but the study' s outcomes will at least contribute to the development 
of principles for sustainable agricultural land management for the whole region, and 
even for the whole of Viet Nam, through its contributions to general principles of 
security of land tenure and the other institutional arrangements. 
The major focus of this study is on how to promote sustainable land management in 
agriculture through the analysis of the relationship between security of land tenure and 
land management obligations, and land conservation. Thus the issues of farming 
practices, land productivity, property rights, institutions, and policy making and their 
enforcement are explored deeply while other related issues such as the biophysical . 
characteristics of land, the technical methods for land improvement, the costs and 
benefits of soil conservation, the use of other resources and other aspects were 
inevitably paid less attention. However, there has to be a comprehensive understanding 
of these biophysical issues in order to develop appropriate policies on obligati_ons to be 
imposed on leaseholders. 
The data set used in this proposed study will also have some biases. There was little 
available information about land productivity and land management during the French 
period, even in the more recent studies. Most of the documents about the northern part 
of Viet Nam in this period were published in French, which limited the author's use of 
data. However, documented information about land management in the two later periods 
(Collectivisation and Renovation) is more readily available and is published in 
Vietnamese. Therefore, the study emphasises the latter two periods. 
1. 7. Structures of the study 
Following this introduction chapter there are nine other chapters in the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 critically reviews the literature relating to a conceptual framework for 
sustainable land use in agriculture. This theoretical framework includes a number of 
concepts related to the research questions. These concepts range from broad issues, such 
as sustainable development, sustainable agriculture and conservation strategies, to 
specific issues, such as land resources, land management, property rights, land tenure 
security, institutions and perceptions of farmers about land tenure and land management. 
Chapter 3 formulates an analytical framework for examining the hypotheses of the 
study. This analytical framework concentrates on why and how land rights and rules 
influence farmers' attitudes to land management and to what extent well-defined land-
use rights and effective implementation of these rights and obligations can give 
incentives for adopting soil conservation practices and relieve constraints to land 
conservation. 
Chapter 4 describes the methodology used in the study. This includes the survey 
conducted in four villages in northern Vietnam to collect data. Tabulation and content 
analysis are the main methods for analysing data collected from this survey. Chapters 5, 
6, 7, 8 and 9 present the main analysis. Each chapter analyses the relationship between 
one aspect of land tenure regimes and land management. The structures of these 
chapters are similar. In the first part of each chapter the concepts or definitio~s of each 
term and the related issues in the different countries have been reviewed. Based on these 
reviews an analysis of the empirical data is carried out in the remaining parts of the 
chapter. 
Chapter 5 assesses the security levels of land tenure 1n two different systems -
Collectivisation and Renovation; and compares the impacts of each land tenure system 
on land management. Chapter 6 investigates the influence of land tenure duration and 
land distribution on soil conservation practices. Chapters 7 and 8 examine the 
contributions of the rights of land transferability and the rights to use land as collateral 
in increasing the security level of the current land tenure system and to give incentives 
for investing in soil conservation. 
Chapter 9 critically analyses the operation of the administrative system and its 
regulations in respect of land tenure regimes. The effectiveness of self..:enforcing 
mechanisms and the governance of state enforcement for protection of land-use rights, 
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and the compliance of farmers with any obligations that accompany their land rights are 
also assessed in this chapter. Finally, chapter 10 presents the implications of the research 
for increasing land tenure security and suggestions on how these should be implemented 
in the future in order to promote sustainable land management. 
. i 
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Chapter 2. Sustainable resource use and well-defined property 
rights: Theoretical perspectives 
Since the overall theme of the research is concerned with agricultural land management 
in a sustainable development context, the analytical framework of the research must be 
based on a number of concepts related to the research questions. These concepts range 
from broad issues, such as sustainable development, and sustainable agricultural 
development and conservation strategies, to specific issues, such as the land resources, 
land management, property rights, land tenancy, obligations and institutions. 
Understanding the interrelationships between these concepts contributes significantly to 
answering the research questions. This section discusses these concepts in order to 
formulate a conceptual framework for sustainable land management in agriculture. 
2.1. Sustainable agricultural development 
2.1.1. Sustainability 
. i 
The emergence of the sustainability concept is vital in the evolutionary process of 
development, as the depletion of natural resources and the decline in environmental ·, 
quality have been increasing dramatically across the world. The idea of sustainability 
gained recognition in the early 1970s within the movement towards environmental 
conservation. In the development debate of the 1980s, the sustainability concept in 
relation to natural resources, including the environment, became an important part of the 
discussion. Various definitions of sustainable development were provided from various 
institutions and countries to suit their specific focus on the development problem. These . 
definitions stemmed from a common question: how to conserve life-support systems 
while maintaining and enhancing human utility and social equity. The broad definition 
given by the Brundtland Commission Report in 1987 stressed the ultimate goal of 
sustainable development as integrating the production process with _ resource 
conservation and environmental enhancement and 
' 
It is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of , 
future generation to meet their own needs. 
(WCED, 1987: 43) 
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Thus the essence of sustainability must be captured in both the temporal and the spatial 
dimensions so that 'before acting, we must consider the consequences of our actions for 
the next seven generations and the next seven watersheds' (D' Souza and Gebremedhin 
1998: xiv). Therefore, 'No generation has a freehold on the earth. All we have is a life 
tenancy - with a full repairing lease' (Thatcher 1988 in Industry Commission 1998:1). 
Since humanity and life-support systems are interdependent, all economic activities 
which use natural resources should be undertaken within the carrying capacity of nature. 
The carrying capacity of an area can be understood as 'the maximum rate of resource 
consumption and waste discharge that can be sustained indefinitely without 
progressively impairing the functional integrity and productivity of relevant ecosystems' 
(Diesendorf and Hamilton 1997: 4 7). Thus, it is important to take into account that any 
decision on resource use must satisfy the limits of exploitation, and also consider the 
process people use to access resources, including the rights to access and. use the 
resources to ensure intra- and inter-generational equity. This means that the health and 
productivity of resources, and the benefits from use of resources, are maintained and 
enhanced for all of the present generation (intra-generation) as well as future .-
generations (inter-generation). 
Sustainability is applied broadly, encompassing the biophysical context and 
socioeconomic aspects of resource exploitation. For instance, sustainability applies to 
harvesting of fisheries, forests, soils and groundwater only up to the point where the 
regenerative capacity of these renewable resources is maintained while the livelihood of 
local communities that rely on the resources is sustained. Figure 2.1-A shows the goal of 
ecologically sustainable development as that of attaining the level of sustainability that 
is determined through integrating the objectives of three systems: the Biological System 
(BS), the Economic System (ES), and the Social System (SS) (Barbier 1987: 1Q3). 
All economic activities impact on and depend on natural resources while the ecosystems 
are recognised as resource bases and a waste sink for economic activities (Diesendorf 
and Hamilton 1997: 47-51). Therefore, economic growth and improvement of 
environmental quality should not be in conflict, but rather be pursued together in the 
same direction, so that environmental resources support economic activities while good 
economic performance can reduce pressure on environmental resources. Also,Jhere is a 
close link between social conditions and economic growth and environmental decay. 
., 
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Sustaining social conditions such as empowerment, equity, accessibility and : ; 
participation lead to sustained exploitation of natural resources, whereas wealth can 
have importance as an instrument for expanding human capability. The higher the 
average income of a country, the more likely its population will be healthy and able to 
enjoy a full and long life (Khan 1995:64). Conservation of biodiversity, minimisation of 
pollution and sustainable resource use can be seen as the essential conditions for poverty 
elimination, and hence for an equitable and stable society. 
Nevertheless, not all three objectives of sustainable development can be achieved at the 
same time and at the same level. The framework within which to approach sustainable 
development is one of trade-offs between systems. For example, there is a trade-off 
between increased production and environmental degradation because environmental 
resources have to be exploited for production at any point. Similarly, exploitation of 
resources for economic growth can affect the culture or traditional beliefs of local 
people. Thus, it is important that the policies of development integrate biophysical, 
social and economic goals, and ensure that all characteristics of sustainability are taken 
into account. 
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Figure 2.1. Conceptual Framework of Sustainable Land Use in Agriculture 
SD: sustainable Development 
SS: Social System 
ES: Economic System 
BS: Biophysical System 
SA: Sustainability of Agriculture 
- Agricultural productivity 
- Conservation of natural 
resources 
- Livelihood security 
ES 
ss 
SD 
Livelihood 
security 
A 
B 
Agricultural 
productivity 
of resource 
bases 
Farmer responses 
(perception, 
aspiration, obligation) 
Policy / Legislation 
(Land-use rights regime) 
Sustainable land use 
(land improvement) 
Source: Adapted and modified from Barbier 1987. 
Impleme~tation 
(institution and 
enforcement) 
C 
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In terms of implementation, the different approaches to sustainable development could 
be handled according to the emphasis on development in each nation. These approaches 
have been categorised by a number of writers (Barbier 1987: 104; Pearce, Markandya 
and Barbier 1989:21; Dodds 1995:6; Diesendorf and Hamilton 1997: 83-97) into five 
schools: reconciliation, restraint, recognition, redistribution and revolution. Each 
approach reflects the way to sustain and improve the welfare of human beings based on 
the identification of a particular type of threat to sustainability. Each approach can also 
be viewed as parts of a hierarchy, where each builds on the previous approach. Only the 
last two approaches identify a need to change the relationships between humans and 
between humanity and the non-human world. 
Reconciliation: bringing economy and environment together in consideration of sound 
environmental management and conservation of natural resources. The implication of 
this approach is to obtain as much output as possible from the natural resources, without 
undermining the resource base, i.e., sustainable yield. 
Restraint: maintaining social and environmental capital, which are the asset base of 
society, to ensure the variability of the resource base for the generations to come, while 
accepting the desirability of reconciliation of economic and environmental policy. 
Recognition: maintaining and improving social welfare through the distripution of 
goods and amenities in relation to wants and needs and people's satisfaction. This 
approach involves the recognition of local attitudes and priorities, as these differ .across 
cultures and countries. 
Redistribution: attacking poverty or the causes of poverty because it is one of the 
factors leading to environmental degradation. Rapid population growth with a given 
resource base leads to the over-consumption, and hence to poverty. Environmental 
management is more sustained when the self-sufficiency and security of the poor have 
increased. 
Revolution: some forms of environmental revolution involve increased attention to the 
intrinsic value of nature and the natural process. The interpretation of this approach is 
that if the environment is treated solely as a commodity that exists for human benefit, it 
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leads to unsustainability. This approach to sustainability may seek the rejection of the -i 
predominant human-centred worldview and the adoption of an eco-centric ethic. 
Using this broad concept of sustainable development, it is possible to devise a 
sustainable agricultural management framework. The specific objectives of this 
theoretical framework are discussed in the following section. 
2.1.2. Sustainable Agriculture 
In the 1970s, environmental degradation began to be regarded as a serious problem 
affecting economic growth and society. The natural resource base essential for 
agricultural production has been damaged in many parts of the world. Land degradation, 
·-
deforestation, lowered water quality and rising ground water had had a serious impact 
on people whose lives depend totally on natural resources because they have no 
opportunity for alternative livelihoods. The development of the concept of sustainable 
agriculture appeared in conjunction with the broad concept of sustainable development 
in the early 1980s. These early concepts have evolved into a construct of agriculture 
based on principles of ecological interaction such as the concepts of regenerative 
agriculture and the articulation of sustainable agriculture practices such as· organic, 
alternative, and low-input agriculture (Harwood 1990:3; Schaller 1998:156), although 
these methods have not been applied widely. 
Mainstream definitions of agricultural sustainability recogmse the links among 
agricultural production activities,. the environment, communities, and society at large 
(Blum 1998). Some selected definitions are provided below to illustrate the major ideas 
of the sustainable agriculture concept: 
Sustainable agriculture should involve the successful management of resources to satisfy 
changing human needs while maintaining or enhancing the quality of the environment 
and conserving natural resources. 
(Technical Advisory Committee 1988 cited in ADB 1991:3) 
Such sustainable development (in agriculture, forestry and fisheries sectors) conserves 
land, water, plant and animal genetic resources, and is environmentally non-degrading, 
technically appropriate, economically viable and socially acceptable. 
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(Food and Agriculture Organisation 1990 cited in ADB 1991:3) 
Sustainable agriculture systems are those that are economically viable, and meet 
society's needs for safe and nutritious food, while conserving or enhancing Canada's 
natural resources and the quality of the environment for future generations. 
(Agriculture Canada 1990 cited in ADB 1991:3) 
Because the broad concern of this research is to achieve the goal of sustainable land-use 
management, the sustainability of agriculture is regarded as an essential framework for 
defining the appropriate approaches to this task. This framework, shown in Figure 2.1-
B, has been based on a number of studies of the concept of sustainable agriculture. The 
crucial objective of agricultural sustainability is integrating its three goals: economic 
(increased agricultural production), social ( security of livelihood) and environmental 
( conservation of the natural resource base). The indicators of each system are identified 
below: 
Economic system (agricultural productivity): maintaining and raising .. adequate 
production; providing food of acceptable quality and diversity; and increasing 
productivity in a sustainable manner by developing more productive biotypes, 
maintaining crop diversity and practising rotations. 
Environmental system ( conservation of the natural resource base): use of natural 
resources in a manner that conserves and enhance the quality of the environment; 
minimising or avoiding adverse impacts on the natural resource base of agriculture; and 
maintaining and enhancing the productive capacity of land and related natural resources. 
Social system (livelihood security): improving social equity by achieving greater -< 
equality of access to, and security, of the means of production, such as fertile land, 
credit, and agricultural information between communities, households, men and women, 
and individuals; eliminating poverty by encouraging labour-intensive technologies to 
facilitate employment of the landless in rural areas and developing alternative 
livelihoods for the poor; empowering local people in decision-making processes. 
(Harwood 1990: 13; Firebaugh F.M., 1990: 674; Roberts 1995: 12; Garforth and Harford · 
1997:24; Diesendorf and Hamilton 1997:189; Schaller 1998: 167; Smith and McDonald 
1998:.22-26). 
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As in the framework for sustainable development, these systems depend on and interact 
with one another. Agricultural production can only be sustained on a long-term basis if 
the natural resources upon which it is based, such as soil, water and forests, are not 
degraded or destroyed by inappropriate farming practices or other impacts. On the other 
hand, increased agricultural productivity, and the wealth arising from this, has brought 
with it improvements in the quality of environmental resources. Security of livelihood of 
rural people has also been obtained only when agricultural productivity is sustained over 
the long term. As well, sustainable institutions can encourage farmers to conserve and 
invest in ecological productivity. However, there are trade-offs between the three 
objectives of agricultural development and the level of sustainability will be determined 
by the extent of the integration of the three systems (Barbier 1987: 105). 
It is important to recognised that sustainability does not mean things never change, or 
that given practices or uses must be maintained. Certain types of land use may be 
replaced by new ones, while others are modified or abandoned (Zweifel 1998: 992). The 
basic challenge for sustainable agriculture is to make better use of available biophysical 
and human resources. This can be done by minimising the use of external inputs, by 
regenerating internal resources more effectively, or by combinations of both. Use of 
improved crop varieties, pest control measures, increased farming mechanisation and 
other technologies are alternative ways for sustaining agricultural land. Many productive 
·,. 
and sustainable systems, needing few or no external inputs, have been developed in a 
number of countries. They stop erosion, produce food and wood, and can be cropped 
over long periods .. For instance, the utilisation of the no-tillage system can improve the 
chemical, physical and biophysical properties of soils, altering the rates of land 
degradation and making sustainable agriculture possible (Pretty 1998) .. 
Thus, the challenge in the decision-making process of agricultural development is to 
implement this framework successfully in terms of conservation and management of the 
natural resource base, particularly in agricultural land management -Conservation 
strategies have been established in many countries through environmental policies 
following on from and modifying the broad goal of the World Conservation Strategy 
published in 1980 by the IUCN. 
29 
2.2. Conservation of land resources 
2.2.1. The World Conservation Strategy 
Since the 1870s, as more people realised how quickly and dangerously the vital resource 
base of soil, water, forests, grazing land, and wildlife was being degraded and depleted, 
the beginnings of a conservation movement emerged. Two major schools of thought 
about resource conservation have developed. The preservationist school believes that 
remaining public lands such as forests and wetland areas should be left untouched so 
they can be enjoyed in their present form now and in the future. In contrast, the resource 
conservation school believes that all public lands should be used and managed 
efficiently and scientifically to provide needed resources to people. In other words, 
natural resources should be wisely used to enhance a nation's economic growth and to 
provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people (Miller 1996:37-41). 
In 1980, the IUCN published its World Conservation Strategy (WCS). The aim of the 
WCS was 'to stimulate a more focused approach to the management of living resources 
and to provide policy guidance on how this can be carried out' (IUCN et a/.1980:vi). 
The implied aim of the conservation of irreplaceable environmental resources is 
conservation of the capacity of ecological systems, which provide those -resources 
(Perrings 1996:231 ). Thus conservation is positive, covering protection, maintenance, 
sustainable utilisation, restoration, and enhancement of the natural environment. From 
this comprehensive objective, the specific policies and plans of conservation for each 
natural resource have been guided_ and formed to suit the situation of each nation. 
2.2.2. Land resources and their conservation values 
Generally, an area of land may have a range of perceived values. For a long time, land 
was regarded as the source of potential riches through saleable products of the earth. In 
recent decades, there has been increased demand not only for raw materials from land, 
but also of its services and amenities (Roberts 1995: 15). When the Chinese say that 'the 
soil is the mother of all things', they state simply the importance of agricultural land to 
the life of all living creatures because the quality of the soil has a profound effect on the 
-
health and productivity of a given ecosystem and the environments related to it: 
Soil is a dynamic, living, natural body that plays key roles in terrestrial ecosystems .. • The 
quality of a soil is largely defined by soil function and represents a composite of its 
physical, chemical, and biological properties that (i) provide a medium for plant growth, 
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(ii) regulate and partition water flow in the environment, and (iii) serve as an 
environmental buffer in the formation, attenuation, and degradation of environmentally 
hazardous compounds 
(Doran and Parkin 1994: 5). 
Thus, land resources are valued as wealth-generating materials as well as important 
contributions to the quality of life of both current and future generations (Industry 
Commission 1998: 75). 
Land, water and forests are flow resources, which can be sustained, depleted or 
increased depending on management. One of the severe consequences of development is 
land degradation. This includes soil erosion, loss of organic matter content and natural 
fertility, plus the destruction of the soil's structure, acidification and soil salinity. Some 
land degradation is due to natural degrading processes, some is due to the impacts of . 
human activities, and some to a combination of both types of causes (Barrow 1991 :2; 
van Kooten 1993:216; Roberts 1995:2; Gretton and Salma 1996:29; Diesendorf and 
Hamilton 1997:178). A simple expression suggested by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: 
7) illustrates that land degradation as a result of both natural and human forces may 
restrict or may restore and improve the productive capacity of land. According to this 
formula, land degradation occurs when the results of land management accompanied by 
the natural reproductive processes do not exceed the results of the destructive activities i 
of humans associated with the rate of natural degradation of land. 
Net degradation= (natural degradation+ human interference) -
(natural reproduction+ restorative management) 
(Blaikie and Brookfield 1987: 7) 
Figure 2.2 summaries several natural and anthropogenic causes of land degradation. The 
natural factors responsible for land degradation include soil depth, clay minerals, texture 
of the soil which can be changed by climate, vegetation, parent material, terrain and ; 
hydrology. 
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Figure 2.2. Causes of soil degradation 
Causes of degradation 
. 
I 
Natural factors Anthropogenic factors 
• soil depth 
• clay minerals 
• texture 
farming practices 
sociopolitical 
factors 
• tillage methods • property rights 
• rotations and 
• agri-chemicals enforcement 
• erosion control • government 
practices policies 
• pest control affecting land 
measures use 
Source: Adapted from Lal, R. and B.A. Stewart, 1992. 
However, the rate of land degradation has been greatly accelerated by unsuitable i 
methods of soil and crop management and by other anthropogenic causes such as use of 
agri-chemicals, deforestation, land tenure systems, legislation and other socio-political 
conditions which can be changed by population density, land use, the development of 
infrastructures, and the industrial complex (Lal and Stewart 1992: 3). 
Land degradation results in two types of costs: on-site costs and external or off-site 
costs. On-site impacts include reduction of yields due to degraded soil structure, surface < 
sealing and crusting, and desertification. Off-site impacts can include the eroded soil 
deposited in drainage canals, irrigation ditches or reservoirs, thereby reducing their 
capacity; erosion can also result in changes in the hydrology of catchment areas, which 
can increase flood frequency. In addition, a reduction in output, loss of irrigated lands, 
and increased salt loading on flows and aquifers result from increased water-logging and 
salinity in soils. Excessive application of chemical fertiliser, pesticides and herbicides _ i 
has led to eutrophication in nearby surface waters, some accumulation of phosphates 
and heavy metals in soils, and growing pest resistance and reduction of natural predators 
of pests (Miller 1996: 525-527). 
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Another principal motive for restoring degraded lands or conserving lands is the 
increasing scarcity of prime agricultural land. The unprecedented population growth in 
developing countries, increasing on average by 2.0% per year between 1986 and 2000, 
had a substantial impact on arable land, but more from the need for increased yields. In 
the 15 years to 1986, forests shrank by 125 million hectares, while the farmed areas 
increased by 58.7 million hectares in developing countries (Rowley and Holmberg 1995: 
116). Cropped land did not increase significantly. However, there are few reserves of 
potentially productive arable agricultural land resource in many areas of Asia, Africa 
and South America, especially those close to populated areas (Lal and Stewart 1992:6). 
Moreover, in these places, land resources are unevenly distributed and in many regions 
much of the land is inaccessible, such as too steep to farm, and the soils too shallow for 
settled agriculture. Tree clearing to bring land into agricultural production can have 
severe ecological, environmental and sociopolitical impacts. 
Therefore, planning for land improvement or soil conservation is recognised as an 
important objective of agricultural sustainability. By preventing soil erosion, promoting 
high biological activity of soil fauna, improving soil organic matter content, and using 
effective nutrient recycling mechanisms, soil quality and its productive capacity can be 
restored and improved. However, it is likely that these measures will only be uvdertaken 
effectively if policies with respect to land-use rights and related legislation along with 
policies affecting farming practices accord with the socioeconomic aspirations of 
farmers. 
2.3. Sustainable land use in agriculture 
.£ 
Sustainable and productive land management systems are essential if we are to continue 
to meet the material needs of the world's population (Cornforth 1999: 173). The 
ultimate aim of this research is to formulate an effective approach to sustainable land 
use; in particular, to give farmers appropriate incentives to invest in land improvement. ·1 
As depicted in Figure 2.1-C, the approach to sustainable land use can be illustrated by 
the close linkages between three interdependent factors: 
• agricultural land policies (the land-use rights regime and policies affecting farming 
practices) 
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• the implementation of these policies (institutions and enforcement) 
• farmer responses ( which depend on their aspirations, for perceptions of and 
obligations towards land improvement). 
In this framework, effective and long-term land improvement is an important factor in 
sustainable land use. This goal can only be achieved where these three factors integrate 
with and support each other. The study explores the characteristics of each factor and its 
influence on the investment in and practices of land improvement. The interaction 
between each of these factors is also investigated. 
2.3.1. Sustainable land use 
Sustainable land management, including long-term land improvement, involves using, 
improving and restoring the productive capacity and life-support processes of land by 
minimising soil degradation and enhancing soil quality, thus leaving options for future 
generations. According to Smyth and Dumanski (1994: 374), the definition of 
sustainable land management used during the development of the framework for 
establishment sustainable land management is based on five objectives: 
Sustainable land management combines technologies, policies and activities aimed· at 
integrating socio-economic principles, with environmental concerns so as 
simultaneously to: 
• maintain and enhance productivity; 
• decrease risks to production; 
• protect the potential of natural resources and prevent the degradation of soil and 
water quality; 
• be economically viable; 
• be socially acceptable. 
(1994: 374) 
In order to achieve this objective, sustainable land use must consider three 
interdependent factors: the impact of farmers on land ( ecological sustainability of farm 
activities), the needs and aspirations of land users or farmers ( economic sustainability), 
and the rights and obligations of land users to the land ( sustainable social and political 
conditions). Socioeconomic factors, such as cultural conditions, market conditions, costs 
of labour, and costs of energy and other raw materials, are determined on a local, 
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regional or even global basis. Ecological factors are defined on a farm or local scale, 
regarding specific topographical, climatic, physical, chemical, biological and other 
conditions of terrestrial ecosystems, especially soils (Blum 1998: 181 ). 
Table 2.1. Farm management practices which affect land and water quality 
Condition 
Soil 
Soil nutrients and biological 
activity 
Soil structure 
Soil acidification 
Soil erosion 
Water 
Waterlogging 
Surface water quality 
Less sustainable 
Rotation without legumes; low 
fertiliser use; inadequate 
drainage 
Frequent cultivation; bare fallow 
No lime; plants shallow-rooted; 
excess fertiliser use 
Overgrazing; excess cultivation; 
poor property planning; soil 
exposure 
Heavy traffic; excessive 
cultivation; poor drainage 
Excessive irrigation; bare soil 
surfaces; high pesticide and 
fertiliser use 
More sustainable 
Improved rotations with 
legumes and weed control; 
balanced fertiliser use; adequate 
drainage 
Minimum tillage; stubble 
retention 
Regular liming; use of gypsum 
and deep-rooted perennials 
Low stocking rates; mm1mum 
tillage; plant cover; stubble 
retention; contour banks; strip 
croppmg 
Strategic revegetation; use of 
gypsum and less cultivation; 
drainage plan 
Efficient water use; retention of 
ground cover; low 
pesticides/toxins 
Source: Smith C.S. and McDonald G.T. (1998), after SCARM 1993. 
At the farm level, management practices directly affect the productive capacity of 
agricultural land, and the use of more sustainable farming practices can supplement the 
attributes used in the measurement of farm land and water quality. For example, in 
Australia, the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management 
(SCARM) has defined attributes of land and water quality affecting on-site agricultural 
sustainability, as set out in Table 2.1. The table shows that if agricultural land is 
inappropriately farmed with respect to its suitability for that particular use, this can be 
considered as an indicator of unsustainability at the farm scale. For instance, with 
respect to the control of soil erosion, farming practices such as overgrazing, excess 
cultivation, poor property planning and soil exposure are unsustainable, while 
sustainable practices are low stocking rates, minimum tillage, plant cover, stubble . 
retention, contour banks and strip cropping (Smith and McDonald 1998: 21). 
An approach to preventing soil erosion is to estimate the potential soil loss using the 
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE). The USLE relates soil loss to rainfall erositivity, 
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R; the erodibility of soils, K; the slope and length of the land, SL; a crop factor, C; and 
conservation practices, P. Thus, the USLE is calculated as: 
Soil loss = R x K x SL x C x P 
(Young 1989: 40) 
From this equation, it is clear that the factors relating to vegetation cover (C and P) can 
be significant in reducing or increasing soil erosion risks. For instance, the multistorey 
layers of trees can significantly reduce rates of erosion. The density of canopy, stem and 
surface roots can play an important role in erosion reduction by reducing the velocity of 
rainfall and improving soil structure and therefore the erositivity and surface runoff. 
Many decades of research have consistently shown that the best means of rest9ring and 
improving soil quality and productivity is by appropriate and regular additions of 
organic materials, mainly through use of crop rotations, crop residues, animal manures, 
composts, nitrogen-fixing legumes, and reduced intensity of tillage. 
2.3.2. Property rights 
.,: . 
~ ,; 
When population growth puts pressure on land and other natural resources, associated 
with the absence of technological and institutional innovations, the result is poverty and 
unsustainable use of natural resources (Otsuka and Place 2001: xix). Property rights ,are 
fundamental to the sustainable use of environmental resources. Property rights regimes ;, 
play an important role in the interaction between human and natural systems and hence 
in making agriculture more sustainable. Thus, Hanna et al. (1995: 15) have argued that 
most environmental problems can be seen as problems of incomplete, inconsistent, or 
unenforced property rights regimes. Property rights regimes comprise property rights, 
the bundles of entitlements defining the owner's rights, privileges, duties and limitations 
for use of the resources, and property rules, the rules under which those rights and 
duties are exercised (Bromley 1991: 21 ; Hanna et al. 1995; Tietenberg 1996: 41). The 
natural and human systems will be linked in complementary or conflicting ways as 
determined by the way property rights regimes in a particular context are designed and 
used. According to Hanna (1996: 381), the functioning of property rights depends on 
three fundamental components: 
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• the principles of design on which they are based 
• the mechanisms by which they link the human system to the natural system and 
• the mechanisms by which they coordinate across jurisdictional boundaries. 
Therefore, it is essential to understand that a property rights regime or a resource 
management regime establishes relationships between people because it is a structure of 
rights and duties characterising the relationships of individuals to one another with 
respect to that particular environmental resource (Bromley 1991: 22; Alcorn and Toledo 
1998: 216). Property rights regimes are a subset of a society's institutions, the 
organisational constraints which structure incentives and shape human interactions 
(North 1990). There are, in general, four types of property rights regimes in terms of 
resources management, namely: 
• private-property rights, where an individual or corporation of social group has a 
right to exclude others from using that resource; 
• common-property rights, where a community, either through formal or informal 
mechanisms, controls the intensity, timing and nature of resource use; 
• state-property, where, in order to prevent overuse and/or gain revenue, government 
restricts the way that people may use a resource; and 
• Open-access or non-property resources where rights are undefined or poorly defined. 
(Gibbs and Bromley 1989: 24; Young 1992: 94; Otsuka and Place 2001: 5) 
Table 2.2. Types of Property Rights Regimes with Owners, Rights and Duties 
Regime Type Owner Owner Rights Owner Duties 
Private property individual socially acceptable uses avoidance of socially 
control of access unacceptable uses 
Common property collective exclusion of non- maintenance, constrain 
owners rates of use 
State property citizens determine rules maintain social 
objectives 
Open access none capture none 
(non-property) 
Source: Hanna, 1996. 
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Property rights regimes differ by the nature of ownership, the rights and the duties of 
owners, the rules of use, and the locus of control. Table 2.2 presents characteristics of 
·.-
these four types of property rights regimes, which are ordered loosely along a spectrum 
of ownership (Berkes 1989; Bromley 1989; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990; McCay and 
Acheson 1996; and Hanna 1996). 
Private-property rights are considered as bestowing full and absolute control on the 
owner. The individual or group of owners can make management and investment 
decisions about the use of land and other related natural resources; and thus the benefits 
produced by the property; as well, the costs of maintaining and improving the property 
fall to the owner (Bromley 1991: 24; Bromley 1992: 12; and McCay and Acheson 1996: 
312). Private-property-rights regimes give sanctioned ability to exclude people legally ,, 
and socially. Thus, the State's enforcement of the owner's rights is necessary. According 
to Demsetz (1967) and Furobotn and Pejovich (1972), privatisation internalises 
individual responsibility for the environment and rational use of resources. Therefore 
private-property regimes seem to be attractive because they can provide incentives for 
individuals to develop resources (see Appendix 2.1). 
However, it is argued that under certain circumstances these regimes can also lead to 
resource degradation, the continued existence of externalities and a decline in social 
utilities. As Bromley argued, 'The very strength of private-property regimes in land and 
related natural resources is also, it turns out, its greatest weakness' (1991: 25). For 
instance, (Runge 1992: 18) points_ out that in the developing world, under such regimes 
there has been an overuse of resources, and in many cases may have contributed to even 
more rapid degradation of resources and to incre;ised inequality in already unequal . 1 
distribution of wealth. Furthermore, farmers may not be able to protect their own 
properties if it is costly to exclude other users (Gardner et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990; 
Otsuka and Place 2001). 
Nevertheless, one has to raise questions about the circumstances that would lead 
property owners to allow their asset (land) to deteriorate or be depleted. For example, 
soil erosion, a negative externalities, may arise under the private system when ' 
forestlands are opened up and newly brought into cultivation. Is this outcome a matter of 
poor definition of the property right or poor enforcement of the property right, or has it 
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to do with the policies affecting farming practices that are in place ( output and input 
price policies, or taxation), or is it what seems to be irrationality in the part of the land 
owner? 
In common-property regimes, the group of co-owners or the commune own the property 
with the rights to exclude non-owners from its use and decision making about its use; 
and with the duty to maintain the property through constraints placed on use (Berkes 
1989; Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1991, 1992; Feder and Feeny 1993; Hanna et al. 1995; 
McCay and Acheson 1996; and Otsuka and Place 2001). These ownership groups 
include tribal groups, villages, and neighbourhoods holding customary ownership of 
certain natural resources. Common-property regimes present the claims of a community 
to free and equal access to resources that could otherwise become the property of only a 
privileged few. 
However, two problems may arise in common-property regimes. The first is that a 
breakdown may occur in compliance by co-owners under the pressure of increased 
population, leading to overuse of the resource, which is the beginning of Hardin's 
argument in 1968 about 'the tragedy of the commons'. Secondly, if the interests of the 
community dependent upon common-property resources are disregarded by the state, 
then externalities to common property will not receive the same responses from the 
government as would external threats to private property (Bromley 1991: 28; 
Durrenberger and Palsson 1996: 370). Therefore, common-property regimes can be vital 
when the collective benefit is high, especially when there is a need for avoiding resource · 
depletion. 
In a state-property regime, ownership and control over resource use belong to the state, 
which is the political unit of citizens who assign rule-making authority to a government 
agency. Such an agency has the responsibility to ensure observance of the rules under 
which citizens may be able to make use of the resources, and thereby promote social 
objectives (Bromley 1991: 23; Feder, G. and Feeny D. 1991: 137; Hanna et al. 1995: 
18). State-property regimes are thus potentially able to address the high risk of open-
access regimes by internalising all externalities to a single owner. Problems with both 
efficiency and sustainability can arise in state-property regimes when the incentives of 
bureaucrats who implement and/or make the rules for resource use diverge from the 
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collective interests (Tietenberg 1996: 49). Therefore, in order to be effective, the state 
must be able to monitor the use of resources, establish acceptable rules of use by 
individuals and communities, and enforce those rules. 
Open-access is property open to all and has no assignment of ownership. A property 
right is a secure claim on a future benefit stream; therefore, in an open-access situation, 
there is no property right, but only the opportunity to use the resource (Bromley 1992: 
11). If private property rights are not viewed as being legitimate or are not enforced 
adequately, de jure private property becomes de facto open access (Feder and Feeny 
1991: 137). Under a regime of open-access, where owners have no specified duty to 
maintain the resource, it is likely to be over-exploited (Berkes 1989; Bromley 1989, 
1991, 1992; Ostrom 1992; McCay and Acheson 1996; and Hanna et al. 1995). 
Obviously, open-access regimes contain a high risk of resource degradation. 
Hardin's 'tragedy' often results from institutional failure to control access to the 
resources, and to make and enforce internal decisions for collective use. However, there 
is often confusion in distinguishing between common-property and open-access which 
Hardin identified as when 'freedom in the commons brings ruin to all' (196_8: 1244). 
According to him, in common property rights regime, no one owns the property, it is an 
open-access resource which everyone can exploit as much as they want. Many scholars 
have argued that Hardin's generalisation about the commons was inappropriate (Folke 
and Eerkes 1995: 122). 
McCay and Acheson (1996: 7) also pointed out that many of those promoting 'the 
tragedy of the commons' model have failed to recognise that common-property is 
always of the open-access variety; the users are selfish, unrestricted by the social norms 
of the community; and the users are trying to maximise short-term gains; so the resource 
is being used so intensively that depletion is possible due to over-exploitation. In fact, a 
community, which owns a resource, restricts use to community members. The 
community is likely to care about future as well as present benefits from the property, 
and thus will set limits on resource use to avoid exceeding the rate of regenerating of the 
resource. 
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In order to formulate an appropriate policy of rights and rules, it is crucial to distinguish 
the reasons leading to problems between open-access resources and common-property 
resources (Young 1992: 95). Many studies have questioned Hardin's assumption that 
open-access and common-property are identical in terms of ownership and management. 
As Young (1992: 97) showed in his study of the tragedy of 'the tragedy of the 
commons': 
The simplistic recommendation, which follows from this belief, is that, as far as 
possible, all common-property and open-access resources should be converted into 
privately owned and managed resources. The recommendation is wrong because it 
assumes open-access and common-property resources are identical and fails to 
recognise that people do not make independent decisions in isolation from the 
community that they live in. 
(Young 1992:95) 
Unrestricted entry is the main reason for the problems of open access, whereas tensions 
in the structure of joint use rights adopted by a particular group determine the problems 
arising in the case of common property. These tensions may arise from population 
pressure, changes in political forces, technology and climate (Runge 1992: 19). Otsuka 
and Place (2001: 12) stated that common property right can be open access, if the 
community or a group of users do not manage it or if the resources are truly non-
excludable. More often, the community structures are destroyed because of government . 
interventions. For example, in many developing countries, when government 
nationalised communal forests, the community members felt less obliged to comply 
with state laws as management rights were shifted from the community to the state, and 
an encroachment problem resulted. However, many societies impose well-conceived 
rules for regulating common property resources. Such regimes depend on political 
stability and robust institutions. 
In reality, property rights cannot be clearly categorised as two opposing types, and no 
single type of property rights can be regarded as an effective way to avoid problems of 
resource overuse and degradation. Both effective and ineffective control can exist under 
a variety of arrangements. Effective property rights regimes are well specified; context-
specific, and enforceable (Hanna et al. 1995: 19). According to Young (1992: 105) and 
Tietenberg (1996: 41), for sustainable resource use, a well-defined property rights 
should have a number of characteristics such as universality, exclusivity, transferability 
and enforceability. They argue that entitlements and obligations should be as fully 
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specified as possible and arranged to promote sustainable investment in resource use. 
They suggested that these arrangements depend on the following necessary conditions: 
• Universality - all resources are privately owned, and all entitlements are completely 
specified 
• Exclusivity - the resource rights are allocated exclusively, so that stakeholders have 
a secure right to prevent others from utilising 'their' resource in any way that 
diminishes its value to them 
• Enforceability - property rights should be secure from involuntary seizure or 
encroachment by others; the political system is expected to uphold the 
rights/ obligations 
• Transferability - all property rights should be transferable from one ·-owner to 
another in a voluntary exchange 
• Collateral security - each resource right can be used as security to finance any 
investment associated with the use of that resource 
• Compensation - any modification of the rights/obligations package which 
diminishes the value of the resource and investments upon it is compensated, and 
• Sustainability guarantee - Investors perceive that providing they continue to use the 
resource sustainably, their heirs, assigns and successors will be entitled to use that 
resource in perpetuity 
(Young 1992: 105; Tietenberg 1996: 41) 
These authors also comment that under these conditions, an owner of a resource has a 
powerful incentive to use that resource efficiently because a decline in the value of that 
resource represents a personal loss. However, Tietenberg also argued · that private 
property regimes are not the only possible way of defining entitlements to resource use. 
The other possibilities including state-property regimes and common-property regimes 
can create rather different incentives for resource use. In particular, common-property 
regimes perform to varying degrees of efficiency and sustainability, depending on ·the 
rules which are formed from collective decision making (1996: 43). 
In term of resource management, the structure of property rights regimes, which reflect 
the attributes of both the natural and human systems, is the basis for sustainable use. 
The natural system includes plants, animals and their biophysical environments. The 
human system comprises constructions of economics, culture, and technology. Property 
rights regimes play an important role in the interaction between human and natural 
systems. As the study of Hanna and Munasinghe (1995) shows, 'people interact with 
their environment through property rights regimes embedded in social, political cultural, 
and economic context. The nature of that interaction affects both the quality and 
quantity of environmental resources'. 
. -;· 
The attributes of human and natural systems that reflect in the property right regimes 
will not always be well balanced. In some cases, the property rights regime has been .. 
weighted toward modification of the human system, while in others the property rights 
regime has been weighted toward modification of the natural system. When the property 
rights regime is weighted toward modification of one system, there is an absence of 
feedbacks of interaction between the two systems. The resulting pattern of resource use 
will lead to the short-term maintenance of the human system, and a long-term 
contribution to neither. Thus, in order to maintain the human and natural systems on a 
long-term basis, the property rights regime should coordinate both these systems in a 
complementary way and contain feedbacks through which they interact (Hanna 1996: 
386). 
Without well-defined rights to resource benefits, ownership of benefits is realised only 
upon capture, creating the incentive to exploit the resource as much as possible and as 
soon as possible, leading to the depletion of the resource. In this situation, the future 
claims to resource benefits are unsecured, leading to irrational use of the resource. Thus 
property rights regimes are necessary conditions and regarded as policy instruments in 
sustainable resource management (Bromley 1991: 35; Hanna 1996: 385). However, 
property rights regimes are not a sufficient condition to prevent overuse of resources, 
even where a private property rights regime is established. For example, under pressure 
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of rapid population growth, or under political uncertainty or inappropriate policies, a 
forest can be cleared for agricultural purposes to gain short-term benefits. 
To be effective, property rights must be enforced through the sets of formal rules, which 
should be provided by the government and/or other organisations (Acheson 1994: 9). 
All types of property rights regimes perform differentially in the reducing the costs of 
open-access. Their performances depend on the attributes of the resources, the local 
community, and the specific rules used (Ostrom 1993: 2). Entitlements or rights are 
protected under three different structures of property rules: the property rule, the liability 
rule, and the inalienability rule (Bromley 1991: 43). Property rules structure individual 
and collective choices with respect to the resources. In other words, various types of 
rules can serve to limit user behaviour in the interest of society (Oakerson 1992: 46, 
McCay and Acheson 1996: 23). Ostrom(l 985, 6) has defined these rules as prescriptions 
commonly known and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent 
relationships. Prescriptions refer to actions that are required, prohibited or permitted 
(Rehfus and Gladwin 1994: 109). 
Many studies have shown that in using common resources, more often than not, rules 
exist regarding access and joint use in rural communities (Berkes 1989; Bromley 1992; . 
McCay and Acheson 1996; Berkes and Folke 1998). Nevertheless the most important in 
designing principles of property rights regimes is the definition of the various interests 
of individuals or groups of owners in the resource. Hence, the specification of property 
rules can be formed to ensure that such rights and responsibilities are as congruent as 
possible; and to ensure that the incentive structure of rules reflects the long-term 
sustainability goals for the ecological system (Young 1992; Hanna et al. 1995: 20). 
To be effective, property rights and rules must be enforced by the state or some other 
governance institutions. 
2.3.3. Security of land-use rights 
Land rights are perceived in terms of control: control over access, allocation, and 
transferability of land. Rights to use land may carry with them particular duties, 
responsibilities and obligations. These rights may be vested to the household unit or the 
village. Thus control can be exercised by these groups with the participation of all its 
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members. But in other communities, control may be in the hands of elected leaders, and 
often they are eventually controlled by the state. In all countries of the South-East Asian 
region, governments exercise some control over the ways people use their land. 
However, in practice, the extent of the control and the way they are implemented vary 
between countries (Cleary and Eaton 1996: 2). 
Security of land rights has been defined and measured in various ways. The following 
definition of Place et al. (1994) comprises several key concepts. 
Land tenure security exists when an individual perceives that he or she has rights to a 
piece of land on a continuous basis, free from imposition or interference from outside 
sources, as well as the ability to reap the benefits of labour and capital invested in the 
land, whether in use or upon transfer to another holder. 
There are three important criteria used for the measurement of land tenure security: the 
quality and quantity of the land rights held (breadth) that may include the rights to 
possess land, to grow and harvest crops, to graze cattle, harvest wildlife, gather 
firewood, and extract mineral resources, to build structures on land, to pass on to heirs, 
to sell or lease land to others, and to pledge land rights as security for credit; the length 
of time for which these rights are valid ( duration); and the certainty of the breadth and 
duration of the rights that are held (assurance). A land 'right' which cannot be exerted or 
enforced is not a right at all (Prosterman et al. 1998: 5). 
Secure land rights are an essential component of economic development, and rural 
development in particular. They provide the conditions necessary for land owners and 
land users to invest in agricultural · and land productivity in the long term without fear of 
losing the land or the benefits reaped from the investment. 
2.3.4. Institutions 
Institutional issues relevant to the research question addressed here include property 
rights and also institutionally-related organisations. Institutions thus comprise rules or 
procedures (codes of law or custom) that shape how people act, and roles or 
organisations (specific organisations) that have attained special status or legitimacy. In 
land-use rights regimes, a rule-oriented institution is a system of land tenure, whereas a 
role-oriented institution could be the legal authority established to adjudicate disputes 
arising out of that land tenure system (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 1992: 371). 
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There are several ways of defining institutions. Institutions are organisations or groups 
with sets of rules that govern expected behaviour, sanctions for breaking the rules and 
rewards for behaving in the prescribed manner (F AO 1992). Institutions which embed 
property rights are defined as having a 'set of rules actually used ( the working rules or 
rules in use) by a set of individuals to organise repetitive activities that produce 
outcomes affecting those individuals and potentially affecting others' ( Ostrom 1992 
cited in Berkes and Folke 1998: 5). 
Good performance of natural resource systems is closely linked to robust resource 
management institutions, whether governmental or local, or even non-governmental 
organisations. The common questions facing institutions are: how to control access to 
the resources (the exclusion problem) and how to institute rules among users to solve 
the potential divergence of rational use of resources between individuals in a community 
(the problem of sub-tractability in joint use). Thus the issues that pertain to institutions 
in dealing with natural resources include rule-making, as well as enforcement, dispute 
management, and the formulation of social norms (Berkes and Folke 1998: 5). 
The resource users are dependent on the enforcement and protection of rights by levels 
of governmental management ranging from local, to regional to central government. 
According to Young (1992: 160), the most effective way of enforcing regulations is to 
make resource rights conditional upon compliance with regulations because the whole 
systems of management becomes more self-enforcing and less costly to administer. 
Then, the resource users have an incentive to protect their rights by demonstrating that 
they have complied with existing regulations. Also, it is essential to recognise that 
producing a good fit between an organisation's internal capacity and its_ external 
situation is the task of institutional strategic management (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 
1992: 375). 
Ostrom pointed out that the design principles used by robust institutions are significant 
in redµcing externalities involved in the use of natural resources. Robust institutions 
tend to be characterised by most of the design principles listed in Appendix 2.2. The 
principles are illustrated by long-enduring common property resource institutions 
including: clearly defined boundaries between individuals; congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and local conditions; collective choice arrangements 
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that facilitate participation of individuals in modifying operational rules; monitoring of 
common property resource conditions and appropriator behaviours; graduated sanctions 
that can be applied to appropriators who violate operational rules; conflict resolution 
mechanisms for resolving conflict among appropriators or between them and officials; 
minimal recognition of rights to organise for reducing the challenges between 
appropriators and the governmental authorities in devising institutions; and nested 
enterprises with multiple layers for organising appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities (Ostrom 1993: 2). 
Nevertheless, long-term land improvement will only be undertaken effectively if the 
land tenure system and institutions are appropriate to farmers' aspirations, their 
perception and obligations with respect to land conservation 
2.3.5. Farmers' responses 
The mix of resource characteristics and institutions involved in land-use situations gives 
rise to a wide range of behavioural responses from farmers. Their responses ,.are based 
on economic and political conditions, the environmental incentives inherent in the 
resource and the institutions that govern resource use. Farmers' attitudes toward land 
improvement should reflect not only private concerns, but as much as possible their 
public concerns about resource use, and consequently, may affect their perceptions of 
erosion problems and their conservation activities. 
Land-use rights have an impact on how a farmer treats the land. If land-use rights and 
rules reflect their aspirations as regards, for example, land title, access to credit, and 
equality of land distribution, farmers have strong incentives to invest in sustainable land 
use. As Lutz and Young pointed out: 
It has been hypothesised that the greater the degree of tenure security, the more a 
cultivator is motivated to make investments and adopt production techniques that are 
beneficial to the long-term productivity of the land. 
(1992: 249) 
Participation of farmers in the decision-making process with respect to agricultural and 
property rights policies is necessary to give farmers incentives to become involved in 
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and to contribute usefully to sustainable land use, because farmers have considerable 
·C 
knowledge about their own farm, they know the local history and local conditions, and 
they use that information in their decision-making and management (Vanclay 1997: l3). 
Any resource user will have a certain amount of local environmental knowledge that 
will allow him/her to carry out a particular activity (Eerkes and Folke 1998: 17). Getting 
local farmers involved in this decision-making process can help them to understand 
better the potential benefits and risks of changes in norms and rules that they could 
adopt. Local organisation facilitates the regimes that will provide accurate information 
about natural resource systems, and mechanisms to back up local monitoring and 
sanctioning efforts. Therefore, high transaction and deprivation costs can be avoided. 
In sum, the attitudes or perceptions of farmers reflected in their land conservation 
activities are determined by two sets of factors: the technical factors of temperature, 
rainfall, slope, erosiveness of land and other biophysical conditions on the one hand, and 
-.. 
the institutional factors and other influences on the other hand such as cultural and 
educational factors, and market conditions (see Figure 2.3). Moreover, of these factors, 
institutional factors including property rights regim~s are expected to affect directly the :'J 
farmer's conservation practice behaviour (Coughenour and Chamala 1989: 39). 
The interaction and dependence between three components (Policy-Implementation-
Response) in the conceptual framework of sustainable land use in agriculture (Figure 
2.1) is presented in the next chapters which analyse the causative relationship between 
land tenure regimes and land management in Vietnam. An analytical framework is 
established in order to determine the objectives and directions for those analyses (see 
chapter 3) as well as the data necessary for testing the hypotheses in the study sites (see 
chapter 4). 
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Figure 2.3. Model of conservation practice behaviour 
Human Factors 7. Technical Factors 
Exogeneous Endogerous 
I 
Farmer decision maker a. temperature b. biological 
I .Cultural factors/ rainfall chemical 
norms - ~ slope mechanical ,.. 
-.... 
2. Markets ~ 4. Age Erosiveness physical 
-
-3. Institutions ,... 5. Education 
programs -
,.. 6. perceived profitability of 
experts/ 
conservation practices 
consul tan ts ~ perveived need for erosion 
~ Jl 
control -....... I 
Income 
1 , 
Farm Resources 
Management-Labor-Capital-Land 
8. farm enterprise strategy 
9. farm conservation plan 
' 
1, 
10 a. Production processes Crops - Livestock ~ A 
--
C 
r Resource using practices 
e 11 . Conservation practices 
s 
l , 
10 b. Output I 
sale I 
Source: Coughenour and Chamala, 1989. 
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Chapter 3. Land tenure arrangements and sustainable land 
management: An analytical framework 
The impacts of land tenure arrangements on farmers' behaviour tend to be assumed 
rather than rigorously examined. In particular, the questions of how significant their 
influence is, what aspects of land tenure affect farmers behaviour, and how these 
arrangements affect farmers' attitudes and practices towards land conservation must be 
carefully investigated. This chapter proposes a framework to examine the relationship 
between land tenure arrangements and land management, particularly the role of land 
tenure security in sustainable land management. 
The hypothesis of this study is that farmers' insecurity over their property rights to land 
gives rise to a lack of concern for long-term soil fertility. In the other words, the more 
secure the land tenure is, the more farmers have incentives for investment in soil 
conservation. The discussion focuses on types of ownership, usage rights, and rules and 
responsibilities with respect to land. The analytical framework concentrates on the 
impact of land rights and rules on farmers' attitudes to land management, and to what 
extent well-defined land-use rights and effective implementation of these rights and 
obligations can give incentives for adopting land conservation practices and relieve any 
constraints to land conservation. 
The significance of impacts of land tenure systems on land management attitudes and 
practices likely varies according to socio-economic and political conditions. These 
determine the attributes of land tenure systems such as access to land, land ownership 
types, access to capital, institutional organisation and enforcement mechanisms. Thus ·., 
this chapter begins with an examination of the impacts of land legislation on land 
management. This is followed by a discussion of the implementation of land rights. 
Finally, the discussion leads to the determination of the data necessary to test the 
hypotheses advanced. 
3. 1. Land legislation and land management 
It has been hypothesised that the greater the degree of tenure security, the more a farmer 
is motivated to make investments and adopt production techniques that are beneficial to 
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long-term productivity (Lutz and Young 1992: 249). However, analysis of,, the links 
between land tenure systems and farming systems should specify the effects of a number 
of characteristics of land tenure arrangement on farming practices, such as access to 
land, access to capital, the rights to transfer land and enforcement mechanisms. 
3.1.1. Access to land 
In an historical context 
The linkages between the security of access to land and land management could be 
examined in an historical context, covering for example, the land tenure system under 
colonialism, the land tenure system ( collectivisation) in the communist countries, and 
the outcome of land reforms (long-term individual leasehold and freehold) in many 
countries. The rights of access to land of the different land tenure systems in these 
different situations could have different effects on farming methods and, in particular, 
on land improvement investments. 
Systems of customary tenure have existed for many centuries, reflecting a great diversity 
in degree of communal and individual control over use rights. In customary tenure, 
rights of access to and use of land are rarely documented and there are rarely registered 
certificates of title. The boundaries of land between communities or between individual 
households of a community are usually not mapped but are formed by natural features 
such as rivers, hills, large stones, and trees (Sandin 1980: 14). In this system of land 
tenure, primary forests and uncultivated woodlands are owned communally and 
controlled by an authority such as a village chief, whereas exclusive rights of cultivated 
land are assigned to individual households of the community, and its ownership rights 
are held traditionally by the extended family (Ward and Kingdon 1995: 28; Otsuka and 
Place 2001). 
This communal ownership regime is different to a common property rights regime 
which is defined by the joint use of resources, and where the property-owning groups 
are social units with definite membership and boundaries, with certain common 
interests, some common cultural norms, and often with their own endogenous authority 
systems (Bromley 1991: 26). However, this difference between customary tenure and 
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common property regimes is not recognised in the opinions of some scholars such as 
' 
Johnson (1972), Feder and Noronha (1987), and Feder and Feeny (1993). 
It has been argued that farming practices under customary tenure are often sustainable 
and land held under such tenure has not been seriously degraded, as long as the rate of 
land exploitation for production does not exceed the natural regeneration rate of land 
resources. The customary system is one in which, at least for members of the 
landowning group, land is available as a source of production, and landlessness was 
prevented. The existence of communal controls over the transfer of land minimises the 
risk of its alienation and loss to outsiders. (Cleary and Eaton 1996: 48). 
Numerous scholars (Gibbs and Bromley 1989; Bromley 1991; Feeny, Berkes and 
McCay 1990; Young 1992; Ostrom 1990, 1992, 1993; Hanna, Folke and Maler 1995; 
Hanna 1996; Tietenberg 1996; Berkes and Folke 1998; Alcorn and Teledo 1998) have 
argued that when the land-use rights are allocated exclusively, the owner or group of .. · 
owners will have a secure right to prevent others from using the land in any way that 
degrades its value to them. All members of a community have rights of access to the 
land, to reside within it and to exploit the products of the occupied area. The use right~ 
on portions of the land can be allocated to various individuals or families by the group's 
leaders, or land controllers, or as the result of discussion by the community. In that case, 
usually no other person has the right to use it or to benefit from its produce. 
Shifting cultivation, the farming system which is often associated with customary land 
tenure, features the rotation of fields by short periods of cropping ( one to three years) 
alternating with generally longer periods of fallow and characterised by clearing by slash 
and bum practices. This form of use allows the land to recover its natural fertility by 
being left fallow for a long period. However, this system implies large land-to-people 
ratios. As long as there is no pressure from any change in social, demographic, political, 
· economic and environmental conditions, the cultivators of the community can keep the 
fallow period long enough to recover the natural fertility of the land. Under population 
pressure, for example, agricultural land held by the group will become scarce, and the 
land will have to be managed on a shorter and shorter fallow, with potential for serious 
degradation of land productivity. 
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The greater intensification of agricultural production that frequently follows population 
increase (Boserup 1965) may lead to disputes over use rights to land resources held 
under customary title, and hence to risk of open-access to community-owned land and to 
depletion of the land. Because individuals in the community have no assignment of 
ownership, the structure of joint use rights within the community is broken, and the 
decline of traditional authority systems is likely to affect attitudes to ownership and 
dealings in land. Individual households will tend to exploit the limited land resources 
intensively in order to maximise their own benefits. Thus, higher population densities 
often require a more exact definition of boundaries and land use rights in order to avoid 
the over-exploitation of land resources, leading to individual forms of land tenure. 
Most previous analyses have focused mainly on the relationships between land tenure 
and land productivity through the constraints of customary land tenure -on land ·' 
improvement/protection investment. According to those analyses, because the rights to 
land in this tenure system are based on birth and subsistence needs, this tenure 
arrangement gives little incentive to increase land productivity (Cleary and Eaton 1996: 
48). When land-use rights are inherited only through membership of a kinship or lineage 
group~ and land is not perceived as a freely marketed good, land users have no incentive 
to increase the value of the resources because of the "free rider" problem. Free riders are 'J 
the other members of the group who may take advantage of any land improvement 
investment without paying for its use (Chand and Duncan 1997: 34). Thus there is no 
traditional management-ensured rights of access to land. While the traditional forms of 
management would control access to land held under customary land tenure, the tenure 
system does not encourage investment to raise land productivity. Demands for increase 
productivity due to population pressure, to the need for increased incomes, or to 
opportunities offered by new technology, for example could lead to tension within the 
. i 
community over the tenure system. 
In many countries, land management has been affected significantly by colonialism, 
under which large numbers of peasants had no rights of access to land and there was 
unequal distribution of land among farmers. In the colonial period, people in a 
customary tenure situation were vulnerable to losing their land rights. The colonial ·': 
administrations often intervened in customary tenure arrangements to ensure secure 
individual land title only for external investors and large landowners, people who form 
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only a small portion of the country's population. This system pushed many rural 
smallholders into work as agricultural labourers and many landless peasants into work 
as tenants or squatters under the rules of landlords (Wiegersma 1976; Callison 1983; 
Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Brooks 1990; Cleary and Eaton 1996). For example, in 
many parts of Asia and Africa all uncultivated "waste land" was granted to European 
planters. Shifting cultivators, therefore, were restricted in their access to such land. This 
restriction, and overpopulation, which resulted in part from the new settlers, likely 
caused a reduction of fallow periods, increased vulnerability to drought, and reduced 
yields of land. 
Under the colonial system of many countries, landless peasants, who had no ownership 
rights, could reside upon the farm and use land for cultivation and grazing with the 
consent of the landlords. Payment was made for labour performed, not in terms of the 
value of the output of their work (Brooks 1990). There thus was no incentive for them to 
be concerned about land productivity, as their benefits did not come from the crop yields 
which might depend on the quality of land resources. Tenants who rented small parcels 
of land, often made no effort towards land improvement as they had no legal ownership " 
and could be summarily evicted by the landlords. Further, they typically lacked access to 
investment funds since they had no collateral to offer and their after-rent income was at 
subsistence level because the rent charged to tenants was high; for example, in the Asian 
landlord-tenant system, it is about 50 percent of the total output (Prostetman and 
Hanstad 1990: 107). 
More evidence of the adverse impacts of non-individual ownership title on land ' 
management can also be seen in the collectivisation tenure system. This system of 
tenure existed after the colonialism was abolished in the socialist countries from the 
1950s. Under collectivisation, land was owned by the state. Private ownership of land 
. was abolished. Although the major part of the land was farmed collectively, each 
household was allowed to farm for its own use a small plot of land, which .usually did 
not exceed five per cent of the average collective landholding. The state managed and : 
controlled the use of land through cooperatives. Farmers worked as agricultural 
labourers. Income was distributed to farmers solely on the basis of the work points 
system. Work points were assigned to a farmer according to the length of time required 
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for a job and the difficulty of the work done (Prosterman and Hanstad 1990:108; Brooks z 
1990: 240; Mathijs 1997: 40). 
Prosterman and Hanstad (1990), and Le T.C. et al. (1996) argued that land did not 
belong to the farmers and their incomes were not related to the productivity of the land. 
Farmers had no rights in the crop they produced and it was little matter to them whether 
they produced more or less. Farmers thus had no incentive to be concerned about land 
productivity and passively followed farming practices planned by the cooperatives. The 
analyses of Prosterman and Hanstad (1990), Brooks (1990), Hann (1996) and Mathijs 
( 1997) showed that agricultural lands degraded seriously under this system because 
fields were no longer tended by peasants who knew them and agricultural tasks were 
done by large groups of people and managed by collective authorities who fnay have 
known little about farming. 
When farmers have secure rights to land, they control the use of agricultural inputs and 1 
the farming practices, and there is an incentive for them to invest in agricultural 
productivity and have concern for land fertility. Under collectivisation farmers put effort 
only into their small private plots because they had rights to that land and the output 
· .. 
coming from the land belonged to them. A critical point about these private plots is that 
they helped to keep people in place for the re-emergence of private farming, as 
happened in Viet Nam during the late 1980s (Abrah~s 1996: 13). 
With increased tenure uncertainty, investment incentives are reduced and short-term 
farming practices are preferred. For instance, the study by Barbier (1990) showed that 
farmers in the uplands of Java without security of land tenure, were interested in 
maximising their short-term investments in seed, fertiliser and labour for annual crops 
rather than adopting land conservation practices such as bench terraces and agroforestry. 
Investment in these latter practices requires labour-intensive, material inputs or the 
'waiting' cost of a number of years for growing tree crops. To ensure that they reap the 
benefits from these investments, farmers need secure titles to their land. However, if a 
landlord has an interest in conserving the land, he may have a contract with the renter 
under which the renter carries out this investment as in the share-cropping case. This 
situation is discussed in the next section. 
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Secure land title 
Secure individual title to land thus appears to be important to agricultural productivity 
and sustainable land management. Usually, the landowner has responsibilities to his 
own land, and he may protect and improve land productivity by investing time, effort 
and money into farm operations. However, individual ownership is not necessary for 
investment in protection and improvement of land productivity. For instance, in the 
Asian landlord-tenant system, the landlord leased land in small holdings to cultivators 
who worked the land with their own livestock, and the landlord collected rent from them 
in the form of money or produce either as a share of the crop or as a fixed amount per 
hectare (Warriner 1969: 45). In the case of share copping, both the landlord and tenant 
may have an incentive to increase land productivity as they both could reap the benefits 
from improved farm productivity. 
But tenants without secure contracts were unlikely to invest in the land for fear of 
eviction and the loss of their capital. Also, since the rent, was based on a percentage of 
the average annual crop, rents could be raised legally if the productivity of the land 
increased, even where rent controls were enforced. Thus the tenants did not want to 
invest in land as they could see no benefits from that investment. On the other hand, the 
absentee landlords, who preferred the urban life and conspicuous consumption, often 
had little knowledge of farm operations and less interest in providing technical direction 
of capital investment assistance to their tenants. They also did not want their tenants to 
invest heavily in the land because eviction was more difficult in this situation (Callision 
1983: 11). 
It has been argued that, in many cases, the form of the contract under which farmers -, 
cultivate is even more important in influencing land improvement investment than the 
land title itself (Cheung 1969). Sharecropping and fixed-rent tenancy are typical 
· contracts between a landowner and a tenant. A farm owner or long-term lease holder 
will bear all of the risks as well as the benefits of output variations, while under a fixed-
rent contract all risks are born by the tenant. The benefits from land improvement 
investment will accrue to the landowner or the tenant depending on whether there is a _- i 
short-term or long-term lease and the kind of improvements made (Griffin 1974: 22-6). 
56 
In share cropping, the risks of any investment are shared by the landowner and the 
tenant, with each bearing a share of the risk in proportion to the share of out put. As 
share tenancy is usually insecure and sharecroppers are usually poor, not much 
improvement in land can be expected under this system. In this case, the important 
incentives affecting investment in land improvement will be the costs and benefits of the 
investment and the term of the lease as well as other social and economic factors that 
may affect land investment decisions. The sharecropper will be interested in land 
improvement only if his own share of the increase in returns exceeds the increase in 
costs. Therefore, two ways in which investment can be encouraged are: either the 
landowner invests in land and charges a higher rental share or he requires the tenants to 
invest and charges a lower rental share (Cheung 1969: 26; Amid 1990: 17). 
Insecurity of land title and the concentration of land in a few members are still problems 
that preclude tenants from investing in land. Hardly any farmer who woulg wish to 
invest in land when he is not certain of reaping the fruits of that investment. The 
analysis now turns to the question of whether secure legal ownership or long-term lease 
is a more important determinants land investment decisions. 
Secure land rights enable farmers to exclude others from the land in the current year and 
into the future. Therefore improvements in production capacity which result from 
sustainable farming practices can be retained by individual farmers. When land tenure is 
unclear, the benefits from their investments in land conservation may be lost to others as 
their farmland may be invaded or they may be evicted. This is relevant to Peder's point 
(1987: 17): 
The most obvious effect of lack of secure land ownership is increased uncertainty 
by the farmer as to whether he will be able to benefit from the investments that he 
makes to retain or improve the farm's productive capacity. 
Studies and surveys in China have indicated that farmers with exclusive rights of land 
use made much greater long-term investments in land because they had secure tenure 
and were not subjected to village reallocation. This security of tenure encouraged 
investment in increasing soil quality (the inputs used were phosphates and organic 
fertilisers (Prosterman et al. 1998: 8). 
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The decision to adopt or reject sustainable farming practices depends critically on , 
farmers' planning horizons, and these in tum are determined by the length of the land 
tenure. In many developing countries, the long-term benefits of conservation farming 
may be irrelevant to farmers whose planning horizons are limited by uncertainty of land 
ownership or short-term lease contracts. For instance, the decision of farmers in the 
Philippines to adopt hedgerow intercropping was influenced considerably by the security 
of land title. The benefits from higher, sustained crop yields from hedgerow 
intercropping are likely to be heavily discounted by farmers whose planning horizons 
are limited by a fear of eviction (Nelson and Cramb 1998: 85, 97). 
However, the short-term land leases that limit the farmers' planning horizons do not 
usually affect the adoption of short-term conservation farming. Investments in land 
conservation can provide short-term or long-term returns depending on the different 
sorts of farm inputs. For instance, the planting of perennials is a long-term investment as 
their conservation benefits can only be received years after the investment. In contrast, 
investments in fertilisers, pesticides and seeds have pay offs within a year in terms of 
increased yields (Bunch 2001). In a study of how spatial and temporal characteristics of 
technologies have implications for the relevance of tenure insecurity, McCulloch et al . 
.... 
(1998) argued that tenure insecurity is likely to be less important if costs and benefits 
accrue in the short run rather than over a longer term period. 
·" 
Supporting this argument, Holden and Yohannes (2002) pointed out that the planting of 
perennials, and other long-term production decisions, plays a role in only some farming 
systems, while annual crops and short-term production decisions totally dominate other 
farming systems. Therefore, tenure security may only matter in farming systems where 
long-term production decisions are important. Thus they hypothesised that tenure 
insecurity has more impact on decisions such as tree planting, building of conservation 
structures or irrigation, than on the purchase of fertilizer, seeds and other inputs that = • 
provide short-term returns. The discussion of this thesis will focus on the long-term 
investments in soil conservation. 
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3.1.2. Rights to transfer land 
Holding the rights to possess and use agricultural land may still not be sufficient 
conditions for farmers to carry out long-term land investments as they may still be 
unable to inherit, sell, lease out and mortgage these rights. Analysis of the impact of 
codifying land-use rights on land management should not consider only the issue of the 
use rights, it should also analyses the linkage between the rights to transfer land-use 
rights and the incentives for land conservation investment. 
Under customary land tenure, the cultivators of the community hold use rights (usufruct) 
only, and there are no rights to alienate or permanently transfer land out of the 
community (Cleary and Eaton 1996: 45; Ward and Kingdon 1995: 36; Ward 1997: 21). 
This situation became more extreme in the collectivisation system, in which there were 
no individual rights of using and transferring land. The absence of any registered title to 
land and transfer rights over that land provides no guarantees for customary landowners 
to retain the benefits from improvements, and the rights to improvements may be 
disputed (Cleary and Eaton 1996: 48). 
When land has value as collateral, or as an asset that can be leased or sold, it enhances 
farmers' attitudes towards improvement of the land's productive capacity. Besley (1995) 
pointed out that the link between rights and investment comes via enhanced 
possibilities for gains from trade. If land title can be sold, land prices will reflect the 
value of conservation improvements and an individual farmer will be able to obtain the 
value of any undepreciated investment in terms of a higher price when the property is 
sold. For example, the pricing model of Miranowski and Hammes (1984) estimated that 
a one-unit reduction in potential erosion on Iowa farmland increased the value of 
farmland by $5.70 per acre. Thus the rights to sell title to the improved land can lead 
farmers to make long-term investments in conservation practices. 
.d 
Possession of a land title can guarantee farmers access to land but does not necessarily 
mean they can inherit, sell, lease or mortgage their land or land-use rights. Restrictions 
on these rights, therefore potentially constrain land conservation practices. If land-use . 
rights cannot be sold or leased out or mortgaged, farmers are limited in their ability to 
access external sources of funds which may lower investment in the land. Moreover, if 
59 
land can be inherited by their descendants who may be less committed to farming than 
their parents, selling or leasing enables such persons to make way for farmers willing 
and able to put more resources and effort into the land. 
According to Alchian and Demsetz (1973), the freedom from expropriation is very 
important for investment decisions. Individuals do not invest if the fruits of improved 
land productivity from their investments are seized by others, as they would be if they 
are not permitted to sell or rent out their land after making investments. This hypothesis 
is supported by the fact that more individualised rights - in particular, the rights of sale 
and the use rights it implies - are associated with a higher propensity to make 
investments in land, because when individuals have full rights over a piece of land, they 
will be able to protect their claim to the land (Feder et al. 1988; Migot-Adholla et al. 
1991; Hayes et al. 1997). 
The adverse relationship between restrictions on land transfer and improvement in land 
productivity has been found worldwide in the different land tenure systems. In the 
system of customary land tenure, which exist in many countries of Africa and South 
America, the rights to transfer land within a community or to outsiders have commonly 
been limited (Fabiyi 1974; Migot-Adholla et al. 1991; Heath 1992; and Besley 1995). 
There were no rights to transfer land in the collectivisation system, which existed in the 
Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union and some Asian countries (Brooks 1990; 
Wenfang and Makeham 1992; Kung and Liu 1997; and Prosterman et al. 1998, 2000). 
This inalienability of land constrains individuals or groups from investment in land 
improvement. In contrast, in Thailand, which granted land titles with the full rights of 
land transferability, investments in long-term land productivity have increased (Feder et 
al 1988). 
However, the impact of restrictions on land transfer rights on land investment is not 
always significant. In some cases, other factors such as household characteristics, the 
nature of credit and land markets, or enforcement mechanism may have more important 
effects on land productivity investment than land transferability factor. 
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3.1.3. Access to credit 
Investment in land improvement will generally require access to capital for materials, 
labour and other inputs. Therefore access to credit is very important to the individual 
farmer. It is hypothesised that land rights and access to credit are interlinked: the higher 
the degree of security of tenure, the greater the creditworthiness of the farmer and 
therefore the better the access to credit. In land tenure systems such as customary, 
colonial and collectivisation tenures, farmers faced many difficulties in terms of access 
to credit as they did not have legal land title, the rights to transfer land-use rights, and 
the protection of their rights. These are crucial conditions for gaining access to credit. 
The transformation of environmental, social, political and economic and technological 
conditions in the customary-owned areas may induce landowner groups to wish to invest 
in productivity improvements. However, such investment is difficult, as customary 
landowners face problems in obtaining credit. In the system of customary tenure, land-
use rights are usually not accepted as collateral by lending institutions as the land cannot 
be permanently alienated outside group ownership, and therefore the lending institutions 
cannot claim the land in the event of default of the loan. 
In the colonial system, smallholders, who had the majority of rights in the land, had 
difficulty in making long-term capital investments in the land because the rules of the 
colonial governments usually only protected landlords' rights. The smallholders 
mortgaged their land to moneylenders or landlords, usually for working capital rather 
than for long-term investments. But still they faced the risk of losing their land to 
moneylenders or landlords due to inability to repay the loan as a result, say, of the lack 
of capacity to hedge against fluctuating market prices. Eventually, they became tenants 
or landless labourers (Wiegersma 1976: 14). 
Many land tenurial analyses point out that secure title is expected to facilitate farmers' 
access to cheaper, longer-term and more extensive credit (Wai 1957, Sacay 1972; 
Domer and Saliba 1981; and Feder 1987). For commercial or formal bank loans, 
possession of a land title is often a mandatory precondition because land has several 
attributes that make it a desirable asset for use as collateral. For example, a secure land 
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title may provide easier access to credit, when credit is sought from lenders who do not 
have personal knowledge of the potential borrowers. 
Compared to its role in the formal credit market, security of ownership over collateral 
play less significant roles in the informal credit market in which the lending decision is 
usually based on personal familiarity and the lender has alternative means of enforcing 
repayment, such as social pressure (Feder 1987: 18). However, secure title is still an 
essential condition for credit access by poor farmers who cannot afford the high interest 
rates of loans from the informal credit market. It has been shown that informal credit 
typically is much more expensive than formal credit and it is confined mostly to short 
term loans of relatively small amounts. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that land title insecurity causes lower farm and land 
productivity because investment incentives are absent and access to credit is limited 
(Domer and Saliba 1981). Evidence from many rural areas has shown that when land 
can be used as collateral for borrowing money on a long term basis from the banks or 
private lenders, farmers invest more in improvement of agricultural land (Feder and 
Onchan 1987; and Heath 1992). For example, in Mexico the ejido (community) land 
parcels are less productive than private farms because the owners of private farms can 
access credit more easily as they can use their land title as collateral for loans from 
commercial banks (Heath 1992: 701). 
Nevertheless, others (Feder and Onchan 1987; and Cleary and Eaton 1996) have argued 
that the limitations on mortgaging customary land may avoid the worst consequences of 
rural indebtedness and landless situations as cultivated lands can be confiscated if 
farmers cannot repay the mortgages. Further, the informal credit market may be well 
developed in some villages, and abundant credit may be available from traders who base 
their lending decisions on their personal familiarity with farmers rather than requiring 
collateral. Therefore, the question that needs to be resolved in this study is whether the 
mortgage of land-use rights or other financial assistance available to the households or 
the combination of both may be better solutions for access to credit. 
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3.2. Enforcement mechanisms and land management 
It is hypothesised that to promote sustainable land management, land legislation must be 
implemented effectively through the full enforcement of the rights and obligations set 
out in the law. The analytical framework presented here thus focuses on the question of 
how rights and obligations can be fully enforced and whether, when regulations are fully 
complied with or enforced, they can help to protect the land-use rights that encourage 
farmers to practise sustainable land management. 
Land rights are fully enforced when the related institutions are robust. After land use 
rights are codified, they can be exercised under a set of rules. Young (1992) has 
recommended that the most effective way of enforcing regulations is to make resource 
rights conditional upon compliance with regulations. The whole system of management 
then becomes more self-enforcing and less costly to administer. The resource users have 
an incentive to protect their rights by demonstrating that they have complied with the 
existing regulations. 
This recommendation is regarded as an appropriate guide for land management 
institutions because, when land-use rights and obligations are matters of the land users' 
interests, and the land users themselves are enforcers, they will fully comply with the 
rules they make for the use of their land. Therefore, land-use rights will be protected. 
For instance, legislation of pastoral land leases in South Australia guarantees that any 
lessee who has complied with the covenants and conditions, which require the land to be 
used on a sustainable basis, can be offered land-use lease in perpetuity. The pastoralists 
thus comply with the rules enforcing environmentfll security, in order to obtain land 
rights security (Young 1992). 
For self-enforcement there must be incentives to encourage cost-effective 
administration, as the land rights can then be administered on a competitive user-pays 
basis that covers annual fees for lease renewal or general administrative expenses. 
Transaction costs and monitoring costs are also reduced. Ostrom supported this analysis 
by her argument that self-monitoring mechanisms lead to dual enforcement because no 
appropriator organisations can hire enough guards to oversee all the boundaries of 
common land resources and all of the activities of land users. Land users as the effective 
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"public eyes" can monitor more of the area than official guards could ever see (Ostrom 
1992: 306). 
The long-serving village institutions in Japan described by McKeen (1992) illustrate this 
clearly. To govern their common lands, an administrative innovation of the Tokugawa 
regime helped to enforce the village rules. In this collective responsibility system, 'all 
individual were members of a five-man group and were equally responsible and liable 
for payment taxes, obedience to the law, and rule violations by fellow members' 
(McKeen 1992: 70). Thus this system of collective responsibility created an enormous 
internal incentive for land users to solve their problems. This self-enforcing process is 
an efficient way to produce the compliance of people with the rules governing the 
common lands. The evidence of failure of enforcement system without self-enforcement 
has been demonstrated in the collectivist systems in which the land-use rights and 
obligations were not a matter of the interest to land users. Instead, those rights and 
obligations were in the form of commands from the central governments. This type of 
enforcement system gave no or little incentive for land users to comply. 
The enforcement mechanisms in each tenure system have significant impacts on land 
management. An advantage of customary tenure is that communal controls over land 
may serve to protect resources and people from over-exploitation, as an identifiable 
group of users holds the rights and responsibilitie~ for the use of the land resources 
under the invisible bodies of rules and regulations (McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 
1990; Oakerson 1992; Bromley 1992; and Berkes et al.1998). Rights to particular 
resources within the land held by the community are defined and allocated to insiders, 
while they are restricted for outsiders. These traditional corporate systems of 
enforcement can reinforce a unified approach to land management decisions and offer 
individual households the freedom to benefit from differential, individual access to land 
_ held within the community (Alcorn and Toledo 1998: 220). 
The community members are the allocators and enforcers of rights to land within the 
boundaries of the community. They are also obliged to comply with the rules and 
obligations of the community. They can use locally-adapted resource management 
systems, which are based on the knowledge and experience of the resource users 
themselves (Berkes and Folke 1998: 13). Oakerson (1992: 47) also pointed out that the 
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institutional arrangements in communities promote sustainable land management as the 
operational rules of co-owners can protect individual shares in the yield of the land 
resources and also protect the total yield of the land resources. Gupta's argument, which 
supports the analysis, portrays the efficiency of the self-governing system of the 
customary institution arrangement as follows: 'As long as rights in land were governed 
by rules and customs which prevented the emergence of great disparities in wealth and 
income and conflicting rights over land within the village, the system of self-
government remained efficient' (1964: 105). 
However, as with any land tenure system, the protection of the communal tenure system 
by the state is necessary to avoid land disputes between the commune and outsiders. 
Unsustainable land use often develops when traditional tenure systems are weakened by 
lack of state support. For example, deforestation is a frequent outcome of the illegal 
extraction of a community's resources by outsiders when communities' rights have been 
uninformed or are not enforced by the state and therefore the communities fail to seek 
state assistance or is not provided assistance to fend off this over-exploitation. Thus it is 
necessary to examine whether a better recipe for sustainable management of communal 
land is the combination of customary tenure and the support of the state. 
Effective enforcement depends also on the administrative systems that govern the 
regulations. If the administrative structure is organised to implement land legislation 
effectively, setting the operational rules based on the interests of land users and local 
conditions with participation or coordination of land users, the regulations will be fully 
complied with and in tum the land use rights can be protected. The key discussion point 
for this analysis is what characteristics of the administrative system could be changed to , 
avoid disruption of local institutions by government intervention and to complement the 
local institutions. 
In many developing countries, the lack of administrative capacity to implement 
government policy and the lack of a comprehensive system of registration or 
documentation of rights is often a source of frustration to the landowners because of the 
resulting conflicts of interest between them or between landowners and governmental 
officials. For example, in Thailand, where the land law enacted in 1954 provided a 
certain level of security of land rights such as provisions for transferable title that could 
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be used as collateral, there were documents and procedures for the registration of such 
transactions. However, major deficiencies in the legislation and its administration 
remained. The lack of central land-title offices, precise descriptions of the boundaries of 
the land, and the lack of the administrative capacity needed to record land titles and 
cadastral surveys led to disputes over ownership that could not be easily resolved 
(Thomson et al 1992: 147). 
The lack of a appropriate institutions can also lead to difficulties in resolving the 
problem of land fragmentation. The fragmented distribution of land is now widespread 
in many developing countries as the result of inheritance over many generations. The 
fragmentation of land gives rise to problems such as high labour costs, land loss, high 
transportation costs, limitations on access, unsuitability for modern equipment, and 
forgone improvements to irrigation, drainage and soil conservation. Consolidation of 
farmland may encourage farmers to apply more efficient farming practices. However, 
consolidation programs are likely to take a long time to complete, and they req~ire 
considerable human capital and well developed cad~stral and land titles (Binswanger et 
al. 1993: 75). 
Thus in this section of the analytical framework, issues of rule making, administrative 
systems and the resolution of disputes over land management are examined. The 
analysis examines how well the rules are obeyed, how well the threatened penalties 
discourage violations, how effectively the rules are enforced, and who has the 
responsibility for those tasks. 
3.3. Summary of the analytical framework 
Arising from the above discussion of the analytical framework, a number of key issues 
will be explored in this study. These issues are summarised below: 
A. Impacts of land ownership types on land management 
The rights of access to land are essential to farmers. Land may be owned by farmers, or 
rented from landlords under long-term or short-term leases. Each types of land title has 
impacts on land management. The relationship between land tenure and farming 
practices is complex and influenced by the economic, environmental, and social 
organisation, people-land ratios, and technological factors. Although less important in . 
some cases, the absence of land title or land registration and insecurity of title are 
problems that inhibit tenants from investing in land. Granting private freehold or long-
term lease titles to individual farmers may increase incentives for land conservation 
_ investments. Secure, long-term land title is a prerequisite for farmers to ensure their 
rights to possess and use land in the long term, and hence invest in maintaining and 
improving soil quality without fear of risk of future income loss, especially the loss of 
investment benefits. 
B. Impacts of the rights to transfer land on land management 
Registered land title can only ensure the long-term use of land but may not lead to 
increases in the value of the land through farmers investing in increasing land 
productivity, if they cannot inherit, sell, or lease out the rights to use the land. 
Restrictions on the rights to transfer land potentially constrain land conservation 
practices because farmers are limited in their ability to access outsider income sources 
which may lower investment in the land. It is important to take into account that the 
transfer terms, rules, transfer taxes and other standardised forms governing the land 
transfer process may facilitate or constrain the allocation of land into the hands of the 
most efficient users. 
C. Impacts of access to credit on land management 
When farmers can mortgage their land-use rights to borrowing money for investment 
from formal financial sources, they can avoid the higher interest rates charged by 
informal sources. They can usually also borrow on a longer-term basis. This study 
examines the argument that when land can be use as collateral for borrowing money on 
a long-term basis from the banks or private lenders, farmers invest more in improvement 
of agricultural land. 
D. Impacts of enforcement and administrative system 
Rights to use land can only be implemented effectively through appropriate 
enforcement. The protection of land-use rights encourages sustainable land 
management. Self-enforcement may the most effective mechanism because it 
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encourages cost-effective administration and when land-use rights and obligations are 
matters of the land users' interests, and the land users themselves are enforcers, they will 
fully comply with the rules they make about the use of their land. If the administrative 
system is robust and the administrative structure is organised to implement land 
legislation effectively, setting the operational rules based on the interests of land users 
and local conditions with the participation of land users, the regulations will be fully 
complied with, and thus the obligations of protecting land will be carried out. 
These key issues have been examined in four provinces of the northern Vietnam. The 
social, economic and agricultural characteristics of these· areas are described in the next 
chapter. The methodology of data collection and of farm-household survey is also 
presented in this part of the research. 
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Chapter 4. Research Sites and Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
The study area is the northern part of Vietnam, which covers half of the country's area 
and reflects a range of social, economic, cultural and environmental characteristics. The 
transformations of agrarian policy and land tenure regimes in this region have occurred 
simultaneously with the changes in the politics of the country. Over the years there has 
been a transition from a small-scale, mono-cultural, and self-sufficient agriculture to a 
large-scale, multi-cultural, intensive and commercial agriculture. 
Land allocation has changed in parallel with the changes in agricultural management. 
Privatisation of land ownership in the colonial period was initially replaced in 1956 by a 
collectivist system, and then it was reformed again to the current system of land lease 
held by individual households. Agricultural land management and farming-· practices 
have changed along with the different historical periods. For decades prior to the recent 
land reform, land was seriously degraded. From 10 years ago, farmers have started to 
practise more soil conservation and other sustainable farming actions. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, this dissertation addresses the causative 
relationship between the changes in land tenure arrangements and farmers' attitudes to 
land management in the northern part of Vietnam. The first part of this chapter presents 
a picture of agricultural development and the transformation of land tenure 
arrangements as well as the changes in land management in North Vietnam. The survey 
conducted to collect data for the analysis is described in the next part. 
Several forms of data collection such as questionnaires, interviews, documentary 
surveys, and participant observation were undertaken during the fieldwork which was 
carried out in the study area from July to December 2000. The information collected for 
the research included primary data, and secondary data at local, regional and national 
levels. Questionnaires were used for interviews with fami-households, the local and 
central government officials and scientists. Four north Vietnamese villages were 
selected for the survey. These villages are located in four provinces which present 
typical features of agricultural development and land tenure systems, and differ from 
each other in several social, cultural and economic characteristics. Thuy Dien village in 
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Vinh Phuc province and Bai Yen village in Hoa Binh province present characteristics of 
the midland and highland regions. Whereas My Giang village in Ha Tay province and " 
Co Cham village in Hai Duong province present characteristics of the Red River Delta 
which is typical of lowland areas. 
4.2. Research Sites 
4.2.1. Overview of northern Vietnam 
The total area of Vietnam is 33 .3 million hectares, three-quarters of which is mountains 
and hills. Vietnam is conventionally divided into seven agro-ecological regions: North 
Mountain and Midland, Red River Delta, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, 
Central Highlands, Northeast South, and Mekong River Delta. The Northern part of the 
country covers 25 provinces from the North Mountain and Midland (NMM), the Red 
River Delta (RRD) to the North Central Coast (NCC) regions (see Map-Figure 4.1 ). 
With a total area of 16.7 million hectares, North Vietnam comprises 50 per cent of the 
total national territory, and has a population of over 36 million. Population density 
differs between the three northern regions. The RRD is Vietnam's most populous and 
intensively cultivated region, with a population density of about 1124 person/km
2 while 
the population density of the NMM region is about 120 person/km2 and that of the NCC 
is 190 person/km2 (General Statistics Office - GSO 1997: 73). 
The North is characterised by enormous cultural diversity and has many ethnic groups. 
The Red River Delta is occupied m_ostly by the ethnic Vietnamese or Nguoi Kinh, while 
the Northern Highlands area is home to 31 of Vietnam's 54 officially recognised ethnic 
groups, known as ethnic minorities or Nguoi Dan Toe. Until the late 1?50s, the 
midlands were mostly sparsely populated by minority groups. However, following the 
defeat of the French colonial forces in 1954, the Vietnamese government began a 
program to resettle Kinh people from the Red River Delta into the less-crowded 
midlands and highlands (Le T.C. et al. 1996: 6). 
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Figure 4.J: Vietnam's .Agro-Ecological Regions Map 
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The North Mountain and Midland occupies 10.3 million hectares of land, with a 
population of 12.4 million, and comprises a large area of poor, infertile, light-coloured 
soil, with mountains, plateaus and hilly lands. Tea, coffee, peanuts, cassava, mulberries, 
maize, and buffalo are farmed in this region. Tea is the main cash crop and accounts for 
some 60 per cent of the region's production. The Red River Delta occupies 1.2 million 
hecta~es, with a population of 14.1 million and comprises the most fertile northern soils. 
Some 90 per cent of this area is cultivated; the main agricultural products are rice, 
maize, sweet potatoes and cassava. The North Central Coast occupies 5 .2 million 
hectares, with a population of 9.7 million and consists mostly of hills and mountains. 
There are narrow coastal deltas, sand dunes and estuaries flats which account for about 
20 per cent of the total area. The region lies in a typhoon belt and is subject to storms 
and torrential rain. The main agricultural products are rice, maize, coconuts, peanuts, 
kenaf flowers, citrus fruits, pineapples and peppers (Lam M.Y. 1993: 17; and Goletti 
and Minot 1997: 143). 
4.2.2. Agricultural development in the region 
Agriculture plays an important role in Vietnam's economy as it defines the lives of more 
than 10 million households and accounts for more than a third of the country's gross 
domestic product and total export earnings. Over 80 per cent of the population live in 
rural areas. Of these 70 per cent rely exclusively on agricultural pursuits, another 20 per 
cent combine agricultural pursuits with other forms of rural employment. The total 
workforce in rural areas is about · 27 million, of which 22.2 million is engaged in 
agriculture. The Red River Delta of the northern region is one of the essential 'rice 
bowls' of the country. Food crops, industrial crops, livestock and aquatic products have 
also contributed a large proportion of GDP (National Assembly Complex 1995: 2). 
According to World Bank estimates, agricultural growth led to a reduction of poverty 
· from over 70 per cent in the mid-l 980s to around 50 per cent in the early 1990s (Chung 
1997: 63). 
From a historical point of view, the development of agriculture in the region can be 
divided into the following major stages: 
• Prior to 1945: Agriculture in the French colonial period 
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• 1945 to 1957: Agriculture in transition to Collectivisation 
• 1957 to 1988: Collectivisation period 
• 1988 to present: Renovation (1981 to 1988 is Agriculture under Contract 100; 1988 
to present is Agriculture under Resolution No 10 and then under the 1993 Land 
Law). 
(Nguyen S.C 1995; Le T.C. et al. 1996) 
The French colonised Vietnam from the nineteenth century to 1945. Shortly after their 
conquest, the French colonists made great efforts in agriculture sector. These efforts 
included hydraulic projects aimed at the conservation and development of rice fields, 
clearing woodlands for cultivation, and the creation of organisations and agricultural 
service agencies to study the capacities of local agriculture, to provide farmers with 
better techniques and financial assistance. All of these efforts to exploit and develop 
Vietnamese agriculture led to there being no arable land available for expansion of 
cultivation. However, in addition to rice, com, one of the most important foods in the 
North, was planted extensively. The amount of land devoted to the French plantations 
also increased considerably, resulting in the starvation of a vast number of peasants who 
did not have an assured food supply even though they tried to cultivate all available 
lands (Pham C.D. 1985: 8-22). 
After the defeat of the French in 1945, the economy of the country was based on 
agriculture with a small share of industry. Agriculture attracted over 90 per cent of the 
labour force and generated over 60 per cent of national income. With agricultural 
production not yet restored and starvation presenting, in 1946 the French invaded 
Vietnam once more. During the nine years (1945-1954) of resistance against the French, 
agriculture and other economic sectors did not receive appropriate levels of investment. . 
From 1954, after the war ended and peace was restored in the North, agriculture grew 
relatively quickly, food output recorded an increase of 57 per cent and there was a 
surplus for export in 1956 and 1957. This development led to improved income and 
living standards for farmers (Nguyen S.C. 1995: 66-70). 
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After 1956, agriculture in the North entered a stage of collectivisation which is 
represented by the cooperative system. The initial step was to establish assistance teams 
and production teams and set up small-scale experimental and low-grade agricultural 
production cooperatives. In 1959, the North began a high level of agricultural 
cooperatization. The rural labour force was organised by specialised production teams 
such as soil preparation teams, seed preparation teams, irrigation teams, transportation 
teams and pig raising teams. A form of piece work was practised in the specialised 
production teams, whereby farmers were only responsible for their contract work and 
received work points for what they had done, without concern for productivity, crop 
yield and animal output. 
Collective production led to some progress in agriculture through the improvement of 
the irrigation system, the introduction of new varieties, and rehabilitation of the rural 
transport network. However, many important parts of agricultural production did not 
show an increase and some even declined. For example, food output declined by over 
one million tons from 5.7 million tons in 1954 to 4.7 million tons in 1960 and 
agriculture's share in national income fell by 2.8 per cent (Nguyen S.C. 1995: 71; and 
Pham X.N. et al. 1999: 78). 
In 1981, the whole country faced economic recession in general and agricultural decline 
in particular. As a result, a form of contract was applied to some crops by some 
agricultural production cooperatives in Vinh Phuc and Hai Phong. This change was 
supported by farmers. This "contract 100" had not yet become the new model of 
agricultural organisation and management. At this stage it was only an improved form of 
transformation from production teams into product contracts for farming households. 
This was the first time since agricultural collectivisation was introduced in 1957 that the 
region recorded a higher food output growth rate than the population growth rate, 
. leading to a small increase in food output per capita. 
Nevertheless, the results gained under this contract were not sustainable. Agricultural 
production started declining. There was a fall in per capita food output in the North m 
1986 and 1987 from 245.6 kg to 238.8 kg, the lowest level since 1981. This decline was 
partly attributed to unfavourable weather but ma~y to the cumbersome management .,. 
apparatus of cooperatives. Prolonging the working day to claim more work points was 
74 
very popular, thus making farmers return contract land to the cooperatives because their 
economic interests were hurt. 
The internal management of cooperatives had many irrational facets such as increasing 
contributions to funds, unstable contractual levels, cheating in labour records and 
increases in contribution levels to the government. In many cooperatives, the output 
belonging to farmers only accounted for 20 per cent of contracted output. This poor 
performance held back the agricultural growth rate, especially the food production 
growth rate (Nguyen S.C. 1995: 87; and Nguyen N.H. 1998: 3). 
Having drawn practical experience from various localities, once again the government 
issued Resolution No.10 on the renovation of agricultural management on 5 April 1988. 
This important resolution marked the beginning of a new renovation stage in the 
country's agriculture and rural areas. The result was agricultural growth at a higher and 
more stable rate than in previous years. Food output was not only adequate for domestic 
consumption, but also available for export. Production developed and farming 
households' income and living standards improved. In this period, ownership, 
management and distribution relations were adjusted. 
Through the contract format, farming households could know their share of output at the 
beginning of the production cycle. This encouraged households to invest more capital 
and labour in order to improve their income. Farmers were allowed to enjoy 40 per cent 
of contracted output but were obliged to pay an agricultural tax. The obligation of 
selling crops at a low price was abolished and any surplus was allowed to be traded 
freely. 
However, these were only initial achievements, and new contradictions and difficulties 
arose. After the introduction of Resolution No. 10, land, forests, sea, and labour 
. resources were not efficiently used. The rural economic structure had been heavily 
· biased towards pure agriculture, paddy monoculture, and self-sufficiency, and animal 
husbandry developed only slowly. This contractual mode led to the division of land into 
small areas. Land, capital, experience and labour of both poor and richer farming 
households was wasted and the average crop yield was reduced because of the 
"egalitarian land plot" (Nguyen S.C. 1995). 
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The 5th Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam was convened in early June 1993 with an agenda of further renovating and 
developing rural society and the economy. Resolution No. 5, an outcome of this 
conference, was advanced compared to the Resolution No. 10 because it extended land 
users' rights to five rights and focused on the issues of rural economic structural 
improvement on the basis of the development of rural industries and services and crop 
diversification. Moreover, the resolution also affirmed the long-term existence of all 
economic sectors in rural areas with the renovation of cooperatives and state owned 
enterprises. Individual activities and the private economy were to be encouraged. 
Agricultural productivity improved greatly in the Renovation period. Per capita food 
production and exported rice in the 1993-95 period increased by 17.5 per cent, 
compared to a 9 per cent increase in the period 1989 to 1992. The quality of food for 
domestic consumption also improved, along with the requirements for the market. 
Progress was also recorded in the production of industrial crops, fruit trees and 
vegetables. Large scale and concentrated zones for growing sugar cane, ground nut, tea 
and vegetables, combined with processing and selling facilities, were developed. 
Although the share of agriculture and forestry in GDP decreased from 39.9 per cent in 
1992 to 28.7 per cent in 1994, its absolute value increased from VN dong 37,5-00 billion 
to VN dong 48,800 billion (Nguyen S.C. 1995: 102-113). 
In the years of Renovation, agriculture has attained very important achievements, 
basically ensuring food security, and economic, political and social stability, as well as 
contributing to pulling the northern region out of the chronic economic crisis that it had 
been in since the 1960s. However, there have appeared new challenges and conflicts in 
the agricultural sector. The key challenges are increasing agricultural productivity and 
farm income, moving from food self-sufficiency to food security, stimulating non-farm 
. rural employment, and managing natural resources sustainably. The constraints of land 
allocation and agricultural credit are crucial obstacles in the development of ~griculture. 
The next section describes the changes in land use and the land tenure system of the 
region. 
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4.2.3. Land tenure systems in North Vietnam 
The important changes in agricultural and rural devel9pment in North Vietnam have 
been the changes in land allocation policy, land use patterns and farming practices. In 
each peridd of agricultural development of northern Vietnam, the land tenure system 
matched the economic and political conditions of the time. Thus the land tenure systems 
of the region can be categorised into the following historical periods: prior to 1945, 
1945 to 1957, 1957 to 1981, 1981 to 1988, and 1988 to the present. 
Traditional land rights: 
In traditional Vietnamese society, land ownership was based on one essential principle: 
the emperor had eminent right to the lands which he leased to the people, who paid 
taxes in return. When the emperor needed a plot of land, he requisitioned it without 
paying any compensation to the peasant who lived on it. The emperor conceded rights to 
village communities in the form of communal rice fields ( cong dien) or communal lands 
(cong tho). When a group of families requested permission to establish a village, the 
emperor granted them an area of territory that became communal lands. The communal 
rice fields were distributed among the village inhabitants and were redistributed every 
three years to the registered members. 
The communal rice fields and communal lands constituted a kind of public domain that 
could not be sold or mortgaged. Theoretically, the communal rice fields and communal 
lands were inalienable except in the case of food scarcity or serious catastrophe when 
the village could ask for special permission to mortgage land for a period of three years. 
But in reality, when farmers had paid taxes over a long period, they could consider their 
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cultivated land as their individual property and thus alienable. However, this right of 
proprietorship was not absolute if the lands were left uncultivated or if the owners did 
. not pay taxes. In such cases, lands were confiscated and once again became public 
· property (Callison 1983: 35-37; and Pham C.D. 1985: 23-25). Some emperors paid their 
officials for their services and rewarded their servants for their loyalty with large 
domains of rice land. This growth of landholdings led to transforming a great number of 
peasants into landless serfs. 
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French colonial period (prior to 1945) 
The French occupation of Vietnam resulted in the full sovereignty of France over the 
whole territory. In 1862, the French colonialists confiscated for the benefit of the 
colonial administration all lands that were in the possession of the indigenous people in 
both urban and rural areas. In 1863 any land owned by fugitive inhabitants was termed 
ownerless. Land belonging to those who had not returned to justify their rights of 
possession (lived in and cultivate their land) was confiscated for the benefit of the 
colonial administration. To maintain an equilibrium between the pretensions of the 
European colonists who came to develop the Cochin-chinese lands, the colonial 
administration in 187 4 extended the benefits of the regulations related to land 
concessions to indigenous people. The policy was that people could apply for parcels of 
more than 10 hectares. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese who benefited from these 
concessions were not the peasants (Pham C.D. 1985: 28). 
In northern Vietnam, the colonial administration granted concessions of a maximum of 
five hectares to the Vietnamese or Asian foreigners who made the requests. However, 
because this region was already heavily populated, all cultivable lands had been used for 
centuries, and in practical terms no more uncultivated lands remained, except in the 
middle areas where the French colonialists had requested very large concessions. In this 
region (middle lands), after the First World War, there were 299 of all (476) French 
plantations in Vietnam (62,8 per cent) and this represented 72,5 per cent of the total area 
of French plantation (Table 4.1 ). 
Table 4.1. The distribution of plantations belonging to French colonists in the 
northern Vietnam in 1918 
Region Number of Percentage Area of plantations Percentage (0/o) 
plantations (%) (ha) 
Low lands 121 25,42 57,688 13,80 
Midlands 299 62,81 302,717 72,50 
Highland 56 11,70 57,246 13,70 
Total 476 100 417,650 100 
Source: Pham C.D. (1985). 
Thus, although the French colonists transformed the communal lands and rice fields to 
private ownership, this situation resulted in a vast number of landless peasants and small 
landowners were left in poverty. At the August Revolution, when the French were 
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defeated, the landlord class accounted for only 2 per cent of the population, but occupied 
51.2 per cent of the land; by comparison, farmers comprised 97 per cent of the . ;, 
population and occupied 36 per cent of the land (Nguyen S.C. 1995: 66). During this 
period, as a result of the decrease in the area of communal land and rice fields, portions 
of which had been taken over by the powerful notables of the villages, the plots of land 
farmers received from their villages were not large enough to meet the needs of their 
families. In these cases, they had to borrow from their rich neighbours at very high 
interest rates (Nguyen V.K. 1999: 4). 
In order to protect land ownership and avoid land disputes, the colonial administration 
measured the land area of each village and made cadastral maps. Based on these maps, 
peasants had to pay taxes according to the quantity and quality of the land areas. 
Landowners registered their ownership in the cadastral book in the local administration. 
The peasants used the land titles as collateral to borrow money for agricultural 
development. The cadastral work was completed in 1939. However, in some areas, 
particularly in forest areas, it was difficult to measure and map the land borders. The 
registration of land ownership also faced difficulties from the existence of two 
management systems, stemming from the Nguyen emperor period and the French 
colonial periods, and from the resulting land fragmentation. 
1945 -1957 period 
Following the defeat of the French, the new government rapidly attempted to eliminate 
feudalism and promote democracy. However, in 1946, the French invaded Vietnam 
again, prompting nation-wide resistance. The new government had been working on 
policies to reduce land rent. The policies involved the land owned by the French and the 
largest Vietnamese landlords. Landholdings of more than 50 hectares were confiscated 
for redistribution, while contributions in the form of finance were taken from lesser 
· landowners. This policy remained in effect until 1953. 
The redistribution was intended to give land to each rice farmer to provide a little more 
than subsistence for him and his family. Reallocated plots were usually less than one 
hectare, but in some areas families received 2 or 3 hectares (Donovan et al. 1997: 15). In 
1954, the war ended and peace was restored in the North. In the process of land reform 
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1n rural areas, the government appropriated 810,000 hectares from landlords for 
redistribution. The per capita land area of the landlords and rich farmers was reduced 
sharply while the per capita land area of poor farmers and landless farmers increased 
greatly (Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2. Average per capita land area of farmer classes during pre- and post-
land reform in rural areas in the North (Unit: m2/person) 
Classes Pre-August 
Revolution 
Land lord 
Rich farmer 
Middle farmer 
Poor farmer 
Landless farmer 
Other 
Source: Nguyen S.C. (1995). 
1957 -1981 period 
10,093 
3,975 
1,372 
431 
124 
336 
Pre-land reform Post-land reform 
(before 1954) (after 1954) 
6,393 738 
3,345 1,547 
1,257 1,610 
490 1,437 
262 1,413 
237 403 
Agricultural cooperatives were established in the North from late 1955. A gradual 
collectivisation process involved three phases: formation of work-exchange teams, 
establishment of low-rank cooperatives, and consolidation and advancement of low-rank 
cooperatives into high-rank cooperatives. Under the regime of low-rank cooperatives, 
farmers continued to own land and equipment, but each family's share of output was 
tied to the amount of land, animals and machinery they had contributed. As an economic 
unit, the cooperatives periodically distributed paddy land for cultivation, granted land to 
households for houses and homegardens ( only 5 per cent of the individual household 
land), organised the work tasks of the production brigades, determined the remuneration 
of labour, controlled agricultural inputs and products, provided information and 
technical advice, granted loans for special needs, and collected taxes. Land and tools 
formerly belonging to members were pooled and all work was done collectively under 
unified management. The output was distributed based on a work point system which 
was calculated in terms of the amount of time spent working on the farm (Le T.C. 1996: 
3 8; Prosterman and Randstad 1994: 4). 
1981 - 1988 period 
In the face of economic recession in general and agricultural decline in particular, decree 
No.100 of the government in 1981 introduced a new agricultural production 
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management system: the "product contract" system (Nguyen N.H.1998). The state 
allotted use of land plots directly to members of cooperatives for a period of two to three 
years. Management and investment responsibilities still resided with the cooperatives, 
however. Land was contracted to.households based on the amount of labour in a family 
rather than the total number of family members. This contract restored the farmers ' 
autonomy in land and labour use (Le T.C.et al. 1996) 
1988 - present 
In January 1988 the State Council promulgated the country's first land law (Resolution 
No 10) which had been adopted by the National Assembly the previous month. This law 
reaffirmed the existing systems of land ownership under the unified management of the 
state, so that the state could assign land to farmers under inheritable leases for 15 to 20 
years. The land law also legitimised the farmers' rights to transfer, cede and sell the 
fruits of their labours and the results of investment in the assigned land when this land 
was assigned to other users. However, it strictly prohibited the purchase, sale, or lease of 
the land. 
The 1993 Land Law and its related implementation decrees were meant to complete the 
land reform process by establishing longer-term and more secure land-use rights. Land 
still belonged to the state but land-use rights could be privately held for 15-20 years 
leases for annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops and the term is renewable if the 
land user has been complying with land legislation. The state reserves the right to take 
the land back, apparently without compensation, in certain cases, but the state must 
provide compensation to land users if it recovers land for purposes of national defence, 
security, or other national or public interests. 
Under this law, which specified the rights and obligations of land users, land-use rights 
. may be transferred, mortgaged, rented, exchanged, or inherited. Leaseholders '-are given 
land-use certificates, through which they are assured of their rights to land. -Vietnam's 
National Assembly also adopted a new regime for taxing agricultural land in July 1993. 
The law cut agricultural tax rates in half, from about 10 per cent of the annual gross 
production volume to about 5 per cent. The law stipulates that the land use tax is no 
longer based on crop yield, but on area and soil conditions, and is levied directly on 
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farm households rather than channelled through the cooperative structure (Prosterman 
and Hanstad 1994: 14). 
Understanding the development of agriculture and land tenure systems in the research 
site can help the researcher to set out clearly the methods of collecting data. Thus, the 
next part of this chapter describes the relevant methods of collecting information in the 
research sites and of analysis. 
4.3. Research Methodology 
4.3.1. Information collected and methods of collection and analysis 
To gain insights into farmers' perceptions of land tenure arrangements and their 
perspectives on farming and soil conservation practices, farmer surveys were conducted. 
Farm practices were also observed during visits to their villages. Secondary data 
collected included census statistics reports, government publications, institutional 
documents, and publications in journals. Details of the selected sites for survey and the 
survey are described in the following sections. 
The scope of the survey and other information collected was determined by the time 
available, accessibility to the villages, and resources available. The analytical methods 
include historical analysis, perception analysis and content analysis. The cross tabulation 
method is mainly used for analysing the quantitative data. Table 4.3 summarises the 
information collected, the data sources, the scope of data collected, and the analytical 
methods used. 
Perception analysis is a method of analysing the research data, in which the researcher is 
able to communicate the subjective experience of observation and analyse the perceived 
knowledge of individuals or groups. The approach is based on the idea that human life is 
· a product of an interaction between sequences of actions and talk about those actions. 
Since the same skills and social knowledge are involved in the creation of both action 
and accounts of that actions, the researcher has two mutually supporting and 
confirmatory ways of revealing the underlying system of social knowledge and belief. 
The analysis explores the social and environmental situation or context in which action 
takes place and is fundamental to the analysis of the behaviour (Uzzell 2002: 328). 
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Content analysis is also a common method of analysing research data. It has been 
defined as "a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text into a 
few content categories based on explicit rules of coding"( Miller and Brewer 2003: 43). 
In the other words, content analysis involve the description and analysis of text in order 
to represent its context. Content analysis enables researchers to sift through large 
volumes of data with relative ease in a systematic fashion. It can be a useful technique 
for allowing us to discover and describe the focus of individual, group, institutional, or 
social attention. Content analysis can be undertaken quantitatively and qualitatively or 
both. Content analysis can be a routine part of coding in qualitative data analysis, in 
which the data analysed in the same terms as if they were texts (Stemler 2001; Miller 
and Brewer 2003). 
Note that in the analysis of the survey results of this study, the term "indifferent" is used 
to present a lack of interest, feeling or reaction of a respondent towards the issues raised 
by the researcher. 
4.3.2. The selected sites for the survey 
The study area is the northern part of Vietnam, which covers 25 provinces from Quang 
Binh province of the north-central-coast region to Cao Bang province of the northern 
highland region. The changes in land tenure systems from the French period to the 
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2 5  h o u s e h o l d s  s e l e c t e d  f r o m  e a c h  
v i l l a g e  w i t h  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  g e n d e r ,  
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s u r v e y  
- Q u a l i t a t i v e  h o u s e h o l d  
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- I n - d e p t h  i n t e r v i e w s  o f  s u b s e t  o f  6 -
1 0  h o u s e h o l d s  i d e n t i f i e d  f r o m  
p r e v i o u s  s u r v e y  
- I n t e r v i e w s  o f  6  o f f i c i a l s  o f  t h e  
b a n k s  
- I n - d e p t h  i n t e r v i e w s  o f  s u b s e t  o f  6 -
1 0  h o u s e h o l d s  i d e n t i f i e d  f r o m  
p r e v i o u s  s u r v e y  
- I n t e r v i e w s  o f  6  o f f i c i a l s  o f  l o c a l  a n d  
c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  
C o n t e n t  a n a l y s i s  
P e r c e p t i o n  a n a l y s i s  
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- Self-monitoring mechanisms 
- Administrative capacity for implementing the law 
- Credit application procedures 
- Procedural rules regarding takings of land for public 
purposes, and compensation 
- Land management law 
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present were similar in all of these provinces but the implementation of the land law 
was different. Also there are differences in biophysical, economic and cultural 
conditions between provinces. Thus, within the region, four study sites were chosen: 
Lap Thach district of Vinh Phuc province, Hoa Binh town of Hoa Binh province, 
Phuc Tho district of Ha Tay province, and Thanh Ha district of Hai Duong province. 
These sites were selected because their features met the necessary criteria of the 
research such as differences in topography, farming practices, soil conservation 
measures, cultures, economic conditions and the implementation of land policies. 
However, before final decisions were made on the case studies, these research sites 
needed to meet other criteria such as information availability, local willingness to 
participate, and availability of people such as scientists who know the area well. 
Thuy Dien village in Lap Thach district, Vinh Phuc province 
Lap Thach is located in the uplands of the Midland area and comprises mountains and 
rolling hillsides interspersed with flat valley lands. This district has poor soil fertility, 
although some forest remains at higher elevations. However, many hilltops are barren 
rocky wastelands displaying deep gully erosion (Map - Figure 4.2). The population of 
the district is 223,000, which is distributed among 47,154 households (10 per cent of 
the provincial population). Before 1954, Lap Thach was occupied by ethnic minorities 
who have a long settlement history with customary rights over the land. After 1954, 
the Kinh people were settled in this district; they brought their lowland production 
technology with their own knowledge and beliefs to the uplands. 
Thuy Dien village is located in the middle area of the district; it comprises round hills 
and plain fields. There are 132 households and all of them farm for their subsistence. 
Paddy rice is the main crop in the flatland valleys; other crops such as cassava, sweet 
potato, maize, tea and peanuts are cultivated on the hillslopes, while shifting 
cultivation is the farming system in the upland areas. 
Many families apply conservation methods to their land. The conservation methods 
used are intercropping, green and manure fertiliser with limited chemical fertilisers, 
and taking mud from the ponds and canals to add to the soil. 
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Figure 4.2: Map of Vinh Phuc 
Source: UNDP (2003) 
Figure 4 .. 3: iMap of Hoa Binh 
-= Source: UNDP (2003) 
\ 
Almost all households in the district have land certificates. Five households in Thuy 
Dien village have not been provided with land certificates. Each family has five to 
eight plots which are often far from each other and far from home (1100 meters on 
average). 
Bai Yen village in Hoa Binh district, Hoa Binh province 
Hoa Binh is a mountain province, located 70 km from Hanoi. Hoa Binh town is the 
province's capital which is located 2 km from the Hoa Binh dam. There are many 
river valleys of secondary and tertiary streams where the majority of the population is 
located. The limestone mountains are sometimes isolated and surrounded by irrigated 
rice fields. The mountains are unsuitable for agriculture and have different degrees of 
forest cover. The agricultural land occupies 72,473 hectares which is about 15.2 per 
cent the total land area of the province (Map - Figure 4.3). 
Bai Yen village is located about 5 km from Hoa Binh town. It comprises mountains 
and valley fields. The village has 94 households, most of them farmers. Each family 
has received the rights to use forestland and agricultural land. On the forestland they 
have to plant eucalypt and Acacia trees (Acacia mangium: keo tai tuong) following 
the command of the local government. Rice, maize and tea trees are the main forms of 
agricultural production of this area. 
Some land conservation methods have been applied in this area such as use of green 
(Acrocephalus capitatus benth: nhan tran) and animal manure fertilisers. The model 
of Forest-Garden-Pond-Husbandry is common in this village. Some households want 
to plant perennial fruit trees but they are facing problems such as lack of investment 
capital and government restrictions. 
All . households in the village have land certificates for their agricultural land. 
Ho\vever, they have not yet received land certificates for the forest land. Agricultural 
lands are very fragmented, with each household having 10 to 20 small plots, the 
smallest is less than 100 m2 and the largest about 700m2 and far from each other (600-
1000 meters). 
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My Giang village of Phuc Tho district, Ha Tay province 
The province is located in a lowland area and is comprised mostly of plains, with old 
and young alluvial soils of moderate to good fertility; a small proportion of the land 
area is saline or acid sulphate. Phuc Tho district with an area of 11,325 hectares, lies 
on the Red River in the north-east of the province, adjacent to Vinh Phuc province 
(Map - Figure 4.4). The population of the district is 147,600 divided into 22 
communes. 
My Giang village of Phuc Tho district is one of the crowded villages in the Red River 
Delta (RRD). It is located about 30km from Hanoi. As in other areas of the district, 
which is a typical lowland area in the RRD, it is occupied only by the Kinh people 
who are by age-long tradition skilled paddy farmers. 
Paddy rice and other crops such as soybeans, maize and vegetables are cultivated in 
almost all areas of the district. The village has 163 households. They have all received 
agricultural land but in each household at least half of the family members have off-
farm income. Many have now changed the cropping pattern from three crops ( two rice 
crops and one cash crop) to only two crops a year ( one rice and one cash crop), 
leaving the winter period for off-farm work. 
Maize, potato, soybean and vegetables are the main cash crops in the village. The 
conservation methods are intercropping, using green and manure fertiliser with limited 
chemical fertilisers. 
None of the households in the village have received land certificates. L3:nd 
fragmentation is also problem in this area. Each household has 5 to 8 small plots, 
mostly lying about 500-1000 meters from their house. 
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Figure 4 .. 4: Map of Ha Tay Province 
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Co Cham village of Thanh Ha district, Hai Duong pr(!vince 
Hai Duong province is one of the most densely populated provinces (1019 
persons/km2) and is located near the mid-point of National Road #5 that links Hanoi 
to Hai Phong province. Although it is primarily agricultural in character, the province 
does have a number of small industries such as pump manufacturing, cement factories 
and a variety of agro-processing industries including meat works and mineral water 
plants. Thanh Ha district has a population of 301,970. The total agricultural land area 
is 11,309 hectares (Map - Figure 4.5). 
The dominant crop is rice. Vegetables, jute, and fruit tree crops such as lychees and 
longans are also important. The province contains many areas of natural beauty in 
addition to the tranquil expanse of its rice fields and the colour of its lychee orchards. 
Co Cham village is another congested village in the Red River Delta. It is located 
about 78 km from Hanoi. Most of the village lands are fertile. This village has 198 
households. All received agricultural land but in each household at least half of the 
family members have off-farm income. 
Most farmers are applying the conservation model of Garden-Pond-Husbandry and 
intercropping. They all have land certificates. Agricultural land in this area is v~ry 
fragmented. Farm plots are at distance of 800 to 3000 meters from homes. 
4.3.3. Farm-household survey 
The fieldwork was carried out in northern Vietnam between July and December 2000, 
taking the forms of collection of secondary archive data, a household survey with in-
depth interviews, and field observations. The survey of households in the four villages 
was based on a stratified area sample. These villages were selected from four districts 
(four provinces) which reflect the typical topography, environmental, social, political 
and economic characteristics of North Vietnam. 
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Figure 4.6. Fieldwork flowchart -- , .. f4};!;j&>· 
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Figure 4.6 shows the steps taken in the fieldwork. Firstly, a preliminary survey was 
organised in order to choose four villages across four provinces. As mentioned earlier, 
these villages were selected on the basis of criteria essential to the research such as 
topography, farming practices, culture, historical land tenure regimes and 
implementation of land policies. 
In each village, the primary survey was conducted using questionnaires, interviews 
and observation of farming practices. Information on household composition and 
farming systems was collected from 100 households, 25 in each of the villages. In-
depth interviews were carried out with 67 households to obtain information on 
farmers' perceptions and farming performance relating to land tenure. Government 
officials and scientists were also interviewed to cross-check and collect information 
on institutional arrangements, enforcement mechanisms, and assessment of land 
situations and extension services. Secondary data on agricultural production, income, 
population and other variables was collected from the local Council of each district 
and the General Statistic Office. 
The household survey was designed primarily to elicit information concerning the 
relationship between land conservation and land rights issues such as access to land, 
access to credit, rights to transfer land and the institutions and organisations that 
govern the allocation of land for households. The survey questions mostly related to 
the current period although several questions related to the historical periods (pre-
,_ 
1954; and Collectivisation). 
The table 4.4 below presents the steps taken in selecting places and households for the 
survey. 
The questionnaire (see Appendix 4.1) was administered first in one village in the 
study area to assess the relevance and acceptability of the questions. The pre-test 
revealed that people were willing to provide information on sensitive issues and it also 
did not appear as if they were trying to impress me by exaggerating estimates of rice 
yields, land productivity or some of their farming problems. However, their answers 
sometimes appeared incomplete and inaccurate when they evaluated the situation of 
96 
farm households. That is, sometimes respondents over- or under-estimated certain 
aspects of their situation. 
Table 4.4. Number of households selected for the survey 
Village name Thuy Dien Bai Yen My Giang Co Cham 
District Lap Thach HoaBinh Phuc Tho Thanh Ha 
Province VinhPhuc HoaBinh Ha Tay Hai Duong 
Total households (No) 132 94 163 198 
Households selected 25 25 25 25 
for interview (No) 
Households selected 15 12 15 25 
for in-depth interview 
(No) 
Percentage of total 11.4 12.8 9.2 12.6 
households(%) 
In general, there were no serious obstacles during interviews in the pre-test survey. 
However, it was decided that questions over land conflicts had to be more detailed to 
ensure that all farmers would answer the questions relating to whether they were 
. 
involved in conflict situations or not. The questionnaire was subsequently revised and 
the order of some questions was changed because some respondents had volunteered 
information on subjects which were to be discussed in a later part of the interview. 
In each village, the questionnaires were sent to 25 households using the following 
criteria which was determined by researcher based on the objectives of the research 
analysis: 
• Rich/Poor (including the richest and poorest) 
• Including both men and women as head of the family 
• The occupancy of the land 
• .Use of family and hired labour 
• Types of land title 
• Distribution of land 
• Investment in land conservation 
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These criteria were discussed with the head of each village. They hold the books 
recording information on household composition. Household samples then were 
selected based on the criteria and the list of village members in the record book. 
The questionnaires provided information on the social and economic characteristics of 
individual households and their farming systems, including farming performance data 
concerning inputs and outputs: number of members in the family; status in the family; 
gender; age; education level; number of persons working on farms; number of persons 
working off-farm; years of settlement in this location; years of farming experience; 
annual income; number of plots; distances of the plots from the house; plot size; land 
type; types of farming practices; sources of water supply; type and quantity of 
fertilisers used; and forms of land tenure ( see questions for household composition 
and farming system, Appendix 4 .1) 
The head of the village helped each family to fill in the questionnaires and collected 
them for the researcher. From this survey, respondents were selected for in-depth 
interviewing by the researcher. Qualitative interviews on details of the above issues 
were conducted in the farmers' houses and in the fields (Figure 5.6 in Chapter 5). The 
researcher spent approximately two days with each respondent in carrying out the in-
depth interviews. The in-depth information is about attitudes and the opinions of 
farmers with respect to sustainable land management and land allocation issues ( see 
question for in-depth interviews, Appendix 4.1 ). 
The data collected in the in-depth surveys was based on a set of questions concerning 
the following: cropping patterns; types of farming practices; the reasons for 
continuing with these farming practices; the understanding of farmers about the 
degradation of their farmland; the understanding of farmers about the causes of land 
degradation; types of conservation practices farmers have used; sources of knowledge 
of iand conservation practices; farmer understanding of the costs of conservation 
methods; significant constraints to adopting land conservation practices and labour 
capital invested in land conservation; the results of applying conservation methods; 
suggestions for improvement in agricultural policies and particularly in land 
legislation that could encourage land conservation investment; opinions of farmers 
about the rights and rules laid down in the certificate; the influence of the current land 
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law on farmers' decisions to adopt land conservation practices; the investment in land 
conservation that has been carried out in relation to the land law; the attitudes . of 
farmers to the obligations in respect of land protection; aspirations of farmers with 
regard to land leases, right to transfer land; rights of access to credit and the 
governance of government; and suggestions of farmers about the land tenure 
arrangements that would give them the best incentives for long-term land 
improvement investment. 
Questioning of officers of the local and central governments was undertaken to obtain 
information on all of the above issues and to cross check the attitudes and practices of 
farmers and of the officials and scientists to the relationship between land 
management and land tenure arrangements. In each village three to four officials and 
one agricultural technician were selected for interview. Interviews were also held with 
10 scientists from the province level and central governments. 
Then the collected information was gathered and grouped in the different categories 
which are set out based on the requirements of the analysis of each issue. The analyses 
in the next five chapters used these quantitative and qualitative data as empirical 
evidence of this study. 
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Chapter 5. Security of land tenure arrangements and 
sustainable land management in North Vietnam 
5. 1. Introduction 
In North Vietnam, land tenure arrangements have been changed and changes have 
taken place in farmers' attitudes and practices with respect to land management. 
During the Collectivisation period, land was seriously degraded and it is presumed 
that one of fundamental causes of the inefficient utilisation of agricultural land is 
insecurity of land-use rights. Before the 1988 Land Law, farmers ignored problems of 
long-term soil fertility; they focused only on short-term benefits from agriculture. 
Farmers began to invest in long-term land improvement in the period of "Doi moi" 
(Renovation). Soil loss and soil erosion have been reduced due to more sustainable 
farming practices. Thus several main questions are examined here: What degree of 
security of land tenure was provided in each land tenure regimes? How have the 
changes in these regimes affected the perceptions and practices of farmers with 
respect to land management? Has the 1988 - Resolution No 10 and 1993 Land Law 
positively influenced farmers' attitudes towards long-term soil conservation? 
To test these questions, this chapter first assesses the extent of security of land tenure 
in the two tenure systems: Collectivisation and Renovation. Then, based on this 
assessment, the impact of land tenure on land management attitudes and practices of 
farmers is analysed in the second part of the chapter. The analysis highlights the 
influence of the different land tenure arrangements on farmers' perceptions, on their 
farming practices, and on their intentions towards land conservation investment in the 
future. 
The goal of this chapter is to compare the security provided by the two different land 
. ' 
tenure regimes, and thus each regime will be discussed only the effects of the changes 
in land policy or legislation on the preferences of farmer. The implementation of these 
policies/legislation with each right of using land will be analysed in the following 
chapters. 
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5.2. Security levels of land tenure arrangements in the Collectivisation 
and Renovation periods 
5.2.1. Definition of land tenure security 
The term 'land tenure' in this study refers to the institutional arrangements pertaining 
to land-use rights and duties of the land-owners and other users. These institutional 
arrangements may be legally established, or customary, or enforced by a combination 
of both. Although security of land tenure has been defined and measured in various 
ways, it is generally a term which embraces three important elements. The first 
element relates to the rights of access to land and the formal duration of these rights. 
An important issue with respect to this element is whether the rights granted are for a 
long enough period to provide an incentive to invest in the land. The second element 
relates to the protection of rights; and the third element relates to the robustness of 
rights, which means the freedom to use and dispose of land (Bruce and Migot-Adholla 
1998: 83). These three elements are also portrayed in the definitions of Place et al. 
(1994) and Prosterman et al. (1998) (see Chapter 2). 
Land tenure security exists when an individual perceives that he/she has rights ·. to 
exclude others and to use the land for purposes such as growing and harvesting crops, 
grazing cattle, harvesting wildlife, gathering firewood, extracting mineral resources, 
or building structures on land. He/she can pass these rights to his/her heirs or 
mortgage the rights for credit purposes. He/she has the rights to sell or lease the land 
to others, thus he/she has ability to reap the benefits of labour and capital invested in 
the land. All these rights must be enforced and protected by appropriate regulation and 
administrative systems. 
The three elements highlighted above are relevant to the approach taken by this study. 
The degree of security of each land tenure system in northern Vietnam can be assessed 
as to how these elements are presented and practised. The first feature of land tenure 
change, which reflects the change in the security level, emphasises individual land 
titling or registration as the mechanism for changing land tenure arrangements. Then, 
a bundle of use rights which do not exist in one tenure system (Collectivisation), were 
given to individual farmers under another tenure system (Renovation). Finally, these 
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rights have been exercised under the state's regulation. The security level of each land 
tenure system can ultimately be addressed through its enforcement mechanism which 
is determined by the strength of institutions in implementing the rights and rules -of 
using land. The following sections demonstrate the extent of security of land tenure 
arrangements in the Collectivisation and Renovation periods in northern Vietnam. 
5.2.2. Insecurity of land tenure arrangements in the Collectivisation period 
Land ownership 
Farmers did not receive private title to their land during the Collectivisation period 
which extended from late 1955 and to 1988. Indeed, after the defeat of the French 
colonists, the Vietnamese government confiscated land from the French colonists and 
other larger landowners and redistributed it somewhat equally among all farm families 
(Prosterman and Hanstad 1994: 3; and Nguyen S.C. 1995: 66). This period of 
privatisation of land tenure was very short due to the subsequent establishment of 
cooperatives. The process of change in land ownership from individual farmers to the 
State gradually occurred in the three steps of the collectivisation process. 
In the first step, farmers continued to own land and equipment, but the government 
encouraged farmers' participation in work teams which carried out collective work on 
certain activities such as planting and harvesting rice, fertilising or ploughing. Under 
this system of work-exchange teams, each family continued to farm its own land and 
payment was generally not offered for such mutual work. By 1958, 86 per cent of 
farm-households in the North belonged to work-exchange teams (Pingali and Vo 
1992: 702). In this year, the second stage was started witµ the transformation of work-
exchange teams into cooperatives. When the cooperatives began to be established, the 
individual ownership of land, animals, and farm equipment was still preserved. While 
the cooperatives planned and organised all farm work, farm-households shared the 
output based on the amount of land, animals, and machinery they had contributed. 
Over 86 per cent of the farm-households were registered under such cooperatives 
(Pingali and Vo 1992: 702). 
Over the next ten years, the cooperatives became a key element of rural organisation 
in North Vietnam, resembling the former Soviet collective farms and former People's 
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Communes in China. By the early 1970s nearly all farm-households in the North had 
been organised into cooperatives. Land and tools formerly belonging to households 
were pooled in the cooperatives. The cooperative was an administrative unit located 
mostly at the village level. It periodically distributed paddy land for cultivation and 
granted land to households for houses and homegardens; but only up to 5 per cent of 
the household land (Le et al. 1996: 38; and Pham et al. 1999: 79). Thus, in this 
collectivisation period, land was owned by the State and the farmers worked on the 
collective farm as agricultural labourers. 
With the egalitarian principle as a core objective, this state-property rights regime 
promoted only the social equity of the cultivation rights for peasants in rural North 
Vietnam. Bromley (1991: 23) and Hanna et al. (1995: 18) have argued that the state, 
which is a political unit of citizens, has the responsibility to ensure the observance of 
the rules under which citizens may be able to make use of natural resources, and 
thereby promote social objectives. However, under this type of land tenure, farmers 
did not have the right of possession of farmland. Income was distributed to farmers 
solely on the basis of the work points system. Work points were assigned to a farmer 
according to the length of time required for a job and the difficulty of the work done 
for the cooperatives. Many studies showed that, in this case, where land did not 
belong to the farmers and their income did not come from the productivity of the land, 
farmers had no rights in the crop they produced and thus it was little matter to them 
whether they produced more or less (Prosterman and Hanststad 1990: 108; Brooks 
1990: 240; Hann 1996; and Mathijs 1997: 40). 
As farmers did not have an individual land title, they faced the possibility of eviction 
and loss of their capital if they invested in the farm. Farmers had to farm on fields 
which might be fertile or infertile, depending on the cooperative's decisions. When 
the government needed an area of land for any public purpose, it was taken over 
without any compensation. The study by Nguyen S.C . . (1995: 73) showed that the 
farming labour force was indifferent to the use of the land because all land had been 
collectivised, production conditions and the production process were not firmly linked 
to the efforts of labourers, and therefore labourers, capital and land were not attracted 
to agricultural production. 
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Without land title, the farmers were also limited in their ability to access credit. Under 
collectivised agriculture, credit played only a marginal role, as the allocation of most 
land, capital, agricultural inputs, and labour was regulated by the cooperative. 
However, farmers still needed credit for the improvement of their own plots and other 
agricultural purposes. Informal credit from family members and neighbours was the 
only way for farmers to increase their capital, as there was no legal right to borrow 
from government banks. Farmers thus faced the high interest rates in informal credit 
sources. A household survey in Lap Thach district showed that during the period when 
the very poor households did not have rice to eat, they borrowed rice from neighbours 
and paid them back one and a half times what they had borrowed (Lipper 1996: 5). A 
number of households the author interviewed in four villages of northern Vietnam had 
borrowed money at 10 to 20 per cent interest from their relatives or neighbours for the 
improvement of their own 5 per cent plots and home gardens. 
State-property regimes are potentially able to address the high risk of open-access 
regimes by internalising all externalities to a single owner (Tietenberg 1996: 49). But 
in the mountainous areas under the collectivisation regime, forestland was encroached 
upon and critically exploited due to the weaknesses of enforcement by the sta,te. 
Deforestation occurred throughout the mountainous region of Vietnam as the result of 
logging and cutting firewood, clearance of land for agricultural development projects, 
and shifting cultivation by the minority peoples. In many parts of the northwest only 8 
to 10 percent of the surface remains under forest cover (Be 1993: 117; and Donovan et 
al. 1997: 21) 
Land-use rights 
In the Collectivisation period, the rights of use, control and management of land 
belonged to the government. The state owned the land and through the cooperatives 
organised the work tasks of the production brigades, determined remuneration of 
labour, managed agricultural inputs and outputs, provided information and technical 
advice, granted loans for special needs, and collected taxes. Each village cooperative 
organised the production brigades into teams composed of the working members· of 
between 20 and 40 households. There were two types of production brigades: (i) the 
rice brigade was drawn from a group of neighbourhoods. Their work was mainly 
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concerned with irrigating, plowing, sowing and supervising other tasks performed on 
individual plots; and (ii) specialised brigades worked on specific activities such as 
livestock production, forest plantations, brick-making, lime-processing, and growing 
of tea or other cash crops. Following the general policies of the central government, 
each cooperative made it own five-year plan that was included in the Grand National 
Plan. This plan regulated how much of production should be delivered as tax and the 
amount of necessities such as equipment, fertilisers and cloth each cooperative should 
receive at the state price (Le T.C. et al.1996: 38). 
Under this land tenure system, farmers only had the right to cultivate on the state's 
land and their usufruct rights were only based on the length of the time they worked 
on the fields. Farmers had no rights to inherit, transfer and mortgage the farmland. 
The state had responsibilities for all management and investment in agriculture. 
Specialised agencies at the district, provincial, and national levels provided guidance, 
technical advice, and funding for large-scale undertakings but did not directly interfere 
with the internal organisation and work of the cooperatives. However, collecti,ve 
production relations did lead to some progress in agriculture such as irrigation, 
rehabilitation of the rural transport network, improvement of land, and introduction of 
new varieties into production (Nguyen S.C. 1995: 71). 
However, the management of cooperatives failed to promote other targets of 
agricultural production in the North. Collectivisation did not have the desired effect 
on rice production. Per capita production of cereal grains declined. In 1961, cereal 
production was 318 kg/capita. By 1980, it had fallen to 215 kg, even though during 
the 1970s the double-cropping of rice had become common in the Red River Delta 
and improved rice varieties had been introduced (Prosterman and Hanstad 1994: 5). 
Rice-equivalent food output was down 0.3 per cent, paddy yield was down 109 kg/ha 
and both annual and perennial industrial crops showed a decline compared to levels in 
1958 (Nguyen S.C. 1995: 72). Kerkvliet (1997: 16) also showed that: 
Many rural people had concluded that collectivised farming was a major 
cause of impoverishment. Because surrendering land, work animals, and 
other means of production to a cooperative, many worried, would make them 
totally dependent on that organisation, which was a new entity fraught with 
problems. If the cooperative's harvests proved to be bad, everyone would be 
in the same sinking boat, with little or no resources of their own to fall back 
on. For these and other reasons, many said, they preferred to farm their own, 
separate fields. 
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The decline in agricultural productivity resulted from the fact that farmers did not 
want to· spend their labour and capital on the cooperative land. In contrast, farmers had 
the rights of possession, control and management only on their own "5% land plot". 
Thus they devoted their time, their effort and their capital to these plots as they were 
ensured their land title, their freedom to use the land without interference from other 
users, and their entitlement to the benefits from the labour and capital invested in that 
land. Evidence of the failures of collectivisation shows up in the fact that in the 1970s 
only 30 to 40 per cent of farmers' income came from work performed on collectively-
farmed land, which constituted 95 per cent of commune land. The remaining 60 to 70 
per cent of farmers' income came from the 5 per cent of the land reserved for 
household plots (Kerkvliet 1993: 11 ). Therefore many farmers applied for withdrawal 
from the cooperatives. Twenty cooperatives dissolved and 5,500 farmers withdrew 
from cooperatives for the winter-spring crop of 1958-59 (Pham et al. 1999: 81 ). 
Management mechanism 
The insecurity of the cooperative system was also illustrated in its administrative 
organisation and operation. The cooperative executives were usually underqualified, 
and deficient in management ability. In fact, the poor and landless farmers, who had 
little capital, production experience and poor educational and technical qualifications, 
played a core role in agricultural management. The experienced farmers, usually the 
middle-income and rich farmers, were _ eliminated from the cooperative executive 
boards because of the communist policy to promoted the role of the poor in society. 
The cooperative chair was elected by cooperative members and acted as its executive 
director. 
All management was responsibility of the Communist Party and People's Committee. 
The_ main duty of the political secretary was to see that national policy was 
implemented at the local level. He had power over all village and cooperative 
decisions, and reported to the district secretary of the Communist Party (Le T.C. et al. 
1996: 39; and Pham et al. 1999: 85). Working in specialised production teams such as 
the soil preparation team, the seed preparation team, the irrigation team, the pig 
raising team, etc., farmers were only responsible for what they had done, and had yno 
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concern about productivity, crop yield and animal output. Thus the main 
characteristics of the cooperatives' production and business were low efficiency, 
regular losses, and declines in crop and animal yield. 
Without the rights of access to land and the rights to manage and transfer land, 
farmers were unable to manage the uncertainty of agricultural production. After 20 
years, it was obvious that the model of agricultural cooperatives in North Vietnam 
was in deep crisis. The bigger the cooperative, the more concentrated its management 
functions, the greater the specialisation covering distinct links in the production 
process, the lower the average yield, output and product value per hectare (Nguyen 
S.C. 1995). The appearance of the "product contract" - first illegally in some rural 
areas and later becoming a decree of the government for the whole nation - was 
inevitable. In other words, land tenure arrangements during the collectivisation period 
offered very limited security. 
5.2.3. Security level of land tenure arrangements in the Renovation period 
Leasehold rights 
The recession of the economy in general and the decline of agricultural production in 
particular, led to the illegal transformation of cooperative management in some 
provinces such as Vinh Phu and Hai Phong. In 1967 and 1968, a form of "household 
contract' was self-generated at the grass-roots level and was applied to some crops in 
these areas. This contract involved a transformation from the piecework of production 
teams into product contracts to farming households. At first, the contract became the 
target of criticism and an end was put to the experiment. In January 1981, however, 
the national government attempted to increase agricultural productivity by instituting 
Directive 100 which allowed cooperatives to contract rice and eventually cash crop 
prodµction to households (Pingali and Vo 1992; Kerkvliet and Porter 1995; Le T.C. et 
al. 1996; Nguyen N.H. 1998; and Tachibana et al. 2001). 
This directive was the transitional step from the centrally planned and subsidised 
mechanism of agricultural cooperatives to self-supporting individual households, and 
the handing over of the rights of land and labour to farmers. However, this 
transformation did not result in more security of land tenure due to the short-term 
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nature of the land contract and the fact that management and investment 
responsibilities remained with the cooperatives. Many other problems arose in the 
implementation of Decree 100. Contracting land based on the amount of labour 
caused an inequitable distribution of land and hardship for families with a high 
number of dependents. Farmers exploited soil productivity as quickly as they could 
because they had a land contract for only two to three years. Consequently, serious 
soil deterioration was widespread and resulted in declining agricultural productivity 
(Nguyen S.C. 1995:86; Le T.C. et al. 1996: 39; and Nguyen N.H. 1998: 3). 
As for as management was concerned, farmers were in charge of three stages, 
planting, maintenance and harvesting, and the remaining stages such as ploughing and 
harrowing, supplying seeds, irrigation, combating pests, and protecting the fields were 
still entrusted to the cooperatives. Moreover, farmers were allowed limited scope in 
decision-making. In general, the farmers were not free to grow crops of their choice 
but had to take care of the crop fixed in the contract and the cooperative still held a 
monopoly over the provision of inputs and the marketing of outputs (Wolz 2000: 13). 
The limited supply of inputs such as fertilisers, pesticides and seeds, and lack of 
capitals discouraged the farmers to invest in soil productivity, even in the short-term. 
The internal management mechanism of cooperatives increased the contribution of 
farmers to funds. Farmers were required to market through the cooperatives and to 
meet the production quotas set by the cooperative according to land quality. The 
production quotas set for the various land classes were quite high, since the 
cooperative had to provide for a large staff and provide funds for its social service 
obligations. 
Farmers reacted to these constraints by returning the contracted land and not investing 
in production. Their refusal to contribute resulted in accumulation of debts, and tens 
of thousands of hectares of ripe paddy were not harvested. Farmers were not interested 
in farmland or framework. Although during the 1981-1985 five years plan, average 
annual food output reached 16.9 million tons as against 13.35 million tons during the 
1976-1980 period (General Department of Statistics 1986: 62), agricultural production 
faced a new risk of depression, with food production in 1987 reduced by 870,000 tons 
(Nguyen N.H. 1998: 3). Starvation occurred in 21 provinces and cities of the North in 
108 
·. 
early 1988, affecting 9.3 million people, and 39.7 per cent of farming households 
(Nguyen S.C. 1995: 87). 
To rectify this situation, in April 1988 the government issued Resolution 10 which 
stipulated that the State allocated farmland for a long period for the use of households. 
Around 70 per cent of the cooperatives' land was allocated to households for farming 
and the remainder was allocated to persons whose had labour, capital and experiences 
of potential benefit to the country. The resolution directed the villages to allocate land 
to households based on the total number of household members and to extend the 
length of contract periods for agricultural lands to 15 to 20 years. 
In 1993 a Land Law was promulgated that clarified the terms of tenure for land 
allocated to households and the cooperatives' role in agricultural production. Its 
provisions called for an additional allocation of communal lands to households, 
reducing the amount of communally held lands to 5 per cent. The Land Law also 
provided for 20 years of land-use rights for land devoted to annual crops and 
aquaculture, and 50 years leases for land under perennial crops. The land registration 
process started after the release of the Land Law. Stability of land tenure was to be 
strengthened by improved definition of land boundaries: the exact size and location of 
each plot of land allocated was to be measured, recorded and included within the 
household's land usage certificates. Providing land rights certificate to individual 
households has thus reduced the threat to a household's land tenure caused by 
unresolved disputes over land claims (Smith and Tran 1994: 14; and Smith 1995: 20). 
Land registration is widely believed to have increased land use efficiency and 
agricultural production by making land transfers possible, providing collateral for 
agricultural loans, and increasing incentives to adopt new technology, on-farm 
investment, and soil conservation practices. Studies of land reform in Vietnam have 
indicated that 'when farmers are given land use certificates, they will be assured of 
their rights to the land and undertake production and business activities on the l~nd, 
creating opportunities for an improved life ' (UNDP 1996: 40). 
The policy of leasing state-owned agricultural land to individual households for a long 
period provides the incentive for farmers to invest in productivity. The benefits of 
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increased security . of land tenure have been illustrated in many of the rice-based 
economies of monsoon Asia, such as China, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Similar 
to Vietnam, in the transition from a centrally planned economy to market-oriented 
rural development, these countries have founded a nominal state - but de facto private 
- land ownership. In this system, the state-owned farmland can be used as private land 
and land can be sold and bought like private property (Hayami 1994: 9; and Zhou 
1998: 2). Studies by Barrows and Roth (1990: 268) of land reform in African 
countries have also shown that individualisation of land tenure (leasehold and 
freehold) increases the tenure security of the landholder. Prosterman et al. has also 
stated: 
Throughout the world, experience demonstrates that the farmer who owns 
the land he tills will make the long-term investment essential to increasing 
production, prospering and becoming a real participant in the local, and 
ultimately in the global, economy. The owner-operated family farm remains 
the most productive of all agricultural systems. Furthermore, land reform is 
probably the most important, and sometimes the only, means of altering 
inequitable power structures for effective development of participatory 
institutions, local and national, and thus for strengthening democracy. 
(1990: 2) 
Nevertheless, a land use certificate alone is not a sufficient condition for land tenure 
security. Land tenure security needs to go together with the appropriate State 
management and enforcement mechanisms. 
Management mechanisms 
The 1993 Land Law legitimised the rights of land holders to transfer, cede and sell the 
fruits of their labour and the results of investment in the land when the land is 
assigned to other users. Households have the right to sell the land if they move to 
another place, if they change jobs, or if they are not able to work. Households may 
also transfer land-use rights by inheritance and may exchange and mortgage land-use 
rights. The law also grants households the rights to sub-lease their land for up to three 
years in certain circumstances. However, it prohibits households from using more than 
three hectares of agricultural land for annual crops. The law points out that the State 
will recover the land back from farmers if the land is not used according to the 
purpose for which it was allocated such as in the case of building a house on land that 
was designated to cultivate crops. These rights are specified in articles of the 1993 
Land Law as show in Box 5 .1. 
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Box 5.1. Article 3, 26, 78 in the 1993 Land Law of Vietnam. 
Article 3: Land and certificates for land use rights can be handed to households on a long-term and 
permanent basis. The rights to the land are increased to five rights: the rights to exchange, transfer, 
inherit, mortgage and lease land. 
Article 26: The State entirely or partly recovers the land already allocated in the following cases: 
( 1) The organisation users of the land being dissolved, going bankrupt, moving to another place, 
reducing its requirement of land use but does not fall under Article 30 of this Law. The individual users 
of the land being dead and having no one to inherit his or her land use right. 
(2) The land user returns the allocated land at his own will. 
(3) The land is not used for 12 continuous months without a permit given by the State body which has 
the authority to allocate that land; 
(4) The land user intentionally tries not to fulfil the responsibility assigned by the State; 
( 5) The land is not used according to the purpose for which it was allocated; 
( 6) The land is not allocated by the rights authority defined under Article 23 and 24 of this Law. 
Article 78: 
The households and individuals who are using agricultural land for annual crop or aquatic culture due 
to the family being shorthanded, hard living, due to the change of job but the new job is not yet stable, 
or being short of labour have the right to lease the land to other persons with the period being not more 
than 3 years. In special cases, the period of the lease can be longer as decided by the Government. The 
land lessee must use the land according to the given purpose. 
Source: Land Law of Vietnam, 1993. 
The principle obligation of the farmer households is to pay tax. As cooperative 
members, it is also their duty to contribute to the cooperative's fund. In many places, 
taxes and the contributions to the cooperative's funds are exempt for privileged 
families such those who have rendered services to the country. Services of 
cooperatives including irrigation and pest prevention are accounted for as production 
costs. The farm households have an obligation to use land according to the assigned 
usage. Some cooperatives even regulate the structure of crops and kinds of plants 
cultivated to a set plan for a particular land area. This practices is applied especially in 
areas that requires uniform irrigation services by the cooperatives. 
The new land tenure arrangements in conjunction with the improvement of rural 
industries and services, has resulted in significant progress in agricultural production 
and improvement of livelihoods in rural areas. Farmers have been eagerly returning 
from their 5 per cent plots to take up their assigned land because they have became,_an 
autonomous economic entity, labour has been liberalised, and a bond between the 
farmers and their land has been created. As a result, more investment in terms of 
labour, time and money has been put into land to increase its efficiency. Some barren 
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and neglected land has been reclaimed. During the 1981-85 period, there was a 
reduction of 25,000 hectares in rice-growing land but the pace of decline in rice land 
slowed significantly after the 1993 Land Law was implemented (Nguyen N.H. 1998: 
8). 
With individual rights to the use of land, farmers have greater incentives to diversify 
crops and rotate paddy and non-staple crops, thus increasing national food production. 
However, the policy of government is that in certain areas of farmland of each region, 
rice is the solely production, and in this case the farmers cannot use the land for other 
purposes (Box 5.1). In each region food production has been improved in terms of 
both quantity and quality. The faster growth rate in food output than in population led 
to an increase of 8. 7 per cent in per capita food output in 1993-94 compared to 1989-
92, reaching 359.1 kg/year. It is estimated that in 1995, food output, food output per 
capita and rice exports were 17 million tons, 362 kg and 2.2 million tons, respectively, 
with a food growth rate of 3.84 per cent and population growth rate of 2 per cent 
(Nguyen S.C. 1995: 105). 
Management of cooperatives has been enhanced. From being subsidised, they are now 
autonomous and self-accounting entities. The management is more democratic and 
transparent. The management staff has been streamlined, with their responsibilities 
closely linked to the households, and new relationships have emerged. Cooperative 
managerial carders who are not directly involved in farming have been reduced by as 
much as a half. The expenses incurred by local party branches and authorities are no 
longer to be covered by the cooperative budget. As households have become more 
independent and gained control over their produce, investment by cooperatives has 
shrunk. As the market economy has developed and private trading of agricultural 
inputs and outputs expanded, farm households have greater freedom in diversifying 
and . specialising their economic activities. Thus the cooperatives are only able to 
maintain their position because they can provide services on a competitive basis. They 
have begun to concentrate on carrying out major services such as irrigation and 
supplying of raw materials that is best done on a large scale (Wolz 2000: 22). 
Cooperatives have given up their leading role in production and handed this role to 
individual farm households (Nguyen N.H. 1998: 8; and Tran T.Q. 1998: 48). 
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The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) and the General 
Department of Land Administration have shared the responsibility for the 
implementation of the Land Law in rural areas. They are responsible for land surveys, 
the organisation of cadastral mapping and registration, as well as for the completion of 
land use plans. These tasks are implemented at the local level by the Cadastral Survey 
Departments, which send out officials to villages in order to carry out surveys, and 
help the households fill out application forms. However, the implementing regulations 
will be very important in determining the effects of the law and how it will be 
administered at the grass-roots level. 
In the implementation of the Land Law, problems in exercising and enforcing land use 
rights have emerged. The process of giving land certificates to farm households has 
faced some difficulties such as the high costs of land measurement, disputes over the 
allocation of land and incorrect information about land type, land size, or user name 
because of the lack of support from local households to the cadastral workers. Neither 
the training nor the incentive structure encourages the use of participatory approaches 
to the allocation process (UNDP 1996: 44). Moreover, some policies such as those 
relating to credit, transfers, and agricultural pricing have not been adjusted 
appropriately to give incentives for increased agricultural production and land 
improvement. 
Problems of landlessness are occurring in rural areas. In areas where yields of rice and 
other grain are low, and rural infrastructure, non-crop agriculture, and off-farm 
employment not yet developed, peasants can find few employment opportunities in 
non-grain production. Their income thus is very low and their ability to cope with 
problems in production and living is very weak. They can obtain permission to sell 
their land to deal with natural disasters, disease, debts and other difficulties, or be 
induced to sell land to industrial and urban developers in order to earn high, short-
term profits. Also, when the agricultural cooperatives were abolished, many individual 
households faced difficulties in accessing agricultural services that heightened the 
necessity for them to sell land. These peasants-farmers became the new landless 
(Demaine 1997: 1063; and Zhou 1998: 3). 
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In contrast, in areas which are in the high-wage economy, a peasant's income can be 
greatly increased as there is no need for them to rely on rice production because they 
can find sufficient off-farm employment. In this case, if land titles could not be 
transferred, there would be a tendency for the leaseholders to become part-time 
farmers and absentee (Zhou 1998: 7). Although there have arisen some problems in its 
implementation, the new tenure system in North Vietnam has created security for 
farmers investing in agriculture and improving agricultural productivity. 
5.2.4. Comparison of the security levels of Collectivisation and Renovation 
tenure arrangements 
Analysis of the level of security of land tenure arrangements in the different historical 
periods of North Vietnam has shown that the tenure regime under Collectivisation is 
insecure for purposes of agricultural development compared with the higher level of 
security of land tenure regime in the Renovation period. The comparison of security 
levels between these two tenure regimes is summarised in Table 5 .2. 
According to the definition of Prosterman et al. (1998), land tenure is secure if it 
embraces three essential criteria which are breadth, duration and assurance. Land 
tenure under Collectivisation did not meet these criteria. There were no rights to 
possess the land, no ability to gain benefits from labour and capital invested in the 
land, no rights to alienate and inherit land, and of course other features of tenure 
security such as duration and assurance were not applicable. In contrast, the land 
tenure regime in the Renovation period provides individualised tenure with clear 
definition of land-use rights that increases security for farmers to invest in agricultural 
productivity. 
The data collected from the household survey in four provinces of North Vietnam 
refl~cts the farmers' preferences regarding ownership rights in land. Question 24 
(Appendix 4.1) asked whether farmers, when given a hypothetical choice, would -like 
the current nominal state - but de facto private - land ownership or prefer the former 
system of production teams working on cooperatives. As can be seen in Table 5 .2, an 
overwhelming majority, 85 per cent, of the farmers in the four villages opted for the 
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contemporary land tenure regime while only 4 per cent prefer the management regime 
of cooperatives. 
Table 5.1. Levels of land tenure security in two land tenure arrangements: 
Collectivisation and Renovation. 
Criteria of land tenure 
security 
Breadth 
Rights to possess and use land 
free from interference of 
outsiders. 
Ability to reap the benefits of 
labour and capital invested in 
the land. 
Rights of inheritance, selling 
and leasing land to others. 
Rights to pledge land-use rights 
as security for credit. 
Duration 
The length of time for which 
these rights are valid 
Assurance 
Enforcement of land-use rights 
Level of tenure security 
Characteristics of land tenure 
in Collectivisation 
(1957 - 1988) 
None. The State owned the land 
and farmers worked for 
cooperatives as agricultural 
labourers. 
Cooperatives organised the 
work points system: payment 
was based on the length of time 
a farmer worked in the fields. 
None. 
None. 
Not applicable 
Not applicable 
Insecurity 
Characteristics of land tenure 
in Renovation 
(1988 - present) 
Yes. Individual farmers have 
been given land certificates and 
can farm the land on an 
individual basis. 
Individual farmers have rights to 
grow and harvest what they 
invested in land. 
Yes. Individual farmers have 
rights to pass on to heirs, to sell 
or lease land-use rights to 
others. 
Individual farmers have rights to 
use land as collateral. 
Farm-households are provided 
with stable and long-term rights 
to use land: 20 years for annual 
crops and 50 years for perennial 
tree crops and fores try land. 
These rights are being enforced. 
Higher security 
The standard errors of proportions and the confidence intervals on proportions were 
calculated and presented in tables. The standard error of a statistic is the standard 
deviation of the sampling distribution of that statistic. Standard errors are important 
because they reflect how much sampling fluctuation a statistic will show. SE gives a 
general sense of the similarity of the measurements in a distribution to their mean and 
so to one another. Where the standard error is small, the observations are generally 
similar (homogeneous). Where it is large, the distribution is heterogeneous (Cochran 
1963; Tal 2001 ). In general, the larger the sample size the smaller the standard error. 
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The inferential statistics involved in the construction of confidence intervals and 
significance testing are based on standard errors. 
A confidence interval (CI) is a range of values that has a high probability of 
containing the parameter being estimated. The 95% confidence interval is constructed 
in such a way that 95% of such intervals will contain the parameter. Similarly, 99% of 
99% confidence intervals contain the parameter. If a parameter is normally distributed 
and the standard error of the statistic is known, then a confidence interval for that 
statistic can be computed as follows: 
parameter± (z) (SEparameter) 
where SE is the standard error of the parameter (such as mean, proportion ... ), and z is 
a tabular value of confidence level ( e.g. if z= 1.96, the confidence level is 95%) . 
There is an extremely close relationship between confidence intervals and hypothesis 
testing. When a 95% confidence interval is constructed, all values in the interval are 
considered plausible values for the parameter being estimated. Values outside the 
interval are rejected as implausible. If the value of the parameter specified by the null 
hypothesis is contained in the 95% interval then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected 
at the 0.05 level. If the value specified by the null hypothesis is not in the interval then 
the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 0.05 level (Harrison and Tamaschk:e 1984, 
Hyperstat 2004). 
To test the difference between the sample proportions or means, one can compute the 
difference between the sample proportions/means, the standard error of the difference, 
and then conduct the confidence interval on the difference between the sample 
proportions/means. In the hypothesis test for the difference between the sample 
proportions or means, the null hypothesis is there is no difference between the sample 
proportions/means (i.e. the value of the null hypothesis is zero) and an alternative 
hypothesis the value of which is different from zero. If zero, the value specified by the 
null hypothesis, is not in the interval, the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
sample proportions/means can be rejected at a certain level. 
Alternatively, one can compare two confidence intervals on the sample 
proportions/means. If two confidence intervals do not overlap or intersect in some 
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parts, we can conclude that the difference between two sample proportions/means 
does exist. If two confidence intervals do overlap or intersect in some parts, the above 
test should be conducted to determine how different the two sample 
proportions/means are. In this study, the comparison of the Cis is used to test the 
difference between the sample proportions/means. If there is an intersection between 
two Cis, a further test will be established (Harrison and Tamaschke 1984, Hyperstat 
2004). 
Table 5.2. Farmers' preference in land ownership and land tenure 
Farmers' preference in State-owned with State-owned with No Total 
land ownership and land-use rights land-use rights response 
tenure regime devolved to the farm- controlled by 
households cooperatives 
Thuy Dien village 22 (88%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 25 
Bai Yen village 24 (96%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 25 
My Giang village 20 (80°/o) 1 (4%) 4 (16%) 25 
Co Cham village 19 (76%) 2 (8%) 4 (16%) 25 
Mean 85% 4% 11% 100 
Standard Error of 0.035 0.0196 0.0313 proportion (SE) 
95% Confidence (0. 78 to 0.92) (0.002 to 0.078) (0.049 to Interval ( Cl) 0.171) 
Note: Standard error of the proportion (SE) is the square root of p(l-p)/n where n is the 
sample size (e.g. SE=0.035={0.85*(1-0.85)/100} 112). 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
A comparison of two confidence intervals on the mean of number of farmers with 
preference on "State-owned with land-use rights devolved to the farm-households" 
and the mean of number of farmers with preference on "State-owned with land-use 
rights controlled by cooperatives" shows that two Cls do not intersect each other (0.78 
to 0.92 against 0.002 to 0.078). This indicates a statistically significant difference 
between two groups of farmers. 
Among the few farmer interviewees who preferred to return to the cooperative regime, 
three of them are from households that derive the bulk of their income from non-farm 
sources and one household is the poorest in the village. These facts indicate that the 
peasants who are not working full-time on the farm or who are not able to carry out 
farming activities, thought it appropriate for the cooperatives to take over 
responsibility for agriculture. 
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Question 33 of the survey questionnaire proposed the idea of essentially granting 
farmers freehold tenure to their land: 'Should land use rights be made permanent?' 
The results of in-depth interviews of 67 farmers in four villages of Vinh Phuc, Hoa 
Binh, Hai Duong and Ha Tay provinces reveal that a majority of farmers, 88.5 per cent 
of the respondents, endorse the idea of perpetuating land use rights, with about 6 per 
cent still attracted to the idea of state-owned land but long-term use rights devolved to 
the farm households. All farmer interviewees of Thuy Dien village stated that they 
would prefer perpetual land use rights (Table 5.3). 
T bl 5 3 F a e • • armers ' tft d t a 1 u es owar d th • • f ti d e proV1s1on o permanen an . ht use rig s 
Should land-use rights Permanent land-use Current term of Unsure Total 
be granted to farmers rights for farmers land lease (20 and 
in perpetuity? 50 year leases) 
Thuy Dien village 15 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 15 
Bai Yen village 11 (91.6%) 1 (8.4%) 0 (0%) 12 
My Giang village 13 (86.6%) 1 (6.4%) 1 (6.7%) 15 
Co Cham village 19 (76%) 2 (8.0%) 4 (16 %) 25 
Mean 86.6% 6.0% 7.4% 67 
Standard Error (SE) 0.042 0.029 0.032 
95% Confidence 0.784 to 0.947 0.003 to 0.116 0.012 to 0.138 Interval (Cl) 
Note: Standard error of the proportion (SE) is the square root of p(l-p)/n where n is the 
sample size. 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
With minor exceptions, the survey results show that households who prefer that land 
rights be granted in perpetuity are primarily those that still rely heavily for an income 
on agriculture and particularly on grain production, and have the ability to invest in 
farm activities. Permanent land use rights are not favoured by the few poor households 
who lack capital and labour for carrying out farm production. Households whose 
income comes from sources other than agricultural production are indifferent to the 
length of land lease term. For instance, all household interviewees who live in Thuy 
Dien village of Vinh Phuc province are fully engaged in farm production and they all 
prefer perpetual land use rights. One very poor family in Bai Yen village of Hoa Binh 
province and one in My Giang village of Ha Tay province said that they would like 
the cooperative to have responsibility for farm production because they are unable to 
carry it. Whereas, a few households in My Giang village and Co Cham village, where 
the major part of the income of farmers is from off-farm work, are unsure about the 
changes in land tenure arrangements. The Cls in Table 5.3 indicates a statistically 
significant difference in opinions between two groups of farmers 
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5.3. Impacts of changes in land tenure arrangements on Jong-term land 
improvement 
The change in the security level of land tenure arrangements from Collectivisation to 
Renovation has affected agricultural development in general and land conservation 
investment in particular. The first part of this chapter assessed the security level of 
each tenure system and the impacts of each arrangement on agricultural production. In 
this second part of the chapter, the influences of these tenure regimes on farmers' 
attitudes and practices toward long-term land improvement are compared. 
5.3.1. Land conservation practices in the research site 
Overview of conservation measures 
Uplands and Midlands 
The midlands and highlands of northern Vietnam are regions of limited agricultural 
land but with increased population since the program of resettlement was 
implemented in 1954. Land productivity has been declining and the main direct causes 
of the decline of land productivity are shifting cultivation, deforestation and 
unsustainable farming practices. Sustainable land management of sloping land areas is 
a recent urgent need. A number of conservation measures have been applied to 
protect, improve and utilise sloping land. The slash-and-bum cultivation regime is 
being changed into terrace farming. The development of perennial crops and agro-
forestry practices has been promoted with the application of intercropping systems. 
Agro-forestry systems, in which the growing of trees is integrated with production of 
annual crops, offer a promising approach to sustainable land use. This system is being 
used on a wide range of land from the valleys to the very hilly areas, including paddy 
fields, home gardens, fish ponds and livestock, tree gardens, swidden fields and 
plantation forest. Wet rice fields are dominant in the narrow terraced valleys. House 
sites and associated home-gardens usually lie along the higher ground between the 
paddies and the hill slopes, where cassava and tea are often planted (Le T. C. et al. 
1996: 9; and Rambo 1998: 50) (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). 
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Gardens are planted with a great diversity of perennial species, primarily fruit trees 
such as custard apples, logan, mandarin, persimmons, plums, lychees, jujube and 
apricots as well as tea, coffee, bananas, herbs, and some timber trees. Home gardens 
are worked almost exclusively with household labour. Manure and some chemical 
fertilisers are the principle inputs. Night soil is preferentially applied to the home 
gardens by most households. Use of green manure cover crops is an effective measure 
for conserving land (Donovan et al. 1997; and Le V.K. 1997). 
Hedgerow farming using shrubby green manure crops is another conservation measure 
which can minimise run-off and soil loss because, with the biomass of hedgerows and 
crop residues returned to the soil, the soil fertility improves gradually. Contours made 
of green manure plants also have a high conservation effect by reducing run-off and 
soil loss. Tea plantations are a very good option for managing steep acid lands. For 
example, in Hoa Binh and Vinh Phuc provinces farmers are interested in conservation 
methods such as intercropping peanut with cassava, Tephrosia or lemon grass 
hedgerows, contour farming, stone-lines and fertilisation (Nguyen H. et al. 1998: 139; 
and Tran D.T. et al. 1998: 88) (see Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4). 
These conservation measures require high establishment costs in terms of labour, time 
and costs of other inputs. The establishment costs strongly influence the short-term 
economic viability of the hedgerow intercropping and terracing relative to traditional 
open-field farming in uplands of many developing countries (Nelson and Cramb 2000: 
142). 
Lowlands (the Red River Delta) 
Villages of the Red River Delta are characterised by household compounds which are 
centralised and surrounded by paddy fields. Small-size home gardens are located in 
the household compounds, and are planted with a variety of fruit trees and vegetables 
(Figure 5.5, Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8). A large of number of ponds are scattered 
throughout the villages, with most of them connected to the house sites. Most low 
land areas are arable. However, the depletion of nutrients from the cultivated lands is 
inevitable, and thus some soil conservation measures have been used. Farmers have 
applied manure to their fields and also added chemical fertilisers. Pig, buffalo and 
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cattle manure compost and night soil are the main types of manure households apply 
to their fields (Patanothai 1998: 171). 
Pig manure compost is accumulated daily by putting rice straw, grasses, rice husks 
and tree leaves into the pig pen as bedding, then collecting the bedding and manure for 
use in the fields twice a year for spring and winter crops. Night soil is used as compost 
by putting ash of rice straw or plant materials in the latrine to mix with human 
excrement. Farmers prefer to use night soil for winter subsidiary crops and rice 
nurseries. The manure of cattle or buffalo is collected from their stables and put into 
the pit near the stables together with straw left over from animal feeding. Green 
manure is also used. Green manure is made by taking weedy grasses, wild azolla and 
leguminous trees such as sweet potato vines, peanut plants and taro, placing them in 
piles in the fields and covering them with soil. 
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Figure 5.1. Farming on steep land with paddy rice and maize in the valley of Bai 
Yen village 
Figure 5..2. Forest-Garden-Pond-Husbandry Model 
I 
J 
Figure 5030 Thuy Dien farmers growing rice, cassava and fruit trees on round 
hills and plain field 
Figure 5.4. Home garden and paddy rice in Thuy Dien village 
Figure 5.5. Plain fields of paddy rice and home-garden in My Giang village 
Figure 5°6. Interviewing key informants in My Giang village 
Figure 5° 7. Paddy rice fields in Co Cham village 
Figure 5.8. Vegetables and fruit tree garden nn Co Cham village 
.. 
To supplement the animal and green manure and night soil, an appropriate amount of 
chemical fertilisers and lime is often applied to the fields. The fertilisers used are urea 
for nitrogen, superphosphate for phosphorus, and potassium chloride for potassium. 
Some compound fertilisers are used but in small amounts. Lime is applied to the fields 
which have high soil acidity. 
Changes of farming practices have been an effective way to improve land productivity 
in North Vietnam. Instead of the traditional mono-culture, the paddy land has two 
crops of rice, and many areas have an additional third crop in the dry winter season. 
Crops grown as the third crop include sweet potato, potato, peanuts, maize, and 
soybean (Tran H.K. 1995: 48). 
Factors affecting farmers' adoption of long-term land conservation 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, farmers' adoption of soil conservation activities is 
determined by personal, physical, economic and institutional factors. Studies that have 
considered farmers' attitudes towards conservation have suggested that farmers' 
decisions about whether to take advice about conservation were affected by three 
dimensions: the policy environment facing farmers, the advisory structures in place 
and the personality of the farmers (Potter 1986; Clark 1989; and Lemon and Park 
1993). 
In this study, the relationship between farmers' personal characteristics and 
institutional arrangements is the focus in examining the impacts of land tenure 
regimes on the attitudes of farmers toward land conservation practices. The study also 
analyses how land tenure regimes have influenced the decisions of farmers about 
conservation practices through their effects on other factors such as physical, 
economic and soil conservation factors. 
Physical factors define the potential erosion or depletion of soil organic matter and 
determine potential productivity benefits over the entire farm unit. Physical factors are 
slope length, slope degree, soil erodibility and other features of soil quality such as 
soil acidity, soil alkalinity, and soil organic depletion. Farm size and farm location are 
also included among the physical factors. 
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Economic factors may either enhance or constrain farmers' attitudes toward land 
degradation control. Higher levels of economic returns are thought to be positively 
associated with a number of conservation practices because financial constraints to 
adoption are less for farmers with larger incomes. Thus, ideally, net farm income 
would be the appropriate measure. However, income data was difficult to collect from 
the sample farmers, so total acres of cropland were substituted. Off-farm income also 
plays an important role in supplementing income for financing conservation 
expenditures; thus the total income of a farm household is also used as a factor 
affecting measurement. Debt level is popularly perceived as an economic factor 
affecting decisions about conservation practices. It is argued that farmers under high 
debt service loads such as land mortgages are forced to plant mostly high return, 
erosive row-crops and cannot afford to invest in conservation practices, especially 
structures (Nelson and Cramb 2000). 
The planning horizon of conservation investment is an important economic factor that 
may constrain or encourage farmers in short-term or long-term investment as the 
future benefits will accrue to the farmers in a certain time horizon of investment 
(Ervin and Ervin 1982). Pay-off to investment in soil conservation practices also 
reflects the benefits of investment including crop yields and soil quality. Economic 
factor affect investment decisions because the return from investment is the total 
profit the farmers receive during the period of investment (Francis 1993). 
Soil conservation effort is a function of the effectiveness and extensiveness of fhe 
individual's practices over the farmland. Soil conservation effort can be measured by 
the labour, time and material inputs committed by the farm household. Conservation 
effort therefore is hypothesized to depend heavily on· economic and institutional 
factors because the farmers' ability and willingness to afford those inputs are 
determined by these factors. 
:., 
Personal factors include personal attributes such as age, education, gender, farming 
experience, and perceptions about land degradation and conservation. The age of the 
household head has been found to be a significant factor in applying conservation 
measures because age affects expectations about the ability to reap the benefits of 
activities that require long periods of labourious work. For example, bench terracing 
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and the construction of rock walls would be less appealing to older farmers (Cramb et 
al. 2000: 74). Higher education levels should be associated with better information 
about conservation measures and the productivity consequences of land degradation 
(Ervin and Ervin 1982: 283). 
Farmers' perceptions about farm problems and options for resolving them are partly a 
function of personal attributes and partly a function of farm attributes. The study of 
the adoption soil conservation practices should consider farmers' awareness of the 
process of land degradation occurring on their farms, the rates of soil loss and the 
impact of land degradation on crop production, the causes of farmland degradation, 
and the appropriate means to deal with it (Seitz and Swanson 1980: 1084). It is argued 
that awareness of a land degradation problem is likely to increase an individual's 
perception of the symptoms of degradation and, in tum, lead to adoption of the 
relevant technology (Anim 1999: 337). Awareness of soil deterioration problems, 
perceptions of long-term profitability and the length of conservation scheme are 
crucial factors for conservation investments and expected to be highly correlated with 
the adoption of conservation measures. Thus these factors are also considered in 
measuring the adoption of land conservation practices by farmers. 
5.3.2. The influence of change in land tenure security levels on the adoption 
of soil conservation in North Vietnam 
The assessment of impacts of changes in the land tenure regune from the 
Collectivisation period to the Renovation period is based on the data obtained from 
the household survey conducted in four villages in four provinces of northern Viet 
Nam (Chapter 4). The socio-economic characteristics of the surveyed households in 
those four villages are described in Table 5 .4. The 100 farmers interviewed reported 
an average household size of 4.93 members and an average family labour of 3.08 
including non-agricultural labour. On average about half of the farm household is 
engaged in agricultural work. However, the percentages of households with non-
agricultural labour are different in the four villages. The large magnitude of standard 
error (0.21) in Table 5.4 shows the different number of farmers engaged in non-farm 
work between the four villages. In Thuy Dien village only 12 per cent of households is 
currently engaged in non-agricultural employment, while 20 per cent of households of 
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Bai Yen village provide non-agricultural labour. In My Giang and Co Cham villages, 
which are located close to urban areas, 54 per cent and 51 per cent respectively work 
off-farm permanently (Appendix 5 .1 a). 
According to the survey, the average landholding size is 0.23 hectares (Table 5.4), 
Generally, leases were allocated on the bases of household size, with an area of 
approximately of one sao (360 m2) per person (Appendix 5.1 b ). 
Land fragmentation is a common problem in rural areas. The government allocated 
land to farmers in an egalitarian spirit, which meant that each person was supposed to 
receive an equal amount of land of given quality. Therefore, each commune's land 
was cut into many small pieces to distribute to farm households. The average · of 
number of plots per farm household in the survey is 7.69 (Table 5.4). The least 
number of plots a family received was three and many families were allocated 10 to 
20 plots (Appendix 5.lc). 
The farm plots are far from each other and from the farm home. The mean distance of 
plots from homesteads is 998 meters. In particular, farmland in Co Cham village, 
which is located close to Hanoi city, is very fragmented with an average distance·· of 
plots from homes of 1432 meters (Appendix 5.ld). 
The estimated average annual per capita household income in the sample is 114.15 
USD. The per capita net income of peasants in Co Cham, where the household's 
income partly comes from the non-agricultural works, was highest, at about 134.80 
USD (Table 5.4). The income levels in the region have been categorised on the basis 
of the UNDP poverty line 1993 for rural households in Vietnam. 
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T a b l e  5 . 4 .  S o c i o - e c o n o m i c  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  1 0 0  f a r m  h o u s e h o l d s  i n  f o u r  v i l l a g e s  
P r o v i n c e  
V i l l a g e  
A v e r a g e  M e a n  f a m i l y  P e r c e n t a g e  o f  
A v e r a g e  p e r  A v e r a g e  f a r m  
A v e r a g e  
M e a n  d i s t a n c e  
H o u s e h o l d  l a b o u r  
h o u s e h o l d s  w i t h  c a p i t a  n e t  
s i z e  n u m b e r  o f  p l o t s  o f  p l o t s  f r o m  
s i z e  n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  
i n c o m e  ( U S D )  ( h e c t a r e s )  
p e r  f a r m  h o m e s t e a d  
l a b o u r ( % )  
h o u s e h o l d  ( m e t e r s )  
V i n h P h u c  
T h u y  < l i e n  5 . 0 5  2 . 7 8  
1 2  
1 0 1 . 4 6  0 . 2 5  
5 . 0 6  
7 4 0  
H o a B i n h  
B a i  y e n  
5 . 3  
2 . 5 3  
2 0  
1 1 8 . 6 6  0 . 2 4  
1 3 . 3  9 6 0  
H a  T a y  
M y  g i a n g  4 . 9 5  
3 . 4 5  
5 4  
1 0 1 . 6 6  0 . 1 9  6 . 0 6  8 6 0  
H a i  D u o n g  C o  c h a m  
4 . 4  
3 . 5 6  
5 1  
1 3 4 . 8 0  0 . 2 3  
6 . 3 6  
1 4 3 2  
A v e r a g e  4 . 9 3  
3 . 0 8  
1 1 4 . 1 5  0 . 2 3  
7 . 6 9  
9 9 8  
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A monthly per capita income ofVND 50,000 (or 4.54 USD) identifies a rural household 
in poverty, VND 30,000 (or 2.72 USD) a starving rural household and VND 91,670 (or 
8.3 USD) a basic needs household (UNDP 1998: 6). Hence, the average net income of 
farm households in the survey is a little above the basic needs level. About half of the 
respondents (52 per cent) have reached the basic needs income level, 26 per cent of 
respondents have per capita net incomes lower than this level, and only 22 per cent have 
higher net incomes {Appendix 5. le). 
Perceptions off armers about the adoption of land conservation practices 
Farmers in the sample perceive that agricultural land has been degraded seriously under 
both land tenure arrangements. There were 42 respondents in the sample who were 43 to 
7 5 years old and were therefore able to reply to the question about the Collectivisation 
period. About 56.7 per cent of farmers reported that they had recognised a land 
degradation problem, 13.4 per cent were indifferent to the problem, while 29.8 per cent 
did not reply to the question because they were children at that time (Figure 5.9a). 
A high proportion of farmers interviewed (85.3 per cent) also reported that they consider 
their farm land is presently being degraded, 8.2 per cent were indifferent to land 
degradation and 6.5 per cent are unclear about the problem as they are engaged in off-
farm work (Figure 5 .9b ). 
Although most of the farmers interviewed say their farmland has been degraded, they 
have different perceptions about the main causes of degradation. A large proportion of 
respondents attributed the degradation mainly to the physical characteristics of land such 
as the length of slope land and steepness of farmland (85.2 per cent) and inappropriate 
farming practices (70.1 per cent). 
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Figure 5.9. Farmers' perceptions of land degradation 
a. In the Collectivisation period 
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11 Indifferent 
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taking place 
b. In the Renovation period · 
8% 
85% 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
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The perceptions of farmers of the causes of land degradation are illustrated in Figure 
5.10 (A and B). In both lowland and upland areas, most farmers interviewed saw that 
the reasons for farmland degradation are inappropriate farming practices (72.2 per cent 
and 68 per cent respectively), land topography (81 per cent and 86 per cent 
respectively), and the poor specification of the land rights under the lend tenure regimes 
(58.4 per cent and 55 per cent respectively). Only six per cent to 33 per cent of the 
interviewed farmers of both areas prioritised other reasons for farmland degradation 
· such as climate change, weakness of enforcement, deforestation and inappropriate 
irrigation and drainage patterns. However, about 36.5% of farmers in the lowland areas 
consider rapid population growth as a cause of land degradation, while very few farmers 
(11.2%) in upland areas thought about that reason. 
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Figure 5.10. Farmers' perceptions about the main causes of land degradation 
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Causes of land deg·radation 
B. Upland areas (Thuy Dien and Bai Yen) 
1. Inappropriate irrigation and drainage patterns 
2. Slope length and steepness 
3. Tree density 
4. Rapid population growth 
5. Inappropriate farming practices 
6. Ill-specified land-use rights 
7. Weakness of enforcement 
8. Others (technical methods, climate changes) 
Source: Tran 2000. Field data. 
The perceptions of farmers about land degradation and its causes are very much related 
to their perceptions about how to protect soil quality. However, there is a clear 
difference in farmers' perceptions about how to conserve farmland under land tenure 
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arrangements in the Collectivisation and Renovation periods (Table 5.5 and Figure 
5.lla). 
Table 5.5. Farmers' intentions about protecting soil quality under the two land 
tenure regimes 
Have you wanted to 
invest in improving Collectivisation regime Renovation regime 
soil fertility of the 
fields 
Yes No No response Yes No Total 
Thuy Dien 1 (6.7%) 8 (53.3%) 6 (40%) 15 0 15 
Bai Yen 1 (8.3) 5 (41.7) 6 (50) 11 1 12 
My Giang 1 (6.7) 9 (60) 5 (33.3) 12 3 15 
Co Cham 2 (8) 15 (60) 8 (32) 22 3 25 
Average 5/42 37/42 25/67 60 7 67 
(11.9%) (88,1 °/4) (37.3%) (89.5%) (10.5%) (100%) 
Standard Error of 0.05 0.05 0.059 0.037 0.037 Proportion (SE) 
95% Confidence Interval 0.021 to 0.783 to 0.257 to 0.489 0.822 to 0.031 to (Cl) 0.217 0.979 0.969 0.178 
Note: Standard error of the proportion (SE) is the square root of p(l-p)/n where n is the sample 
size. 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
Non-intersection between the confidence interval on the mean of number of farmers 
preferred "Collective Regime" for soil quality protections and the mean of number of 
farmers preferred "Renovation Regime" (0.021 to 0.217 against 0.822 to 0.969) in Table 
5.5 indicates that there is a statistically significant difference. The cross-tabulations 
indicate that 88 per cent of farmers who responded to the survey questions about their 
intentions with regard to protecting soil quality did not wish to invest in improving soil 
fertility of the cooperative fields. They all said that as the farmlands belonged to 
cooperatives, and all farm equipment and other inputs and even the output were also 
owned by the State, they did not see that any benefits would come to them from 
protecting the soil quality of cooperative fields as they were paid by the amount of rice, 
which relied in tum on the length of time they worked in the fields. Another reason 
given was that the rights and responsibilities of managing farmland had not been in 
farmers' hands, thus most of them neglected to protect the soil under the 
Collectivisation regime. 
However, 11.9 per cent of respondents said that they wanted to improve the soil fertility 
of cooperative fields. Some of these farmers were members of the technical teams who 
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were sent to the training courses on farm techniques. The few farmers who preferred the . 
cooperative management also said they had wanted to protect the soil fertility of the 
cooperative fields. 
In contrast, 89.5 per cent of farmers in the four villages said that they wished to invest in 
long-term land improvement (Table 5.6). These farm-households pointed out that under 
the new Land Law, giving them the rights to use land over a long period, they have 
confidence to invest in agricultural production and improve soil quality because they 
believed that they could get profits from what they invested in farmland. Also, the land 
transfer rights, together with the rights to inherit and borrow money from the banks, 
have encouraged them to invest in improving their farmland. 
The reasons for these (10.5 per cent) of farmers not wishing to invest in soil 
conservation varied according to household characteristics and some constraints in 
implementing the Land Law. For example, two farmers in My Giang and Co Cham 
villages did not wish to invest in long-term land improvement due to the limitation of 
their household labour and finance. The other four farmers were indifferent to soil 
conservation investment because the main sources of their income are off-farm work. 
One farmer in Bai Yen village said that he lacked capital for investment in farming. He 
had attempted to borrow money from the banks, but his application was not accepted 
because he does not have any valuables to mortgage together with mortgaging his land. 
' 
Farmers' land conservation practices 
Under the cooperative system agricultural tasks were carried out by large groups of 
people, so that fields were no longer tended by peasants who knew · the land 
characteristics well. Land management was undertaken by the specific technical teams. 
However, the work of these teams was focused on rice production and they took little 
.care of land productivity. The cooperatives took sole ownership of all property, except 
the households' five percent of field plots. The only other means of earnings for farmers 
was participation in production activities governed by the cooperative on the 
cooperative's land and with the cooperative's equipment and other inputs. 
The results of the survey shown in Table 5.6 show that in the Collectivisation period a 
large majority of farmers (83.3 per cent) practised long-term land improvement only on 
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their own 5 per cent plots, while 92.8 per cent said they did not spend time, labour and 
other inputs on improving the cooperatives' fields. All respondents said that they had 
rights to cultivate, control, manage and pass their 5 per cent field plots to their children, 
thus they had applied some s~il conservation methods to their fields because they could 
reap profits from the improving productivity of the land. 
Table 5.6. Farmers' land improvement practices under Collectivisation 
Did you practise Collectivisation regime 
land Your 5% field Cooperative fields 
improvement? No 
Yes No respond Yes No No respond 
Thuy Dien 7 (46.7%) 2 (13.3%) 6 (40%) 1 (6.7%) 8 (53.3%) 6 (40%) 
Bai Yen 5 (41.7) 1 (8.3) 6 (50.0) 1 (8.3) 5 (41.7) 6 (50.0) 
My Giang 8 (53.3) 2 (13.3) 5 (33.3) 0 (0) 10 (66.7) 5 (33.3) 
Co Cham 15 (60) 2 (13.3) 8 (32.0) 1 (4) 16 (64.0) 8 (32.0) 
Average 35/42 7/42 25 3/42 39/42 25 (83.3%) (16.6%) (7.2%) (92.8%) 
Standard error of 0.057 0.057 0.0397 0.037 proportions (SE) 
9 5 % Confidence 0.721 to 0.054 to -0.006 to 0.851 to 
Interval (CI) 0.946 0.279 0.149 1.006 
Note: Standard error of the proportion (SE) is the square root of p(l-p)/n where n is the sample 
size. 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
There is a statistically significant difference between groups of farmers who wanted to 
applied land improvement practices to their 5% and cooperative fields. The confidence 
intervals in Table 5.6 reveals that 72 percent to 95 percent of farmers applied land 
improvement practices to their 5% field, while only zero percent to 15 percent of 
farmers did it for the cooperative fields. A number of farmers (16.6 per c~nt) were 
indifferent to improving their own land because they worked as traders in the markets. 
About 7 per cent of farmers who did practise soil conservation on the cooperatives' 
fields were members of the technical teams and some other young people who wanted to 
contribute their efforts to the cooperatives. The methods, which were used for protecting 
soil in the Collectivisation period, were traditional ones such as cattle and green 
·manure, crop residues and chemical fertilisers . Farming practices were unchanging 
because of the economic system and the limited technical knowledge. 
The effects of changes in land tenure security from the Collectivisation period to the 
Renovation period on farmers' long-term land improvement practices are indicated in 
the survey results. Table 5.7 shows that 79 per cent of farmers who were interviewed in 
the four villages currently apply some soil conservation methods. Among these villages, 
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the number of farmers in Bai Yen and My Giang who practised soil conservation is 
obviously less than in the two other villages (standard error = 0.2). Most of these 
farmers said that since the 1993 Land Law has been implemented, they are assured of 
the rights of using and managing their land as well as the rights to reap benefits from 
what they have invested in the land, and thus they are encouraged to invest in long-term 
land improvement. However, 21 per cent of the interviewed households had still not 
invested in long-term land improvement due to the number of constraints within the law 
itself and its implementation, as well as financial and labour constraints. A few of the 
households who rely on off-farm income are reluctant to invest in land. 
Table 5.7. Farmers' long-term land improvement practices under Renovation 
Have you practised long-term Yes No Total 
land improvement on your 
farmland? 
Thuy Dien 15 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 15 
Bai Yen 8 (66.7%) 4 (33.3%) 12 
My Giang 8 (53.3%) 7 (46.7%) 15 
Co Cham 22 (88.0%) 3 (12.0%) 25 
Mean 53 (79%) 14 (21 %) 67 (100%) 
Standard error (a) of percentages 0.05 0.05 
95% Confidence Interval (Cl) 0.694 to 0.888 0.112 to 0.306 
Note: Standard error of the proportion (SE) is the square root of p(l-p)/n where n is the sample 
size. 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
Investment in soil conservation in the Collectivisation Period was different between the 
upland and lowland regions as well as between provinces. These different types of 
conservation are illustrated in Table 6.3 . The common soil conservation in all areas is 
intercropping with application of fertilisers. Farmers in the upland with hills and 
mountains (Bai Yen and Thuy Dien) applied the model of agro-forestry while farmers in 
the lowlands (My Giang and Co Cham) applied the model of garden-pond-husbandry. 
Each village also had different conditions and incentives to adopt different soil 
· conservation measures. For example, My Giang villagers dropped the winter crop in 
every year as one soil conservation measure because they wanted to have time to work 
in the city to get higher incomes. But in Co Cham, another lowland village, also located 
close to urban areas, farmers grew fruit trees and leguminous vegetables. 
Nevertheless, compared with the 92.8 per cent of farmers who did not protect soil 
quality in their Collectivisation Period, the current tenure regime has shown in a 
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dramatic fashion its advantages in terms of giving incentives for farmers to adopt land 
conservation practices (Figure 5.11 ). 
Figure 5.11. Different impacts of land tenure regimes on conservation adoption 
a. under the Collectivisation Period 
No 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
b. under the Renovation Period 
No 
21% 
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Most of the farmers indicated that simultaneously with the appearance of new 
conservation techniques, the greater security of the current land tenure regime led them 
to invest in land improvements and to apply appropriate conservation methods including 
farming methods which can restore and improve soil quality. Each village uses some 
specific conservation methods. For example, in Thuy Dien village, the usual measures 
are intercropping, using fertilisers, gradual terracing and added mud to the soil. As in 
many other highland areas, Bai Yen village has applied the model of Forest-Garden-
Pond-Husbandry, cattle and green manures, terracing, and planting Acacia tree. 
Whereas, in My Giang and Co Cham villages, which are typical lowland areas, the 
common conservation measures are intercropping with the application of fertilisers, 
planting fruit trees and leguminous trees, and using livestock and green manures. 
Supporting for the above argument, data of the Agricultural Bureau of Lap Thach on the 
cropped area in Lap Thach district of Vinh Phuc province provided evidence of the 
.changes in farming practices from monoculture to multi-cropping with l~guminous 
plants which improves the nutrients in soil. Table 5 .9 demonstrates that over the period 
between 1988 and 1993, the area under cassava declined 25 per cent while the area 
under sweet potato, beans, and soybeans and vegetables increased substantially. 
However, the changes in farming practices in this period have been influenced by many 
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social, economic and environmental factors including the institutional changes (Lipper 
1996). 
Table 5.8. Lap Thach district cropped area, 1988 and 1993 (hectares) 
Crop 
Rice 
Com 
Cassava 
Sweet potato 
Beans 
Vegetables 
Peanuts 
Soybeans 
Source: Lipper (1996). 
5.4. Conclusion 
1988 
13139 
2649 
2121 
1612 
141 
979 
1049 
42 
1993 % change 
13181 0 
2633 -1 
1600 -25 
3042 89 
360 155 
1019 4 
1198 14 
239 469 
As in many developing countries, especially in the formerly socialist countries, the 
change in land tenure arrangements in northern Vietnam has marked an important 
change in agricultural development, particular in agricultural land management. The 
tenure regime with State sole ownership but without individual tenure, which dominated 
for over 30 years, adversely affected the region's agricultural production. Farmers who 
worked on the farms had no rights to the use and management of farmland, while the 
payment they received from their farm labour was based on the length of the time they 
spent on the cooperative fields. Therefore, they had no incentive to take care of 
farmland or invest in the land because their income did not come from agricultural 
production. 
In contrast, the 1993 Land Law gave full rights to the use of land to farmers, granting 
20-year land-use rights to farmers for agricultural land and 50 years for forest land, with 
the rights of transfer and rights of using land as collateral. The security of land tenure 
for individual farmers has not only led to changes in farmers' perceptions towards soil 
. conservation practices, it has also led to change in the fanning activities of farmers . 
Recently, farmers have been applying many soil conservation measures on -their farm. 
This fact demonstrates that the current land tenure regime provides security for farmers 
in North Vietnam to invest in long-term land improvement. 
However, there are a number of problems with the implementation of the 1993 Land 
Law such as problems in registering land certificates, the conditions for transferring 
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land rights, and the conditions for mortgaging land-use rights. These constraints have 
adversely affected the investment of farmers in long-term land improvements. These 
issues are analysed in more detail in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 6. The impact of land tenure duration on the adoption · 
of long-term land improvements 
6. 1. Introduction 
The 1993 land reform has created favourable circumstances for the development of 
agricultural production in Viet Nam. The new land tenure regime, in particular, has 
contributed positively to the adoption of long-term land improvements. 
However, besides the many advantages for farm and farmland productivity, there are a 
number of limitations in the law itself as well as in its implementation. These 
limitations exist in all aspects of the tenure regime such as the land registration process, 
land right certificates, land distribution, land transfer rights and the taxing of transfers, 
conditions for mortgaging land rights, the enforcement mechanism and the 
administrative system. This chapter and the next focus on these aspects of the current 
land tenure regime in order to understand the advantages and shortcomings, and their 
influences on agricultural production and land productivity. 
It is hypothesised that the duration of land tenure is an aspect of land tenure that 
strongly influences the adoption of land conservation practices. In examining this 
hypothesis, this chapter addresses the relationship between farmers' attitudes and land 
conservation practices and the issues of land registration, land lease term, and farm size 
as well as farm fragmentation problems. Using quantitative and qualitative data 
collected in the field work, this study shows that giving farmers land-use certificates 
with long-term rights to land can lead farmers to undertake production -and land 
protection activities that create opportunities for an improved life. The evidence 
provided also demonstrates several limitations in the processes of distributing land 
certificates and land re-distribution to farmers. 
· This chapter develops arguments with respect to the three main issues affecting the 
duration of the land tenure regime. First, it criticises the process of distributing land-use 
certificates, and the rights and obligations specified in the certificates in relation to 
farmers' investment in land. Second, the chapter discusses the relationship between the 
lease term and the long-term return from adopting land conservation practices. Third, it 
141 
examines the effects of the fragmentation of farm plots as well as their small size and 
the impacts on soil conservation practices. In conclusion, it discusses the implications 
for land registration and re-distribution theories and future policy formulation . . , 
6.2. Land-use rights certificates 
6.2.1. Definitions of land registration 
Since people first started growing their own food, land tenure and the title expressing it 
has played an important part in economies and in agriculture, as people needed tenure 
security for the land they farmed. Going back to about 3000 B.C. there were records of 
land ownership for ancient Egypt where the rulers kept a Royal Registry to record land 
ownership for taxation purposes (Larsson 1971). Much later, after Napoleon I decided to 
establish a French cadastral survey, land records were gathered for the purpose of 
taxation in Europe. At this time, there were also private needs for land records to 
support secure and efficient land transfers and protect ownership in land. This need for 
land records eventually provided the stimulation for land registration systems· (Hanstad 
1996: 2). 
A land registration system is defined as a public system of records concerning the legal 
rights to land. Land registration systems have existed in two categories: registration of 
deeds and registration of title. Registration of deeds developed hundreds of years ago in 
several European countries. This system involved the registering or recording of 
documents relating to interests in land. Many early legal systems and systems of 
customary law in less developed countries have regarded publicity alone as sufficient 
guarantee when land is transferred and neglected t~e private rights in land records that 
affect the land transactions between individuals. However, as societies become less 
close-knit and more complex, the process of private conveyancing of land becomes less 
. satisfactory. Purchasers and other interested parties need to be able to inquire into the 
· so-called owner's rights to the land (Ruoff 1957, Larsson 1991). 
The essential idea of land title registration was that a land register should show the state 
of ownership, rather than just provide evidence of ownership. Thus, under this system, 
the government guaranteed all rights shown in the land register. Under land title 
registration, a certificate of title provides conclusive evidence of the land rights 
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pertaining to a particular land parcel. A legal interest in land is not created or transferred 
until government itself - officials in the land registry office - makes a conclusive 
assessment of the current state of the title. In a Minnesota Supreme Court decision in the 
United States, Chief Justice Start described the difference between systems of land title 
registration and land recording in this way: 
The basic principle of this system (land title registration) is the registration of 
the title of land, instead of registering, as the old system requires, the evidence 
of such title. In the one case only the ultimate fact or conclusion that a certain 
named party has title to a particular tract of land is registered, and certificate 
thereof delivered to him. In the other, the entire evidence, from which 
proposed purchasers must, in their peril, draw such conclusion, is registered. 
(McCormark 1992 cited in Hanstad 1996: 20) 
In the United States, the land title registration system is generally referred to as the 
Torrens system, named after Sir Robert Torrens who also introduced land title 
registration in Australia. Although much of the rest of the world distinguishes between 
the Torrens system, the English system, the German system or the Ottoman system of 
title registration, experts point out that there are few differences between the systems 
and that using different names suggests a distinction in kind that does not really exist. 
Land registration is often closely linked to a cadastral. A cadastral is a methodically 
arranged public inventory of data on land parcels within a certain country or district 
based on a comprehensive survey of their boundaries. It is called a cadastral survey and 
a cadastral map indicates the boundaries of land parcels. Although cadastral were 
originally established for land taxation purposes, in many countries they later came to be 
used for land registration purposes (Larsson 1991 ). 
6.2.2. The necessity of a land registration system 
· Land is a fundamental resource, which can be most effectively used and exchanged 
when the rights to land are registered. Land titling or registration is needed, among of 
other reasons, to encourage land transfers to more productive farmers, improve farmers' 
access to credit, create incentives for investment in long-term land improvements and 
new technology, reduce litigation over land disputes, and improve the land 
administration system. 
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To promote land transfers 
A land market is central to the desirable policy goals for agriculture: improving the 
efficiency of the agricultural sector, raising the return to agricultural labour, and 
facilitating the exit from the agricultural sector of those who will be more productive 
elsewhere in the economy to be replaced in the agricultural sector by more productive 
farmers (Faruqee and Carey 1997: 1). In any society which recognises privately-owned 
property rights in land, a market in those rights will develop and interests in land will 
also pass by inheritance. Thus, it is important to provide adequate and efficient 
mechanisms by which to safely transfer interests in land (Hanstad 1996: 5). 
Many customary land tenure arrangements permit land transfers. Bruce and Domer 
(1982), Feldman (1974), and Collier (1983) have argued that in some situations land 
transfer may be discouraged by perceived insecurity on the part of owners who want to 
rent their land out, or potential purchasers who are dissuaded from buying land due to 
the uncertainty caused by local custom or government land policy. For example, the 
success of the land titling program in Cameroon was due to the fact that the boundary 
markers on farmers' land are placed by state agents, and are backed by state ,authority; 
community members respect the markers as powerful symbols of an individual's land 
claims. The markers therefore enhance the farmers' tenure security and promote 
economic growth (Sellers and Sellers 1999: 1120). 
Land titling or registration might be expected to reduce the costs of risks and 
transactions of land transfers. However, the formal legal and administrative mechanism 
of land registration - boundary delineation and recording of land claims - may increase 
risks and transaction costs for certain groups, especially local people who rely on 
informal means to establish and safeguard their claims. In particular, small farmers 
seeking credit are likely to face high transaction costs in dealing with formal 
·bureaucratic institutions such as banks (Atwood 1990: 663). In Kenya, for example, 
transaction costs are sufficiently high to discourage official registration of some sales. 
Many people rely on customary or informal land transfer practices rather than formal 
land registries (Coldham 1979, and Haugerud 1983). Other studies of the land 
registration issue have also founded that land titling increases , rather than decreases, 
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insecurity of tenure (Goheen 1988; Bruce and Fortmann 1989; and Watts 1993). Thus, 
the transaction costs involved in registering need to be carefully examined. 
Land registration or the written land contract is an important part of change in land 
tenure arrangements in many former communist countries. These countries are changing 
their land rights systems to allow for private land ownership and development of a land 
market. Therefore, it is essential that the opportunity to introduce a land title registration 
system be taken up (Hanstad 1996: 5). 
To improve farmers' access to credit 
The registration of rights to land provides the documentary evidence necessary to prove 
land rights at any time. The holder of the land rights can lodge his land rights as security 
for a loan. Secure legal rights are expected to facilitate farmers' access to cheaper, 
longer-term and more extensive credit. Possession of a land title is often a precondition 
for formal bank loans (Wai 1957; Sacay 1973; and Domer and Saliba 1981). In most 
countries the permanent improvement of land and the commercialisation of agriculture 
depends on the extension of agricultural credit. Investments in agricultural production 
and in land improvement require cash or credit because they require additional labour, 
capital, and some mechanised or draft power. However, lending institutions are typically 
unwilling to extend credit to farmers if they do not have well-defined and documented 
land rights to offer as collateral (Hanstad 1996). Registered or titled land can reduce the 
lenders' cost of information and the risk of default as it becomes a mortgageable 
commodity, thereby provides lenders with collateral (Atwood 1990: 664). 
Nevertheless, while the land title may lower a lender's risks and information costs 
regarding the validity of the borrower' s land claim, it may not reduce the remaining 
transaction costs. Formal credit institutions may have procedures for loans that make the 
opportunity cost of formal credit higher than for informal credit (Tran T.D 1999). Thus, 
· small farmers will not necessarily increase a bank's pool of potential borrowers when 
the pool of titled land is increased. For example, in some villages of Thailand where 
informal lending prevails, the granting of land title did not serve to secure loans in the 
formal credit market (Feder et al. 1985: 50). Informal lending is seldom if ever secured 
by land, but rather by other property (Tapsoba 1982 cited in Atwood 1990). Informal 
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lenders may even accept informal, unregistered land claims as collateral if the lenders 
are close enough to the community to have low-cost information on the legitimacy of 
informal land claims (Feder 1987: 18; and Atwood 1990: 665). 
However, farm credit from informal sources is often limited because it is typically much 
more expensive than formal credit and it is confined mostly to short-term loans of 
relatively small amounts. Thus, if farm productivity is to increase through investment, 
formal credit must become an important source of capital for farmers and land 
registration or a secure title is a significant prerequisite. 
To promote on-farm investment, conservation, and adoption of new technology 
Long-term farm improvements can include purchase of plant and machinery, improved 
soil quality, clearing of stumps, irrigation and conservation of water, bundling, 
terracing, and/or planting trees. If a farmer is to invest time, effort and capital in these 
improvements, he must be assured that the future income he expects from such 
investments will accrue to him or his family. Secure land title is an important 
requirement for this expectation (Atwood 1990: 665). The probability of losing one's 
land is affected by the security of the land tenure. Given the security and duration of the 
tenure, the farmer will choose between investments in capital equipment, which is not 
lost in the event of eviction, land improvements, which are completely lost in an 
eviction, and non-farm activities and assets, which are unaffected by eviction (Hayes et 
al. 1997: 370). Thus, the eviction risk is an obvious disincentive for improving untitled 
tracts (Feder and Onchan 19 8 7: 31 7). 
Studies in many countries have proven that the availability of secure land title has 
significant influence on farm and farmland investments. In Africa, customary tenure is 
widespread, and this may discourage the adoption of productive investments, soil 
_ conservation measures, or new technology. This situation also occurs where population 
pressure, ambiguously administered land laws or ch~ging rural authority s~ctures and 
institutions give rise to land disputes. Farmers feel less secure in their holdings when 
neighbours or village authorities disagree with the adoption of new techniques by 
refusing to respect their land claims (Atwood 1990: 666). 
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For example, in Cameroon, as land has becomes more valuable, farmers find themselves J 
threatened by family members seeking to claim private title to jointly-held land, by 
neighbours encroaching on customarily-defined boundaries, and by businessmen and 
politicians seeking to claim undeveloped land. Thus, the titling program of the state was 
popular because of the modification of Cameroon's 197 4 Land Ordinance by farmers 
and local administrators. Farmers used the law to obtain concrete boundary markers, 
rather than title, and increased their investment in the land. Administrators have used 
the ordinance to register underdeveloped land. Most importantly, it was suggested that 
policy makers should aim to register and record property rights based upon existing 
community norms and institutions, and should ensure that any program was simple and 
inexpensive to make the titling program successful (Sellers and Sellers 1999: 1125). A 
study in Costa Rica found a positive correlation (in the range of 0.40 to 0.67) between 
the degree of ownership security and farm investment per unit of land (Salas et al., 
1970). 
Like many African countries, Ghana is in a transition between a traditional system of 
land rights which emphasises on the claims of the community and a modem one which 
emphasises the claims of the individual. Development of formal land rights -in Africa 
has become more important with increases in population pressure, and these increases 
have been a key factor in the adoption of large-scale land titling programs. Such a 
program was instituted in Ghana in the 1980s. Besley's study in Ghana supported the 
idea that individualistic property rights in legal land title facilitated investments in farms 
and farmland (Besley 1995: 936). Empirical research in Gambia has also shown that 
more individualised land rights were associated with a higher propensity to make 
investments, which in tum had positive effect on yields (Hayes et al. 1997: 381). 
There is other evidence of the incentive from secure land title for farm investment from 
. Asian countries. Empirical analysis in some provinces in Thailand indicated that the 
· possession of a legal land title contributes significantly to capital formatio:p. and land 
improvements. The results of a survey carried out by Feder and Onchan in 1984 in three 
provinces demonstrated that the probability a plot being improved by bunding and 
clearing is significantly higher on titled plots in the two north-eastern provinces as 
summarised in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1. Incidence of land improvements for titled and untitled plots 
Province Lop-Buri Nakhon Khon-kaen Pooled 
Ratchasima 
Farmer group Titled Untitled Titled Untitled Titled Untitled Titled Untitled 
plots plots plots plots plots plots plots plots 
% % % % 
Bunding 39 32 66 44 71 49 60 42 
Clearance of stumps 77 76 63 29 50 38 62 46 
Sample size 211 216 251 284 258 189 720 689 
Source: Feder and Onchan (1987). 
As can be seen in Table 6.1, the probability of bunding on a titled plot in Nakhon 
Ratchasima and Khon-Kaen is 30 and 20 percentage points higher, respectively, than for 
an untitled plot. Land titles have a statistically significant effect on clearing of stumps in 
the three provinces. The probability of clearing stumps on titled versus untitled plots is 
nine percentage points higher in Lop-Buri, 14 percentage points higher in Khon-Kaen, 
and 11 percentage points higher in Nakhon Ratchasima. However, the authors noted that 
important differences between plots may simultaneously affect the land improvement 
decision (Feder and Onchan 1987: 318). 
Box 6.1. Factors affecting the adoption of soil conservation by upland farmers in 
Cebu city and Claveria 
Two separate field surveys were undertaken in two sites, namely, Claveria, Misamis Oriental in Mindanao 
and Six Mountain in Cebu province. Sixty respondents were interviewed in Claveria, consisting of 39 
adopters of contour hedgerows and 21 non-adopters of contour hedgerows. In Cebu, there were 70 
respondents interviewed, consisting of 35 adopters and 35 non-adopters of contour hedgerows, 
respectively. 
The probability of adoption was hypothesised to depend on a range of variables such as age of household 
head, household size, education, farm size, slope, erosion, non-farm income, livestock income, extension, 
strip cropping, fallow, tenure, and credit. The results of this estimation described were as follows: 
Adoption in Claveria is significantly influenced by tenure status, slope, and access to markets, and the 
amount of loans received which is an indicator of access to credit. The results suggest that a farmer who 
owns the farm, has better access to markets, and operates a farm with steeper slope, is more likely to adopt 
contour hedgerow technology. All the other variables except for farm size have the expected signs, 
although they turned out to be statistically not significant. The extent of adoption in Cebu, on the other 
hand, is significantly influenced by the education of the farmers and the slope of the land. Hence, farmers 
with more schooling and who are cultivating farms with steeper slopes are more likely to construct 
contour hedgerows on a larger area of their farm. 
· Source: Lapar and Pandey, 2000. 
Similarly, in the Philippines, the tenure security of farmers was found to be positively 
related to the adoption of soil conservation. In some provinces, while legal land rights 
were not a significant determinants or not a sufficient condition for farmers' decisions to 
undertake land-improving investments, they were still an enabling factor for 
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conservation (Lapar and Pandey 2000: 186). For instance, the results of surveys 
conducted by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in two field sites in the 
uplands of the Philippines in 1996 illustrated the incentive that legal land title provides 
for the adoption of soil conservation (Box 6.1 ). 
Nelson and Cramb (1998) have also studied the economic incentives for farmers in the 
Philippines uplands to adopt hedgerow intercropping relative to traditional open-field 
maize farming. The analysis found that adoption of hedgerow intercropping has been 
constrained by a range of factors including limited access to credit and insecure land 
tenure (Nelson and Cramb 1998: 84). 
While the potential benefits of a land registration system are many, the establishment of 
land registration does involve high costs in terms of compiling and maintaining a 
register. If land I?arcels are extremely fragmented, it may be prudent to carry<out some 
form of land consolidation before land registration. In some cases, instead of relieving 
landlessness, provision of registered land rights to small farmers and the promotion of a 
land market has the potential for contributing to further dispossession. Therefore, any 
government considering the establishment of a land registration system must consider 
these issues. 
6.2.3. Impact of land registration on land improvement in North Viet Nam 
As mentioned in chapter 5, when focusing on the economic reforms, in June 1991, the 
7th Communist Party Congress of Vietnam adopted the strategy on ' Stabilising and 
developing the socio-economy towards the year 2000'. In June 1993, the 5th Meeting of 
the Central Committee passed a resolution on major guidelines to develop agriculture 
and rural livelihoods to the year 2000. Following these events, the new Land Law, 
ordinances and decrees were promulgated. The main point of this law is that the rights 
to land have been increased from three to five, i.e. the rights to exchange, transfer, 
· inherit, mortgage and lease. Land and certificates of land use rights have been_ handed to 
households on a long-term. Land had been allocated to households on a stable basis 
which gives individual farmers the full rights to use and manage their farmland. By 
issuing the land-use rights certificates, rights and obligations over the land are now 
recognised and protected. 
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The allocation of land to farmers was carried out successfully for agricultural land. 
However, the issuance of the land certificates has only been carried out recently and 
farmers' interests have not been satisfied in a timely and satisfactory manner. The 
contents (name, plot map, rights and obligations) of the land certificate are poorly 
described and lack transparency. These deficiencies in the land certificate have impacted 
on agricultural productivity, particular on the adoption of land improvements. The 
influence of this system of land registration on farmland improvements has been 
examined through the survey which was carried out in four provinces in northern 
Vietnam. 
Impact of the process of issuing land rights certificates 
Since the Land Law was enacted in 1993, the process of its implementation has 
proceeded differently in different provinces in North Vietnam. The process of issuing 
land-use rights certificates - "So Do" (Red Card) - was carried out successfully in most 
provinces in the midland areas while it has been slow in some provinces close to urban 
areas and in the provinces embracing forest land. The slow process of issuing land rights 
certificates was caused by heavy workloads, inadequate staff numbers, insufficient 
physical facilities and limited budgets. At the end of 1997, the certificates had been 
issued in 5,955 communes, accounting for 57.5 per cent of all communes, to 7,416,000 
households or 74.2 per cent of total farm households, covering an area of 4,639 million 
hectares or 58 per cent of total agricultural area of Vietnam (Nguyen N.H. 1998: 22). 
The question that arises here is whether farmers who hold the land-use rights certificates 
will be encouraged to invest in long-term land improvement more than farmers without 
land certificates? This study investigates the effects of the certificates distribution 
process on farmers' attitudes and soil conservation practices. 
_ Data from the surveys of this study (Table 6.2) shows that 78 per cent of respondents 
have practised soil conservation methods under the Renovation regime and 73 per cent 
of them held the land certificates. In Thuy Dien village, where all farm households had 
received their own land certificates, 93 .3 per cent of farmers are carrying out soil 
conservation practices. The main conservation methods are intercropping, terracing and 
collecting mud from the rivers to add to the field soil. In Bai Yen village, about 66 per 
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cent of farmers have practised soil conservation while 25 per cent of these farmers have 
not received land certificate. Intercropping, terracing, using animal manure, collecting 
green manure from forests, and planting Acacia are the main measures for conserving 
land in this area. In Co Cham village, only 4 per cent of farmers have not received land 
certificates and 88 per cent of farmers have planted fruit trees, practised intercropping, 
and applied chemical fertilisers together with green and animal manures. 
Nevertheless, the field interview notes showed that the issuance of Red Cards for 
farmers in this village can indirectly affect the adoption of soil conservation practices as 
they did not hold legal records of their farmland. 
"We heard about the land use certificate for ages since the new land law was 
disseminated but until now we have not received it. Thus we feel insecure to use land for 
any purpose as we cannot borrow money from the bank through the mortgage and not 
many years of lease term are left for using land when the certificate is issued (Group of 
farmers, My Giang village)" 
Table 6.2 Correspondence between the issuance of land certificates and soil 
conservation practices off armers in North Vietnam 
Village Have you practised long-term land Have you received a land improvement on your field plots? certificate? 
Yes No Yes No 
Thuy Dien 14 (93.3%) 1 (6.7%) 15 (100%) 0 (0%) 
Bai Yen 8 (75%) 4 (25%) 10 (83%) 2 (17%) 
My Giang 8 (53%) 7 (47%) 0 (0%) 15 (100%) 
Co Cham 22 (88%) 3 (12%) 24 (96%) 1 (4%) 
Mean 52 (77.6%) 14 (21 %) 49 (73%) 18 (27%) 
Standard error of 0.051 0.049 0.048 0.048 
proportions (SE) ' 
95% Confidence 0.676 to 0.876 0.112 to 0.309 0.625 to 0.827 0.163 to 0.375 
interval (Cl) 
Note: Standard error of the proportion (SE) is the square root of p(l-p)/n where n is the sample 
size. 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
The standard error (0.47 and 0.48) in Table 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate the significant different 
opinions from the interviews between four villages about the issue of receiving land 
certificate. The 95% confidence interval on the difference between the number of 
farmers received a land certificate in My Giang and average number of farmers received 
a land certificate in four villages is 0.63 to 0.84. It illustrates that the difference is 
significant since zero, the value specified by the null hypothesis, is not in the interval 
(thus the null hypothesis of no difference can be rejected at the 0.05). 
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Although in the total, 73% farmers have got land certificates, but the percentages of 
farmers who receiving land certificates are very different among four villages. It is 
different in My Giang village (0%). Similarly to the other villages in Ha Tay province, 
the issuing of land certificates has proceeded very slowly, because of the slowness of the 
local administrative system and the cadastral works. Although no farmers in the village 
have received land certificates, about 53 per cent of them have practised soil 
conservation methods. In this province, therefore, the land certificates are apparently not 
so important for the adoption of soil conservation (Table 6.2). Decisions about adopting 
soil conservation methods may depend on other factors such as the nature of farming, 
land quality, off-farm income and access to credit. 
The interviews with My Giang farmers demonstrate that in this case, the nature of 
farming in the region and the means to invest play a significant role in practising soil 
conservation. As in many areas in the northern region, My Giang farmers traditionally 
practise intercropping with fertilizers ( chemical, green, and manual fertilizers) and apply 
the model of Garden-Pond-Husbandry without considering the land lease terms (Table 
6.3). The opportunities for off-farm income (54%) are an important factor that 
influences the adoption of soil conservation. Almost all families in My Giang village 
have income sources from the off-farm work such as making bricks and clothes, selling 
vegetables and other work in the city. As in many other families in the country, family 
members in My Giang shared their incomes, thus the off-farm incomes have often been 
contributed to farm production and soil conservation practices. Therefore farmers in this 
village have credit for investing in farming work and they have dropped the winter crop 
as a measure of soil conservation and to save time for off-farm income work. 
The 95% confidence intervals in Table 6.3 reflect some differences between off-farm 
employments in four villages. The Table 6.3 reveals that there is no significant 
difference between Thuy Dien and Bai Yen villages, and between My Giang and Co 
Cham villages (since zero, the value specified by the null hypothesis, . is in _the 
confidence interval, thus the null hypothesis of no difference cannot be rejected at the 
0.05). 
There is a large number of families (54% and 51 %) in My Giang and Co Cham villages 
have off-farm employment while only small percentages (12% and 20%) of Thuy Dien 
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and Bai Yen villages have off-farm incomes. The similarity of farming experience of . 
farmers between four villages indicates the non-significant effect of farming experience 
on the adoption of soil conservation. However, farming experience, topography and land 
uses have affected the types of soil conservation applying on the specific land areas. 
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Table 6.3. Factors influencing the adoption of land conservation 
Received Off-farm Income Farming 
Village Topography Land uses land employment (US$) expenence Type of conservation 
certificate (% households (Average 
(%) on village) years) 
Thuy Dien Hilly and slope Paddy nee, 100 12 101.46 37.9 Intercropping with fertilizer application 
land other crops Contour made of green manure plants 
Hedgerows of leguminous 
Bai Yen Hilly and Rice, maize, 83 20 118.66 38.6 Intercropping with fertilizer application 
mountain teas Contour made of green manure plants 
Agro forestry 
My Giang Lowland Paddy nee, 0 54 101.66 37.8 Intercropping with fertilizer application 
vegetables, No Winter crop to fallow farm land 
fruit trees Garden-Pond-Husbandry 
Co Cham Lowland Paddy nee, 96 51 134.80 29.8 Intercropping with fertilizer application 
vegetables, Fruit trees 
fruit trees Garden-Pond-Husbandry 
Mean 88% 34.25% 
Standard error 0.0542 0.0472 
95% 0.625 to Confidence 0.247 to 0.433 0.837 interval ( CI) 
95% confidence intervals of the difference between off-farm employments in four villages 
Thuy Dien Bai Yen My Giang Co Cham 
Thuy Dien - -0.24 to 0.31 0.09 to 0.71 0.13 to 0.65 
Bai Yen - 0.04-0.7 0.07 to 0.64 
My Giang 
- -0.31 to 0.33 
Co Cham 
-
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-However, the results in Table 6.2 are likely to reflect the combined impacts of several 
other factors on the adoption of soil conservation practices. Thus, to separate the impact 
of the land registration from the other factors, farmers were interviewed in detail about 
their perceptions regarding each factor. The evidence in Figure 6.1 indicates that 
farmers' decisions about adopting long-term land improvements are significantly 
influenced by the land certificate. About 72 per cent of respondents in the four villages 
expressed concern about the security of land-use rights in their decision-making. 
Farmers' decisions about soil conservation practices have also been influenced by a 
number of factors. The survey results show that a large proportion of respondents (81 
per cent and 76 per cent respectively) saw their income and soil quality of their field 
land as important. The land type of the field plot, the planning period and the cost of 
inputs are the other important factors affecting their decisions. The planning period 
refers to the time horizon over which an investment is expected to pay off. Other factors 
such as age, education and experience are relatively unimportant in these decisions. 
Figure 6.1. Factors influencing farmers' adoption of soil conservation practices 
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Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
Although farmers hold different perceptions about the necessity of land-use rights 
certificates, they are in common agreement about several essential advantages of the 
land certificates with respect to farm and farm land investments. In the interviews, they 
said that having land-use rights certificates can ensure their ownership and use of a 
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specified land area over a long period; can ensure that they reap the benefits after 
investing in land improvements; and can ensure the legal sale of their land, provide 
easier access to credit, and reduce land disputes. 
The survey results in Figure 6.2 show that the majority (86 per cent) of farmers of the 
four villages perceived that land use certificates with lease terms of 20 years and with 
the sizes of the field plots detailed have given farmers confidence in their possession of 
land use rights. The overwhelming majority of farmers (90.8 per cent) also responded 
that they believed that the specification of field size and the borders of field plots will 
reduce the conflicts over land tenure. A relatively high proportion of farmers ( 66. 7 per 
cent) believed that they can obtain the benefits from their investment in land 
improvements because the land certificates have given them the rights to the land over a 
long period. Nearly half of respondents ( 46.4 per cent) understood that they can use 
their land certificates as a secure pledge for borrowing money from formal or informal 
sources. However, a much smaller proportion of respondents (27 .1 per cent) indicated 
their understanding of their rights to sell their land with some constraints on transferring 
rights which will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 7). 
Figure 6.2. Farmers' perceptions of the advantages of land-use certificates 
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Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
While the process of land registration m northern Vietnam has begun, there are 
limitations not only in the process of giving out land certificates, but the contents of the 
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land-use certificate are also problematical. As can be seen in Appendix 6.1, the first 
page of the land certificate contains the full name of the household head and the name 
of the village, commune, district and province where his/her family are living. The basic 
information, eg. the size of the total land area, the details of plot sizes, the locations and 
lease term, are also included on this page. The second page has a map of the field plots 
but it has been left blank in many districts because of problems with the cadastral 
system. For instance, in Phuc Tho district, the boundaries of field plots have not been 
mapped, therefore the second page of the land-use certificate has been left blank and the 
certificate has not been given to farmers. The third page has been left for specification 
of some general conditions and notes on the changes in land use after a farmer receives 
the certificate. 
The land-use certificate proves the right of a household to use a certain area of farmland. 
However, a brief outline of rights and obligations should also be included in the contract 
rather than the mention made of the numbered articles of the 1993 Land Law as written 
in the certificate: 'Individual who was granted the land-use rights certificate have rights 
to use land and have obligations to follow the rules indicated in the 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 
78, 79 of the 1993 Land Law' (The Red Card - Appendix 6.1 ). 
Although information about the Land Law has been disseminated publicly to every 
village of the country, farmers need to have the land-use rights (Box 6.2) written down 
briefly on the certificate to help them in understanding their rights, particularly in cases 
of conflict over the land, transferring land, or borrowing money for investments. 
Box 6.2. The 1993 Land Law: Rights and Obligations of Land Users 
Article 73. Land users shall be subject to the following rights: 
1. To be granted with certificate for the right to use land; 
2. To benefit from the results of their labour and their investment on the land allocated; 
3. To transfer the right to use land in accordance with the regulation stipulated by the Law; 
4. To enjoy the benefit derived from public projects of land protection and reclamation; 
5. To receive State guidance and assistance in the process of land reclamation and fertilisation; 
6. To enjoy State protection against infringement of their legal land use rights; to be indemnified 
for actual losses incurred in the event that the land currently used by them is recovered; 
7. To contribute their land for production co-operation and for business in accordance with the 
regulations stipulated by the Law and with purposes when the land was allocated; 
8. To make complaint or to denounce on violation actions of their legal right to use land and 
other breaches of Law on land. 
Article 74. Any households which or individuals who use agricultural land or forestry land for 
afforestation or for habitation shall, due to requirements of the life and production, be entitled to transfer 
or assign the right to use land, be subject to a right purpose of use and comply with the term for which 
land is allocated. · 
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Article 75. 
1. Any household which or individuals who use agricultural land or forestry land for afforestation 
shall be entitled to transfer or assign their right to use land in the following case: 
a. To move to another place; 
b. To deal with another profession; 
c. To fail their capacity to work as direct labour; 
2. Any households which or individuals who use the land for habitation, if moving to another 
place or are no longer in need of land for habitation shall be entitled to transfer or assign the right to use 
land. The transfer or assignment shall be permitted by the competent State body. The transfer or assignee 
must use the land with right purpose. 
Article 76. 
1. Those individuals, who receive agricultural land allocated by the State for planting annual 
crops or for aquaculture. Their right to use land may be left to their successors, after their death, as the 
regulation stipulated by the Law on Inheritance. 
2. If any member of those households which were allocated with agricultural land for planting 
annual crops or for aquaculture, died, other members of these households shall be entitled to enjoy other 
further use of area of land previously allocated to them. In the case where no members of the family 
exists, the State shall regain the land. 
3. Any individuals or members of the household which were allocated with land for planting 
long-day crops for afforestation or for habitation, their right to use land may be left to their successors 
after their death, according to the regulations of the Law on Inheritance. 
Article 77. 
1. Any households which or individuals who use agricultural land or forestry land for afforestation shall 
be entitled to put their right to use land to pledge at the Banks of State of Vietnam or at credit 
organisations of Vietnam which were permitted by the State for the establishment to loan capital for 
production. 
2. Any households which or individuals who use land for habitation shall, due to the requirements of the 
life and production be entitled to put their right to use land to pledge with Vietnam economic 
organisations and individuals at home. 
Article 78. 
Any households which or individuals who use agricultural land for planting long-day crops, for 
aquaculture shall, due to lack of manpower, meeting difficulties or the change of profession but still not 
stable, be entitled to put their land, previously allocated to them, for rent within the duration which shall 
not exceed three years. In special cases, the duration may be prolonged and it shall be stipulated by the 
Government. The land renters must use it with right purpose. 
Article 79. 
Land users shall be subject to the following obligations: 
1. To ensure that land is used strictly right in accordance with its indented purpose, that its use is 
confined to within its allocated boundaries and complies with all other conditions stipulated at the time of 
allocation; 
2. To ensure land protecting and take necessary measure to increase the capacity of land use; 
3. To comply with the regulations concerning environment protection and ensure that deserved 
interest of surrounding land users shall not be lost; 
4. To pay taxes for the right to use land, taxes for transfer of right to use land; and pay cadastral 
fees according to the stipulations of the Law; 
5. To pay money for land use when land is allocated according to the stipulations of the Law; 
6. To indemnify previous users from land is regained for reallocation, for any loss actually 
incurred and to pay compensation to them. 
7. To return the land when it is regained by the State. 
Source: Vietnam Trade Information Center, 1993. Law on land, 1993. 
The survey results show that 62. 7 per cent of farmers believe in the necessity of having 
their rights and obligations written on the land certificate. The standard error (0.37) in 
Table 6.4 demonstrates the different survey result of My Giang compared with three 
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other villages. Most farmers (86.6 per cent) in My Giang village did not respond this 
question because they had not received land certificates (Table 6.3). 
Table 6.4. Farmers' perceptions of the contents of land certificate 
Is it necessary to indicate the rights and obligations of using land in 
Village the land certificate? 
Yes No Don't know Total 
Thuy Dien 12 (80%) 1 (6.66 %) 2 (13.4%) 15 
Bai Yen 10 (83.4%) 1 (8.3%) 1 (8.3%) 12 
My Giang 2 (13.4%) 0 (0%) 13 (86.7%) 15 
Co Cham 18 (72%) 3 (12%) 4 (16%) 25 
Mean 42 (62.7%) 5 (7.46%) 20 (29.84%) 67 (100%) 
Standard error of 0.059 0.032 0.056 proportions 
95% Confidence 0.511 to 0.743 0.012 to 0.138 0 .18 9 to 0 .4 5 8 Interval (Cl) 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
The majority of farmers recognise that the land use rights certificates or 'Red Cards' are 
beneficial and stressed the added security that the Land Law would provide. It was 
recognised that the certificate results in an increased sense of responsibility for their 
land, an end to the pattern of shifting cultivation, a decline in forest destruction, and a 
decline in land disputes. 
However, they complain that the incentives for investing in long-term land 
improvements are limited because of the slowness of the process of issuing the 
certificates and some problems with the content of the certificates such as unclear rights 
and obligations for land users, restrictions on the use of the allocated land ( some plots 
are restricted to growing rice), and no mention the quality of the plots and the rights to 
renew the land lease. 
"Since we have been handed the Red Cards, we believe that we can use our farmlands 
individually at least until year 2013 without the fear of encroachment from other 
people. We recognised the benefits of the issuance of land certificates. The issue of land 
certificate may provide us with a form of collateral for the banks or other informal 
sources of credit. We have been investing more of our capital, labour and time in farm 
· productivity and/or soil conservation because we have more confidence of the rights to 
use land in a long term since we held the certificates. However, we would like the 
certificates would be written more clearly the rights and obligations as well as without 
restriction of land use purposes in some areas, thus we can invest more in perennial 
fruit trees in those areas ( Group of farmers, Thuy Dien villages)" -
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The family of Mr S. Nguyen is one of the households in Bai Yen village which has 
invested in land fertility improvements. Mr Nguyen and his wife are young (25 years 
old). They live with his mother and their two children. They have been allocated 2,800 
m2 of farmland, which is divided into 17 plots. Since they were granted the land-use 
certificate, they have pledged their Red Card to the bank as collateral for credit. They 
have invested capital, time and labour in increasing farm and farmland productivity. 
After three years of applying the model of "Forest-Garden-Pond-Husbandry'' with other 
soil conservation measures, the yields of their farms have increased from 2.3 tons/ha in 
1995 to 4.0 tons/ha in 1998. 
"The Red Card assures me that my family will legally use this piece of land for years 
and I wanted to increase the productivity of yields and soil quality of my farmland. We 
did use this Red Card for borrowing money from the local branch of the Bank of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. This money has been used in agricultural purposes 
including in soil conservation investments. However, when we try to invest in perennial 
fruit trees in forestland areas, which have been allocated for my family, the limited 
amount of the borrowed money was not enough for the investments and -the local 
government did not support us. Moreover, they forced us to grow only Eucalyptus and 
Acacia in forest land areas" (Mr S. Nguyen, Bai Yen village)" 
6.3. Land lease term 
Analysis of farmers' decisions about the adoption of soil conservation practices has 
shown that the land tenure regime plays a significant role. If the farm is leased, the 
farmer is less likely to make conservation expenditures than where the farmer is the 
owner. Moreover, the shorter the lease term the less confident is the farmer of capturing 
the benefits of investments (Garcia 2000: 165). 
The length of the use rights is a critical variable determining incentives to conserve land 
quality because it lengthens the planning horizon of conservation. Farmers will then 
have incentives to conserve soil as future benefits will accrue to the farmers who make 
the investments. Short-term use rights provide farmers with little incentive_ to make 
investments which will increase the productivity of the land on a long-term basis, since 
any benefits beyond the contract term will accrue to the state or subsequent land users 
(Ervin and Ervin 1982: 284; and Prosterman et al.1998: 11). 
Thus, with short-term leases a "mining" strategy based on rapid exhaustion of soil 
fertility might be adopted. For example, farmers who followed loggers into the uplands 
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of the Philippines grew food crops in logged areas for a few years and then abandoned 
the fields. As these fields did not belong to the farmers, they had no incentive to 
conserve their productive capacity (Lapar and Pandey 1999: 245). The decision to adopt 
or reject conservation farming critically depends on farmers' planning horizons. The 
long-term benefits of conservation farming may be irrelevant to farmers whose planning 
horizons are limited by the short term of the land use rights (Nelson and Cramb 1998: 
85). 
Evidence on the significant impacts of long-term leasehold or freehold land use rights 
on farmland investment has been illustrated in many areas of the world. For instance, in 
Managok and Pananag of the Philippine uplands, most adopters and non-adopters who 
responded to the survey questions on adoption of farm improvement practices agreed 
that tenancy was an obstacle to adoption. They commented that the owners of the land 
would be the long-term beneficiaries. In Guba in the Philippines, there was widespread 
adoption of contour hedgerows, much of it on tenanted land. However, the important 
thing to note is that the tenancy arrangements here were generally long-term and stable 
(Cramb at el. 2000: 83). Thus, the length of the land-use contract plays an important 
role in decisions on adopting soil conservation practices. 
-
Since the beginning of rural reforms in China in 1979, the land tenure system has gone 
through in several stages. The break up of collectivised agriculture led to the Household 
Responsibility System. Under this system, land use rights and agricultural output 
requirements were contracted directly to households for periods of three years or less. In 
1984, the Communist Party Central Committee issued Rural Work Document No 1 
urging local officials to prolong the use rights term to at least 15 years. Then in 
September 1994, the Central Committee decided that the land use rights to arable land 
would be extended another 30 years after the original 15 year-right expires (Prosterman 
et al. 1998). 
A survey of eight counties was conducted to test the appropriateness of such a policy. 
The majority, 62 per cent said they preferred the situation where land was periodically 
reassigned among farm families in response to changes in the composition of their 
families and thus stabilises tenure relations and thereby encourages farm and farmland 
investment (Kung and Liu 1997: 34). The Rural Development Institute in China also 
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carried out a Rapid Rural Appraisal study in 14 provinces and provincial-level 
municipalities from 1987 to 1996 and found that only 39 per cent of the farmers 
interviewed had made long-term land improvements which could increase the 
productivity of their land. When asked whether they would make long-term 
improvements if the use term were extended perpetually, 84 per cent of the farmers 
responded affirmatively (Prosterman et al. 1998: 11). 
The 1993 Land Law provided for long-term usufruct rights for annual crops and 
aquaculture (20 years) and perennial crops (50 years). The Law states that farmers who 
invest in perennials will be given the rights to a 50 years lease. For example, each 
family in Bai Yen village has been given 20 years lease for the crop fields and 50 years 
for the forestlands. When the 1993 Land Law was enacted, the lease terms automatically 
granted to the farmers depended on the existing farming practices ( types of crops) of -
each family. The change in the length of land-use rights was in conjunction with the 
granting of the rights to inherit, exchange, transfer, lease and mortgage land use rights to 
individual households. This allocation of lands to households made the household rather 
than the cooperative the basic unit of agricultural production. Households were given 
decision-making power over all management and investment decisions on their land, 
including cropping patterns and input use. The length of the lease term has impacted on 
farmers' attitudes and practices towards farm production and land improvement. 
The interviews in four villages in northern Vietnam showed that farmers' perceptions of 
the long-term land lease are positively related to the adoption of soil conservation 
measures. As can be seen in Table 6.4, over half of the respondents (67.2 per cent) were 
influenced by this longer term of land use rights when they decided to adopt 
conservation methods. The majority of farmers (83.4 per cent and 73.3 per cent) in Bai 
Yen and Thuy Dien villages respectively, are applying soil conservation measures such 
as terracing and contour hedgerows and planting perennial fruit trees due to the change 
in the length of land use rights contract. About 68 per cent of farmers ~ Co Cham 
village decided to adopt soil conservation practices because of the long-term leases. 
Only in My Giang village, where many households incomes rely heavily on their off-
farm work, over half of farmers (53.3 per cent) did not take into account the change in 
the land lease term in their decisions about land improvements. 
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Table 6.5. Farmers' preferences on the lease term of land use rights 
Does the land lease term (20 years and 50 years) influences your 
Village conservation decisions? 
Yes No Don't know Total 
Thuy Dien 11 (73.3%) 1 (6.66 %) 3 (13.4%) 15 
Bai Yen 9 (83.4%) 2 (16.6%) 1 (8.3%) 12 
My Giang 7 (46.6%) 5 (33.3%) 3 (20%) 15 
Co Cham 17 (68%) 3 (12%) 5 (20%) 25 
Average 44 (65.7%) 11 (16.4%) 12 (17.9%) 67 (100%) 
Standard error (SE) 0.058 0.043 0.047 
95% Confidence 0.543 to 0.77 0.075 to 0.253 0.087 to 0.271 Interval 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
However, the 20 years lease term for agricultural land is not the desired length for 
farmers who want to devote capital to farm and farm land investments. Most 
respondents in the four villages (91 per cent) endorsed the idea of perpetuating land 
rights. 
A few farm households, who are very poor, with limited labour, prefer cooperative land 
ownership or do not care about the length of lease term because they may not be able to 
afford the agricultural tax. A few others who enjoy substantial shares of non-farm 
income do not favour the idea of making land use rights permanent. Permanent land use 
rights are most favoured by farmers who rely heavily for their income on agricultural 
production and wanted to invest in long term land improvements. 
"We are pleased with the current land use rights contract because we can use land 
individually for 20 years, we have more confidence for investing our capital, labour and 
time in farm productivity. However, we thought it may not be long enough for some 
long-term investments, thus we wish that land rights should be granted in perpetuity 
that can ensure us in applying some soil conservation measures which require the long 
term planning horizons without the fear of benefit lost" (Group of interviewed farmers 
in the four villages, 12 August 2000)" 
These results are supported by the scientists who were interviewed in the research sites. 
Most scientists (11 out of 12) agreed that before the 1993 Land Law was enacted, the 
most important obstacle to adoption of soil conservation methods was the limited 
capital and the insecure land tenure, especially the short-term land rights contract. The 
pace of applying soil conservation measures has been increased in many parts of the 
region since the land use rights were granted to individual households for longer terms 
(Tran 2000 - Field data). For example, in Viet Hong commune, Hai Duong province, the 
number of households who established lychee plantations has increased considerably 
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from 193 households (28 hectares) in 1987 to 862 households (114 hectares) in 1999 
(The People's Committee of Viet Hong, 2000: 4). 
Another problems with the land lease term that inhibits decisions about soil 
conservation practices is the unclear conditions for the renewal of the lease. Article 20 
of the 1993 Land Law states: 'At the expire if the land users have further requirement on 
land use and during the process of using land, the land users comply with the law on the 
land, then the state shall allocate that land to the land users for a further use' (National 
Assembly of Vietnam 1993: 21). Nearly all farmer interviewees were unclear about the 
detailed conditions for the renewal of land lease terms and the length of the renewed 
leases. 
The survey results showed that 80.6 per cent of the interviewed farmers were unsure of 
the renewable land lease term. Only people who worked as commune administrators 
(13.5 per cent) of the four villages said that they believed this statement of the law. In 
response to the question about the influence of the renewal of lease terms on soil 
conservation decisions, most farmers said that they did not want to make plans for long-
term investments after year 2013 which is the expire date of land lease terms because 
they did not know the time period of the renewed land lease. 
Although virtually all farmers appear to regard the 20-year use rights and the automatic 
renewal of the leases if the land user has been complying with the land legislation as an 
improvement over previous policy, most would prefer to receive permanent use rights to 
the state-owned land. Permanent use rights would imply that the land would not be 
taken back at some future date, creating a high degree of land tenure security which 
would encourage farmers invest in long-term land improvements. 
The above discussion reflects the positive relationship between the lease term and long-
term soil conservation. Nevertheless, for adopting short-term soil conservation, the 
short-term of land leases may not play a significant role. For many years before the 1993 
Land Law, farmers in the North applied chemical, green and manure fertilisers on their 
fields. This investment can accrue costs and benefits to farmers in a short run. For 
example, Thuy Dien farmers usually invested their time and labours to improve the 
fertility of their fields by adding mud to their farm in conjunction with applying other 
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fertilisers. These measures of soil conservation are carried out in the short terms ( three 
months to a year) and their costs and benefits can be determined in a short run. The 
costs of labour is calculated as cong/sao/crop ( one cong = 12,000 VNdong - 15,000 
VNdong = 80 cents to 1 USD) (People's Committee of LapThach 1999). The farmers 
estimated the benefits from these investments by using the yields of annual crops or 
vegetables. However, they were unable to distinguish between the benefits from soil 
conservation investment and other farm investments. Thus in this study, it has not been 
possible to calculate the actual benefits from soil conservation measures separately. Yet 
farmers can make the decision to adopt soil conservation measures without considering 
the short-term land leases. In this case, the highest concern is the capital for soil 
conservation investments rather than the term of the land lease. 
6.4. Land distribution 
6.4.1. Impact of farm size on land productivity 
Smallholders in developing countries must use their land intensively to secure their 
livelihood. Their farm output is often limited by poor access to improved technologies, 
lack of support institutions, uncertain property and lease conditions, poor access to 
credit, and unequal distribution of water. Farm ,size also influences what will be 
produced and how much will be sold at the market. Small farms keep more livestock, 
farm more for subsistence and are more likely to plant annual crops. The strength of 
large farms is in arable farming, planting cash crops and growing perennial crops 
(Bodenrecht and Bodenrdnung, 2001) 
It is often argued that there is a inverse relationship between farm size and productivity. 
Though it is an issue that is often debated (Binswanger et al. 1993: 45; and Faruqee and 
Carey 1997: 8), many factors intervene. If a smallholder is forced to farm the land 
intensively due to not having any alternative income sources, then the small farms may 
increase yields. But the situation may be different when interest in farming declines due 
to having alternative employment opportunities. Even in regions with strong 
technological improvements in agriculture, small farms do not necessarily have _ the 
highest productivity. They may not be able afford the required investments and may not 
be in a position to realise economies of scale. 
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In developed countries, for example in the United States, Carlin and Saupe (1993) found 
that many small farms contribute more to local economic activity in rural areas than a 
few large farms. There are specific benefits of small farms within a sustainability 
context: small farms can act as buffers against urban encroachment; the aesthetic appeal 
of small family farms to tourists; the small farms tend to use their land less intensively 
than large ones, which potentially is less environmentally damaging; and the less 
intensive land use by small farmers may mean that they are contributing less to soil 
erosion than larger operations (Thompson 1986; and D'Souza et al. 1998). 
Studies from developed countries show that larger farms are more likely to use 
conservation technologies than smaller farms (Ervin and Ervin 1982). For example, at 
Pananag in the Philippines, in adopting hedgerow methods, averaged 3.5 hectares, more 
than twice the average for non-adopters (1.7 hectares). One explanation offered was that 
a larger farm size enabled adopters to increase the maize area to offset the area lost to 
hedgerows, thereby maintaining total food production and minimising consumption risk. 
Larger farms also often had larger individual fields, which meant larger net areas for 
cropping. Thus, larger farms reflected both greater incentive and capacity for adoption 
(Cramb et al. 2000: 72). However, in many other areas farm size was not a significant 
factor influencing the adoption of soil conservation technologies. 
In the implementation of the 1993 Land Law, the allocation of land for households was 
a complicated and difficult task for the local governments in Vietnam. The small farm 
sizes and fragmentation of farm plots have often affected the development of 
agricultural production and the application of new technologies and soil conservation 
measures. In allocating land under the Land Law and Decree 46/CP, most communes 
concurrently dealt with overdue debts. The households had to fully pay off their debts in 
order to receive the land. However, not all the debts had been paid. Communes usually 
dealt with the remaining debts by retaining a part of the land allocated to the household 
and selling it. Therefore, the debt problem could be resolved but on the o~her side it 
adversely affected farm size, especially for poor households (Nguyen N.H. 1998: 12). 
Farms in the research site are very small with an average of 0.23 hectares. Among the 
four villages surveyed, the farms in Thuy Dien village, Vinh Phuc province are largest, 
0.25 hectares; in Bai Yen village, Hoa Binh province, the average farm size is 0.24 
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hectares; in Co Cham village, Hai Duong province, the average farm size is about 0.23 
hectares; and the smallest size on average is 0.19 hectares in My Giang village, Ha Tay 
province (Table 6.5). 
Table 6.6. Average farm size and number of farm plots of households in the four 
villages 
Village Province Farm size Number of plots Mean distance of 
(hectares) per farm plots from 
household homestead 
(No.) (meters) 
Thuy Dien VinhPhuc 0.25 5.06 740 
Bai Yen HoaBinh 0.24 13.3 960 
My Giang Ha Tay 0.19 6.06 860 
Co Cham Hai Duong 0.23 6.36 1432 
Average 0.23 7.69 998 
Farmers' perceptions about the impact of farm size on soil conservation practices appear 
to depend in part on the soil conservation measures used in the different areas and in 
part on their other activities. As can be seen in Table 6.6, the conservation practices of 
farmers applying hedgerow cropping, and planting cash crops and perennial crops or 
wishing to use machinery, have been affected by the small size of their farmland. Many 
of them (66.6 per cent of respondents in Thuy Dien and Bai Yen village; and 76 per cent 
of respondents in Co Cham village) want to have larger farms, in which they can invest 
more for long-term land improvement. In contrast, only 20 per cent of farmers in My 
Giang village consider their small farm size to be a constraint on soil conservation. 
Most of them are engaged in non-farm activities and/or are practising simple 
conservation methods such as intercropping vegetables using fertilisers. Thus they are 
largely indifferent to protecting the land and hence to the impact of farm size. 
These results support the hypothesis of a positive relationship between farm size and the 
adoption of soil conservation methods. Evidence of this positive relationship is further 
illustrated in several cases of conservation adopters who have extended their farmland 
by renting or buying more land. 
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Table 6.7. Effects of farm size on soil conservation practices 
Village Does your farm size affect your soil conservation practices? 
Yes No Indifferent Total 
Thuy Dien 10 (66.6%) 3 (20%) 2 (13.4%) 15 
Bai Yen 8 (66.6%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (16.7%) 12 
My Giang 3 (20%) 5 (33.3%) 7 (46.7%) 15 
Co Cham 19 (76%) 3 (12%) 3(12%) 25 
Average 40 (59.7%) 13 (19.4%) 14 (20.9%) 67 (100%) 
Standard error (SE) 0.06 0.048 0.05 
95% CI 0.48 to 0.718 0.099 to 0.289 0.112 to 0.306 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
There was further support from the answers to other survey questions. Concerning the 
constraints to adopting soil conservation methods, the majority of adopters (86 per cent) 
mentioned the lack of capital for investment; 69.5 per cent mentioned the small size of 
landholdings; 71 per cent considered the short term of land use rights to be a constraint; 
and 7 6 .1 per cent said that land fragmentation was a constraint. Fewer adopters were 
concerned about water supply limitations and lack of technological information (47.4 
per cent and 58 per cent respectively) (Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3. Farmers' perceptions of the constraints on adopting soil conservation 
practices 
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Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
The data by inter-village also reveals the significant of the length of land use rights and 
farm sizes among other factors on making soil conservation decisions. Table 6.7 shows 
that for the majority of farmers in four village (73% in Thuy Dien, 58% in Bai Yen, 
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62% in My Giang and 85% in Co Cham), small size of farm land is the an important 
reason for not undertaking soil conservation methods. This Table also illustrates that 
most of farmers in Thuy Dien, Bai Yen and Co Cham (88%, 74% and 76% 
respectively) villages consider the short term of land use rights as a main constraint of 
adopting soil conservation practices. As mentioned above, there is an insignificant 
number of My Giang' farmers (46%) concerning about the length of land use rights. 
However, for farmers in My Giang, the lack of investment capital, fragmentation and 
small size of land holding are major limitations in practising soil conservation. 
Table 6.8 Farmers' perceptions of the constraints on adopting soil conservation 
practices by villages (percentage % ) 
Thuy Dien Bai Yen My Giang Co Cham 
Short term of Land use rights 88 74 46 76 
Small size of land holding 73 58 62 85 
Farm land fragmentation 85 71 70.4 78 
Limitation of water supply 42.5 56 41 49.9 
Lack of technological information 57.5 63 56.3 55.2 
Lack of investment capital 81 89.6 87.4 
·- 86 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
One of the constraints of the farmland distribution policy is the freeze on the land 
allocation to households. As mentioned above, land has been allocated to households 
based on their household size in 1993 and it has been fixed for 20 years. Almost 
interviewed farmers complained about the farm size being fixed over such a period. 
According to them, the farm size should be adjusted every three or five years to 
accommodate the changes in household size as children are born or people die. 
However, this adjustment is an administered solution that will increase land insecurity, 
compared to the alternative market reallocation of land that can also be used to facilitate 
the inevitable need for rural adjustment. 
6.4.2. Fragmentation of landholdings 
The fragmentation of landholdings is an important characteristic of farming in the less 
developed countries. The fragmentation has often resulted from inheritance customs. It 
may be difficult to consolidate a farm within the family after subdivision because one 
sibling lacks the means to buy out the others. Consolidation by sale to someone outside 
of the family is complicated by the right of refusal that family members enjoy on 
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inherited land. Another reason for the existence of land fragmentation is that transaction 
costs may inhibit the transfer of small plots (Faruqee and Carey 1997: 14). 
The disadvantages of land fragmentation include the travelling time between the fields 
which leads to lower labour productivity and higher transportation costs for inputs and 
outputs, reduced scope for irrigation and soil conserving investments as well as the loss 
of land for boundaries and access routes, the unsuitability of certain equipment, the 
greater difficulty with pest control and management, and the greater potential for 
disputes between neighbours (Blarel et al. 1992: 233; and Binswanger et al. 1993: 74). 
However, in many cases, the influence of fragmentation on productivity may be 
overstated. It has been argued that land fragmentation may be an insurance mechanism 
similar to the practice of growing different crops (McCloskey 1976; and Towsend 
1994). 
A test of whether fragmentation has a detrimental effect on land productivity in Ghana 
and Rwanda showed that farm fragmentation does not seem to have any adverse impact. 
Although fragmentation resulted in the costs of travel time between plots and between 
farmers' residences and their parcels, at the same time fragmentation increased the 
diversity of agro-climatic conditions available to the farmer, and this led to more 
diversified cropping patterns. Such diversification can be beneficial for risk reduction, 
reducing peaks and troughs in labour demand and enhancing household food security 
(Blarel et al. 1992). In contrast, a study in Salogon, the Philippines, showed that 
conservation adopters' fields were on average only seven minutes from their residence, 
whereas non-adopters averaged a 39 minute journey. Thus the greater distances may 
have discouraged them from adopting the recommended conservation practices ( Cramb 
et al. 2000: 80). 
Similar to other developing countries, fragmentation is a typical feature of farmland in 
northern Vietnam. Before the collectivisation period, this fragmentation resulted from 
the inheritance customs. In the collectivisation period, land was consolidated in the 
hands of the cooperatives. Since the cooperative system was abolished, the agricultural 
land of a commune had been redistributed to individual households on an egalitarian 
basis: each member of a family received one sao (360 m2) and each household was 
allocated a number of plots in different areas based on the different qualities of the field 
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plots as well as access to water sources or other infrastructure. Therefore, farmland has 
been deliberately fragmented ( average of 7 .69 plots per household) with very small-
sized parcels and often far from each other and from the household's residence ( average 
of 1 km) (Table 6.7 and Appendix 5.lc and 5.ld). 
Table 6.9. Perception of the impact of land fragmentation on conservation 
practices 
Village Has the fragmented farmland impacted on your conservation 
practices? 
Positively Negatively lndiff erent Total 
Thuy Dien 5 (33.3%) 7 (46.7%) 3 (20%) 15 
Bai Yen 0 (0%) 11 (91.7%) 1 (8.3%) 12 
My Giang 2 (13.3%) 10 (66.7%) 3 (20%) 15 
Co Cham 0 (0%) 23 (92%) 2 (8%) 25 
Mean 7 (10.4%) 51 (76.1 %) 9 (13.5%) 67 (100%) 
Standard error of mean 0.037 0.052 0.042 
95 % CI 0.031 to 0.178 0.658 to 0.863 0.053 to 0.216 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
The analysis of the survey data from North Vietnam demonstrated that land 
fragmentation has significantly affected conservation practices The majority of farmers 
(76.1 per cent) considered that land fragmentation has had an adverse impact on their 
conservation practices (Table 6.9). These farmers did not wish to make conservation 
investments for some of their remote plots because of the higher costs of transport and 
labour. Another reason given was that it was difficult to make plantations of commercial 
crops such as perennial fruit trees. The 95% confidence interval of the difference 
between opinions of the negative impacts of farmland fragmentation on land 
conservation (0.15 to 0.55) in Bai Yen and Co Cham compared with Thuy Dien and My 
Giang indicates that the difference is statistically significant. It is because the farmlands 
in the latter villages are less fragmented than the two former villages. Number of plots 
per farm-household is 5.06 in Thuy Dien and 6.06 in My Giang while number of plots 
per farm-household is 13 .3 and 6.36 in Bai Yen and Co Cham villages. 
However, a few farmers in Thuy Dien and My Giang villages found that in some 
respects the fragmentation of land has positively impacted on the adoption of soil 
conservation methods. Table 6.10 shows that these farmers (33.3% in Thuy Dien and 
13.3% in My Giang), who have land parcels located close to their residence (740 meters 
and 860 meters respectively), and not have many fragmented plots (5.06 and 6.06 plots 
respectively) compared to two other villages, were keen to invest in long-term land 
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improvement because it was not costly of transport and labour supply. On the other side, 
however, having several plots may reduce the risk of farming or conservation 
investment. The rest of the respondents (13.5 per cent) were not concerned with the 
improvement of land productivity because their income did not rely heavily on 
agricultural production. 
Table 6.10. Impact of fragmentation and the distance of plots on practising soil 
conservation 
Village Farm size Number of Mean Impact of fragmented 
(hectares) plots per farm distance of farmland on conservation 
household plots from practices 
(No.) homestead Positive Negative (meters) 
Thuy Dien 0.25 5.06 740 5 (33 .3%) 7 (46.7%) 
Bai Yen 0.24 13.3 960 0 (0%) 11 (91.7%) 
My Giang 0.19 6.06 860 2 (13 .3%) 10 (66.7%) 
Co Cham 0.23 6.36 1432 0 (0%) 23 (92%) 
Average 0.23 7.69 998 
Mean 7 (10.4%,) 51 (76.1 %) 
Standard error 0.037 0.052 (SE) 
95% CI 0.031 to 0.178 0.658 to 0.863 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data 
6.5. Conclusions 
The hypothesis that the incentives for adopting soil conservation measures are increased 
by increasing the duration of land tenure has been tested using survey data from the 
different provinces in northern Vietnam. The 1993 Land Law has brought about a 
radical change in land tenure in rural Vietnam. Land and land certificates for land-use 
rights have been handed to households on a long-term basis. Although the process of 
issuing the land-use rights certificate has progressed slowly in many areas, especially in 
the upland regions and the regions with high population density, giving this written 
land-use rights contract to individual households has impacted significantly on farmers' 
attitudes towards long-term land improvements. But even though the law states that the 
rights to land have been increased to five rights - i.e., the rights to exchange, transfer, 
inherit, mortgage and lease - on a long-term use basis, these rights need to be written 
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clearly in the land rights contract. Doing so will ensure farmers have a better 
understanding of their rights and obligations under the contract. 
Excepting some short-term conservation, the adoption of soil conservation measures, 
has been influenced strongly by the change in the length of the land-use rights contract. 
The terms of 20 years for annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops and forest land 
have encouraged farmers to adopt soil conservation measures as this means that they 
will be able to reap the benefits from their investments. However, the right to use land 
in perpetuity is favoured by most farmers. The renewability conditions of the land lease 
are not clear to farmers. Making it clear to farmers that their leases will be renewed 
automatically unless they do not observe their responsibilities to the land would be an 
improvement over the present situation. 
Soil conservation practices in the region are determined by a number of factors such as 
farm attributes, age, education, and experience of the farmers, institutions, access to 
credit and other socio-economic factors. As a part of the change in the land tenure 
system, the distribution of farmland to individual households has significantly affected 
soil conservation practices. Because of the scarcity of arable land and because of 
Vietnam's egalitarian philosophy, land was allocated to farmers according to household 
size and each member of the family received a very small piece of land. Thus, land 
farmed by farm household is small in total and fragmented. These characteristics of the 
farms adversely affect the improvement of land productivity the costs of transport and 
labour, and makes use of mechanical equipment uneconomic. 
The shortcomings in implementing the land law must be resolved to encourage farmers 
to invest more in conservation practices and land productivity. However, these 
shortcomings cannot be resolved in isolation of the other aspects of the land tenure 
regime such as the rights to transfer land and the rights to use land as collateral, which 
· are explored in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7. Impact of transferability of land use rights on 
investment in land improvements 
7. 1. Introduction 
The most important differences in the 1993 Land Law compared with the previous land 
tenure regime were the granting of the right of land transferability and the right to 
mortgage land-use rights for credit. 
Before 1993, farmers could not rent or sell their land. Land had been cultivated 
following the plan of the cooperatives in the Collectivisation period; farmers had no 
rights to sell or lease the cooperative land, nor could they do so with their own "5 per 
cent" plots. Even when Directive 100 about the production-land contract was published 
in 1981, selling or renting land was strictly prohibited. It is hypothesised that this 
restriction limited the opportunity to obtain credit, buy more land for farm investment, 
and reap benefits from farmers' investment if they are unable to farm. Farmer may also 
have little interests in long-term land improvement, and the allocation efficiency of land 
use because of the restriction on land transfers. After the 1993 Land Law was 
implemented with the rights to transfer land granted to individual households, farmers 
started to have land transactions in most areas of Vietnam. 
This chapter, therefore, deals with several relevant questions: How has the right of land 
transferability contributed to perceptions of land tenure security? Has the right to 
transfer land rights promoted credit supply and demand as well as the development of a 
land market? Has this right affected the perceptions and practices of farmers with regard 
to long-term land improvements? 
Thus the first part of this chapter addresses the impact of land transferability on credit 
use and agricultural productivity over the different land tenure systems. The second part 
analyses the impact of the transferability of land use rights on agricultural production 
through its impact on farmers' access to credit; on land values through the development 
of a land market; and particularly, on the impact of this right on investment in soil 
conservation. 
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7.2. Effects of land transferability on credit use and agricultural 
productivity 
Many previous studies have investigated the effects of land transfer restrictions on 
agricultural productivity through the impact on credit use, land cultivation and 
investment decisions. Most studies examine the hypothesis that tenure security, 
particularly the rights of sale, lease and mortgage, has a positive impact upon the 
propensity to invest in land improvements. The critical analyses of Feder et al. (1988), 
Wenfang and Makeham (1992), Place and Hazell (1993), Besley (1995), Carter and 
Olinto (1996), Gavian and Fafchamps (1996), Lopez (1996), and Hayes et al. (1997) 
have shown that the right of land transfer has an impact on credit supply and demand, 
and/ or land allocation efficiency, and/ or demand for land improvements. The evidence 
that has supported these arguments has been found in different land tenure regimes such 
as customary ownership and collectivised systems. 
7.2.1. Customary land tenure 
In most developing countries where customary land tenure has dominated, the rights to 
transfer land between the community members or between them and outsiders have 
commonly been limited. It has been argued that: 
the distinguishing feature of different tenure regimes may be said to revolve 
around restrictions on the individual holder' s ability to transfer land (only 
among family members, within the lineage or community, or to outsiders; and 
with or without approval from other lineage or community members), which 
also tends to coincide with the mode of transmittal (inheritance, gifts or 
bequest, and sale) 
(Migot-Adholla et al. 1991: 159). 
In other words, members of the community are not free to make independent decisions 
about transferring land held communally. 
For example, the traditional land tenure system 1n Africa is often referred to as 
communal. In such system, a customary authority regulates transfers of land. The 
-
cultivators of a community may have no discretionary land transfer rights; such 
usufructuary rights (rights to reap production benefits) are granted only as long as the 
current operator remains on the land. It is even stated in some regions that land is not a 
negotiable property and as such is not heritable, disposable and alienable by individuals 
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(Oluwasanmi 1966: 26). The inalienability of land constrains individuals or groups from 
investment in land improvement and makes it impossible to use land to the best of its 
potential (Fabiyi 1974: 79). Land reform in Africa has become more important with 
increased population. Pressure for land reform has emphasised individualistic rights. 
The study by Besley (1995) in Ghana provides evidence of the impact of transferability 
of rights on investment incentives. Besley tested this idea using data from two regions 
(Wassa and Angola). Based on the testing of three theoretical models - the security 
argument, the collateral-based view, and the gains from trade argument - the empirical 
analysis yielded insights into the determinants of transfer rights in both regions. Besley 
found limited support for the credit supply effect and the gains from trade hypothesis. 
The findings were supportive of the idea that more secure rights facilitate investment 
and that formal transfer rights have a positive effect on investment. 
In Wassa, for instance, the regression results suggested that land transfer rights, together 
with other rights to land, matter for investment in trees. The right to transfer land with 
approval from the customary authority raises the probability of investing by 2.5 percent 
and this result is significant at the 5 percent level (Besley 1995: 919-931 ). In Angola, 
among the interviewed farmers who held parcels of land in perpetuity, 61.8 per cent of 
"complete transfer" parcels were improved by investments in drainage, mulching or 
excavation as opposed to only 5.4 per cent of "limited transfer" parcels. Moreover, the 
land which could be transferred freely was more likely to have been improved than that 
requiring prior approval (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991: 166; and Besley 1995: 927). A 
study in Rwanda also found evidence of the positive effect of land transfer rights on 
long-term land improvement. About 78.7 per cent of land which may be bequeathed was 
improved as opposed to 26. 7 per cent of those lands which could not be bequeathed 
(Migot-Adholla et al. 1991: 166). 
Heath (1992) examined this issue in Mexico when he analysed the hypothesis that 
farmers in the land reform ( ejido) sector would be less productive than private farmers. 
Since ·the land reform in Mexico in 1917, possession of land guarantees the ejidatario 
(ejidatario is a household that is allocated its own tract of the community's land to 
work, the income from which accrues to the household rather than the community) 
access to land but does not permit him/her to sell, lease or mortgage the land. The law 
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decrees that if an ejidatario attempts to rent, lease out or sell his holding, or if it is left 
idle for two years or more, the land will be seized and may be allocated to other 
members of the ejido (Diaz 1983). 
Restrictions on land transferability were thought to constrain ejido productivity in two 
ways. First, they may make it difficult for farmers to engage in off-farm activities, 
because if farmers were unable to farm they may need to sell or rent their land to obtain 
credit for off-farm work. Second, leasing restrictions may increase land allocation 
inefficiency as those inheriting ejido land may be less committed to farming than their 
parents; but they are unable to lease out their farmland to farmers with the resources and 
the vocation to extract greater productivity from the land. More important, leasing the 
land for a market-determinant rent provides an opportunity to compensate the .ejidatario 
for improvements made to the land. Without access to this type of compensation the 
ejidatario may be less inclined to carry out improvements (Heath 1992: 699). 
These arguments based on the data of the 1981 Agricultural Cencus. There was some 
indication that, in terms of revenue per hectare, ejido land were less productive than 
same-size private holdings. A larger share of cultivated land in ejido land (76.7 per cent) 
of up to five hectares was occupied by subsistence annual crops compared to private 
farms of equal area (70.8 per cent). More over, a smaller part of the cultivated area was 
devoted to perennials on the ejido land (19.2 per cent compared to 29.5 per cent on 
private holdings up to five hectares). In addition, the 1988 survey showed that the ejidos 
contain three quarters of the nation's forest land but contributed only 17 per cent of the 
output of forest products; private enterprise owns 20 per cent of forest but accounted for 
65 per cent of forest production (Heath 1992: 704). 
In Gambia researchers have investigated the determinants of investment, input use and 
productivity under customary tenure in peri-urban areas. Hayes et al. (1997: 381) has 
shown that within a customary tenure system there exist differing incentives for 
investing in land. More individualised rights or secure tenure, represented QY complete 
transfer rights - the right of sale and the use rights it implies - are associated with a 
higher propensity to make investments, which in tum has a positive effect on yields. The 
results of the analysis indicated that tenure security affects investment mainly through 
credit demand, not credit supply, because credit access in rural Gambia rarely depends 
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on the use of land as collateral; less than three percent of loans are used for agricultural 
purposes (Hayes eta/.1997: 381). 
7 .2.2. Collectivised regimes 
One-third of the world's population lived in the centrally planned countries of Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union, and Asia in which agrarian institutions were abruptly and 
forcibly recast during collectivisation in the middle decades of the twentieth century. 
Under this system the food economy often declined. The political and economic 
implications of these declines led in 1988 to public recognition that the problem lay 
with collectivised agriculture, and the system of land tenure and the incentives for 
management and effort within that system. The change of land tenure systems in those 
countries towards providing contract land to individual farmers was not sufficient for 
improving agricultural productivity when the land laws allowed restricted tenure, under 
which the farmers could not sell, rent or mortgage the land. These restrictions on land 
market activity were seen as costly (Brooks 1990: 236-237). 
Insecurity of land tenure, especially the restriction on land transfer, in these former 
communist countries affected on agricultural productivity adversely This was because of 
inefficient land allocation, lack of access to credit and lack of incentives for land 
improvement investments. For example, China's agricultural sector was collectivised 
for about 30 years. Collective ownership of rural land was established in Chin<:1, in 1956. 
Market transactions in land· were prohibited until the early 1980s. No organization or 
individual could appropriate, buy, sell or lease land. The rural reform in the late 1970s 
resulted in important changes in the land use system. The collectively owned land was 
contracted to individual households in proportion to their family size. But until 1983 no 
one was allowed to transfer, lease, or sell land in any way. This restriction caused 
farmers to have little interest in long-term land improvements (Wenfang and Makeham 
1992: 139-40). 
The restriction also affected land allocation efficiency. Many farmers were driven to 
devote their efforts to non-farming activities. Land could not be used efficiently as the 
land use rights could not be transferred from less productive to more productive 
farmers. As Wenfang and Makeham (1992: 153) stated: 
179 
--
There is no better substitute for the market mechanism in allocating land 
resources. When he pays for his use of land, a farmer will use it more 
efficiently and be ready to give it up when he cannot manage to use it properly. 
When his concession for the use of land is compensated, a farmer will be more 
willing to give it up. 
In January 1984, China decided to amend its tenure system. The government extended 
the length of the land contract to 15 years or longer (in 1998 land use rights were 
extended for another 30 years) and began to encourage farmers to transfer land use 
rights between each other, especially to divert land use to those who were more adept at 
farming. Farmers were allowed to obtain compensation for investments they had made 
in land which they transferred (Bing 1993: 11 ). Facilitating voluntary transfers of land 
use rights has been important to China's agricultural and economic development for 
four reasons. First, land transferability facilitates allocation of land into the hands of the 
most efficient users. Second, a land user with the rights to transfer will adopt a longer 
planning horizon and be likely to make improvements to the land, since he will be able 
to reap the benefits from improvements made even ifhe wishes to retire and his children 
do not wish to farm. Third, the introduction of a land market will give land a value and 
create the conditions for an equitable and efficient land tax. Fourth, the right to transfer 
is a prerequisite for the ability to mortgage; though the Guaranty Law prohibits 
mortgage of land use rights to collectively-owned arable land while allowing the 
mortgage of land use rights to wasteland which the mortgagor has contracted 1n 
accordance with the law (Prosterman et al. 1998: 36). 
A survey was conducted in 17 provinces of China in 1998 to assess progress on 
implementation of the 30-year land use rights and its security level. The survey results 
show that the overwhelming majority of farmers (90.8 per cent of 1621 interviewed) 
believed they should have the right to transfer or lease their land use rights to other 
villagers while 80.1 per cent felt they should possess the rights to transfer or lease their 
land use rights to non-members of the village collective. These attitudes were believed 
to result from the influence of transfer rights on investments in land (Kung and Liu 
1997: 48; and Prosterman et al. 2000: 21). However, the markets for rural land use 
rights remain largely undeveloped in China. Although some transfers of rural land use 
rights occur, most such transfers are not long-term, but are made on a seasonal ,or annual 
basis while the transferor is away from the village engaging in non-agricultural work. 
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The reasons are that while Chinese law has generally allowed the transfer of rural land 
use rights, no detailed regulations or standardised forms have been issued to guide the 
process (Bing 1993: 14-16). 
7.2.3. Other regimes 
Most studies on the relationship between the right to transfer land use rights and 
agricultural and/or land productivity have utilised the conceptual framework which 
Feder, Onchan, Chalamwong and Hongladaron (1988) developed to explain how tenure 
security and transferable land titles can enhance farmers' investments and productivity 
in Thailand. Private ownership is now the typical form of land tenure in Thailand. 
All land in Thailand, historically and theoretically, belongs to the king. However, any 
Thai citizen could claim land in order to provide food for his family. For many years, 
widespread clearing of forests; settlement, and cultivation were permitted with few 
restrictions and little government control. Rights to use land were informal and 
customary. In 1954, the comprehensive Land Code defined procedures for registration 
of privately-owned land and issuance of title. The land documents contain the 
demarcation of land boundaries and allow the owner to sell, transfer, and mortgage the 
land (Feder and Onchan 19 8 7: 312; and Feder and Feeny 1991 : 13 9). In their seminal 
study, Feder et al. (1988) found that land titles with the full rights of land transferability 
increased investment, input use and the productivity of land use in Thailand, mainly by 
increasing farmers' access to formal credit. 
Empirical data on credit transactions of farmers in the four provinces of Thailand 
revealed that more medium-term and long-term loans are provided by institutional 
lenders than by non-institutional lenders and that titled farmers obtain such loans much 
more often than untitled farmers who lack acceptable land collateral. Since untitled 
farmers cannot offer land as collateral, they are obliged to provide a collateral substitute 
- a group guarantee - to obtain institutional loans while titled farmers could and did offer 
their land as collateral in the case 53 per cent of the institutional loans in three provinces 
and in more than three-quarters of the institutional loans in the other province. The data 
also demonstrated that commercial, non-government banks in the sample were more 
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inclined to require land as collateral, as 85 per cent of the loans transactions with such 
banks involved land as collateral (Feder et al. 1988: 51-55). 
About half of Thailand's area is classified as forest reserve land, belonging to the state. 
However, an estimated one-fifth of the land officially designated as state-owned forest 
reserve was permanently occupied and cultivated by squatters who had had possession 
of the land for 15 to 20 years without land titles or certificates of use. Since 1981 the 
Royal Forestry Department has issued usufruct certificates to large numbers of squatters 
in the forest reserves. These certificates, known by their Thai acronym STK, provide 
"temporary cultivation rights". This covered only holdings up to 15 rai (2.4 hectares) 
and restricted the transfer of holdings except by inheritance. 
Squatters were at a disadvantage in gaining access to institutional credit since they could 
not legally provide land as collateral. Moreover, the conditions stipulated in the 
certificates may reduce the efficiency of squatters. For example, land could be 
transferred by inheritance only to direct descendants; it could not be sold, rented out, or 
given to others. The responses of the squatters interviewed demonstrated several 
constraints of the STK program. Nearly one-thirds of squatters did not perceive any 
benefits from the program. Another 15 per cent could not identify the benefits that were 
entailed in possession of an STK certificate. About 24 per cent of them expected the 
certificates to reduce land disputes. Only 13 per cent felt that possession of an STK 
certificate with the restrictions on land transfer reduced their risk of eviction (Feder et 
al. 1988: 126). 
The question of whether restrictions on the transferability of land have adversely , 
affected investment in farm productivity, the efficient allocation of land and use of 
inputs, and credit supply and demand in developing countries has been widely debated. 
The effects may be small or significant, depending on the socio-economic conditions of 
· different countries or regions. For example, in many countries, the relationship between 
land rights and productivity is significant as seen in the study of Feder at al. (1988), 
whereas studies in other regions have found minor or no impact from restrictions on 
legal transferability on agricultural productivity. Here the results of empirical studies in 
two countries - Kenya and India - are described as illustrations of the two sides to this 
argument. 
182 
Kenya. As in many African countries, customary tenure in Kenya was already 
undergoing individualisation at least several decades prior to the land reform in the 
1950s. Population pressures were resulting in severe fragmentation of holdings and 
increases in land disputes among farmers and corporate groups as land scarcity was 
gaining in importance in most areas. Individual freehold tenure, following the 
Swynnerton plan of land consolidation and land registration, was introduced first in the 
Central Province (Odingo 1985). Land markets had existed in many areas as early as the 
1930s. Ironically, sellers were often those needing money for land litigation. Buyers 
were usually wealthy men such as chiefs, teachers, agricultural staff and other 
government officials (Brokensha and Glazier 1973). 
A well-functioning land market had not been created 1n Kenya as a result of 
individualised tenure and land registration although many people decided to make 
purchases immediately prior to registration in order to have holdings in their names. 
Based on the observations of a few land transactions, Okoth-Ogendo (1976) attributed 
the lack of land transfer activity to the perception held by farmers that individualised 
tenure did not include the option of selling land. Purchases . mostly were by educated 
elite who understood the implications of registration. They had capital to invest from 
non-farm employment and wished to use the opportunity to acquire land as a speculative 
asset (Barrows and Roth 1990). The Kenyan regions of Madzu and Kianjogu were used 
to test the effectiveness of the land registration program and the individualisation of 
land rights. The empirical results showed that the commercialisation of land rights was 
not very attractive to Kenyan farmers, as of the 97 parcels with land titles in the two 
regions, only 23 could be sold by current farmers (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991: 164). 
Studies of land tenure in Kenya did not find a significant relationship between land 
rights and the use of formal credit. Farmers were reluctant to use land as collateral 
because of the fear of losing it. About one-third of those sampled in Machakos had 
applied for credit, but very few had approached commercial banks or u~ed land as 
collateral. Indeed, in most districts, less than two percent of title-deed holders in any one 
year receive loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation. The reason for this 
situation was that although farmers had the rights to transfer their land, lenders have 
difficulty in recouping the administrative costs of small loans; the minimum loan size 
fixed by most banks exceeded the capital needs of smallholders. In some areas, credit 
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volume was not increased but simply redistributed to large farms owned by more 
wealthy individuals (Okoth-Ogendo 1976; Odingo 1985; Barrows and Roth 1990; and 
Migot-Adholla et al. 1991). 
Most of the studies also did not find any correlation between land rights and long term 
investment or yields in Kenya. Farmers in Kisii region were just as willing to plant 
permanent crops before registration as after; smallholders wanted to develop their land 
regardless of title to meet subsistence and cash needs; and large title holders were not 
inclined to cultivate more of their uncleared land (Wilson 1972; Haugerud 1983; 
Odingo 1985; and Migot-Adholla 1991). The lack of relationship between land transfer 
rights and access to formal credit, long-term land investment and agricultural yields, 
therefore, suggests that in some areas, land transfer rights alone are not a significant 
factor. Others social or economic factors may have stronger effects on credit supply and 
demand as well as on investment in land and agricultural productivity. 
India. The main systems of land tenure in India, which were established by the British 
regime were in place until the 1950s. There were two systems - zamindari tenure and 
raiyawari tenure - with several variations in each case. The zamindari system admitted 
three interests in land: the government, owners and the tenant-cultivator. The 
landowners leasing land and receiving rent and the tenant-cultivators paying rent while 
cultivating the soil; and the landowners paying land taxes to the government. The 
raiyawari system came later in the heyday of British domination. In this system, 
ownership rights were vested in the cultivators themselves, and thus only one payment~ 
taxes from owners to the government - was admitted. Areas constituting Maharashtra 
and parts of Andhra Pradesh typified this system (Khusro 1973: 3-5). 
Nowadays, most agricultural land in Andhra Pradesh is held privately under formal title. 
Two broad categories cover the remaining land: assigned land and government land. 
Assigned land is land that has been granted mainly to poor, low caste people under 
various land distribution schemes. Recipients of such land received usufruct rights 
intended to be secure but are not marketable, even though leases are officially permitted. 
Distribution of assigned land began in the mid-1950s. Land assignment mainly covers 
encroached common land. Increasingly poorer quality land is assigned because most of 
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the better land has been distributed already. Most sales of assigned land have been 
unofficial where sales restrictions are not always enforced (Pender and Kerr 1999: 9). 
Pender and Kerr (1999: 289) used data from two Indian villages - Aurepalle and Dokur-
in this area of India to examine the effects of land sales restrictions on credit use, 
investment and cultivation decisions. In these villages, both forms of private land rights, 
including full rights to lease or bequeath and assigned land, which is subject to official 
limitations on sales, exist. Differences between the two villages in enforcement of sales 
restrictions helped the researchers to separate the different impacts of assigned status in 
the two villages. In Aurepalle, 16 per cent of assigned plots were purchased despite 
official restrictions on sales of these plots. Very few assigned plots have been purchased 
in Dokur. 
The econometric analysis showed that ownership of assigned land has a negative but 
statistically insignificant effect on both supply and demand for formal sector and 
money- lender credit. They also found that neither the share of the household's land 
subject to sales restrictions nor sales restrictions on the particular plot have a significant 
effect on investment. Some household characteristics were found to affect investment 
demand on plots subject to sales restrictions in one village, suggesting that the 
transactions effect of such restrictions may be inhibiting allocative efficiency (Pender 
and Kerr 1999: 291-293). Because this effect was present for titled plots as well as plots 
subjected to sales restrictions, the inefficiency of land allocation may be occurring with 
respect to titled land. 
An explanation for the limited effect of land rights status may be the imperfect 
enforcement of sales restrictions. Other factors, particularly the nature of credit and land 
markets, possibly affect the impact that sales restrictions have, even if effectively 
enforced. If lenders do not use land collateral to enforce credit contracts or to screen 
· borrowers, sales restrictions may have little impact on credit supply. The nature and 
extent of informal credit markets is a critical determinant of the economic impacts of 
marketable property rights as the impact of transferable title was relatively unimportant 
in the one region where informal lending was predominant. 
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7.3. The risks of land transferability 
Theoretically, a market in land will allow those with higher marginal value product to 
bid land away from others. Land will pass to those who can put it to its highest-valued 
use, eliminating the loss created by restrictions on land sales (Barrows and Roth 1990: 
268). However, this outcome is not always ensured as in developing countries land was 
transferred to richer people, who may not engage in farm activities, from poor farmers 
who rely on farm production. In many rural areas, because of the lack of infrastructure, 
diversified cropping, non-crop agriculture, and off-farm employment, peasants' income 
is very low and their ability to cope with problems in production and living is also very 
weak. Moreover, a new landlessness has emerged as a result of the permission to sell 
land. The concern felt about this development is reflected in the following statement 
relating to monsoon Asia. 
The permission to selling state-owned but individually possessed land opened 
up the possibility that peasants might be forced to sell land to deal with natural 
disasters, debts (including gambling losses) and other difficulties, or be 
induced to sell land to industrial and urban developers/ dwellers in order to earn 
easy and high short-term profits, thus becoming newly landless. 
(Zhou 1998: 3) 
For example, in Kisii (Kenya) 95 per cent of the land sellers were farmers with no off-
farm work. Land was often sold because of financial hardship, widows being a typical 
case. In contrast, 45 per cent of the buyers of land were full-time farmers, 41 per cent 
were self-employed traders, and 14 per cent were government employees (Wilson 
1972). This increasing concentration of land in the hands of larger farmers suggests a 
tendency of increasing landlessness in this area. 
The newly landless situation has emerged commonly in the countries which have a 
nominal state - but de facto private - land ownership. Under this new system, st!lte-
owned but individually-possessed farmland can be ,sold. Due to difficultie~ from weak 
individual land operations, poverty, illness, and even gambling losses, families have had 
to sell their farmland. In Cambodia, the poor landless were families headed by widows, 
gamblers, and peasants who sold residential and farmland along the road-way 
(Kusakabe et al. 1995: 89). Similarly, one village in Laos has 15 landless families and 
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no land left to allocate; no less than 7 5 hectares have been sold in only two years. 
Around Vientiane, landlessness accounted for 10-15 per cent of all rural families. In one 
village, 71.6 per cent of the households were landless (Groppo et al. 1996: 11, 17, 42). 
However, although the rights to sell and mortgage land inevitably open up the 
possibility of landlessness and poverty, the root causes of landlessness should not be 
attributed to the right to transfer land; the main reasons stem from other social and 
economic conditions; for example, the lack of job opportunities for those people moving 
out of farming. In monsoonal Asia, once the rural infrastructure, non-crop agriculture, 
off-farm employment and industrial companies in the cities developed, rural peasants 
can find sufficient employment in non-agriculture and off-farm lines. If land were fixed 
to the possessors, then, in a high wage economy, inefficient small land-holdings is a 
considerable problem. (Zhou 1998: 7). 
The study of Zhou (1998) showed that in the high wage economy, landlessness is not an 
important problem, but it is inefficient land-holding that results from the tendency of the 
land possessors to become part-time farmers and absentees when they go to cities to 
earn more income. These farmers still keep the land just as an asset withou! tilling it 
efficiently, nor selling and leasing it to full-time farmers who wish to concentrate on 
farm production. The "pull" from the rural to urban areas led to the situation of much 
land held by part-time farmers and absentees with inefficient use, while the remaining · 
full-time farmers could not get larger land and is thus difficult to survive. 
7.4. Development of land markets in North Vietnam 
Vietnam had a developed land market for centuries. Private ownership with the rights to 
sell and lease land was a significant feature of the land tenure system in the feudal 
period. At the beginning of the XIXth century, the total agricultural land of the country 
. was 3.396.584 hectares, of which 83 percent was private lands. In the northern region, 
65 percent of total agricultural land was private (Vu M.G. and Vu V.Q. 1997: 35). In 
this period, the exploitation of public land within each village created many loopholes to 
tum public land into private land. First, in the process of land distribution and 
redistribution, the village authorities (members of the Council of Notables and Chiefs of 
villages) took advantage of their positions to seize plots of land that were fertile and had 
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good access to water sources, thus a part of the public land became private land. 
Secondly, a number of peasant families who grew rich, bought public land which thus 
became their private property (Pham X.N. et al. 1999: 62). 
From the end of the XIXth century to the middle of the XXth century, due to the impact 
of French colonial policies, a substantial amount of land fell into the hands of French 
plantation owners and the indigenous landowning class. As a consequence of the French 
colonial rulers appropriating land, Vietnam's labouring peasants - who accounted for 90 
percent of the population - were separated from their basic means of production. 
Moreover, a number of decrees on land allocation issued by the Governor General of 
Indochina in 1913, 1918, 1926 and 1929 and the lending policy of the Land-Bank gave 
priority to the rich people in the countryside. The impoverishment and bankruptcy of 
many peasant families induced them into selling their farmland at very low prices and 
they became landless peasants. The landowners rented land to tenants or hired 
agricultural labour. Mainly poor and lower middle-income peasants had to work as 
tenants for landlords, while landless peasants worked as hired agricultural labour (Pham 
X.N. et al. 1999: 63-70; and GDLA 1997: 19). 
The cooperative system of rural landholding was established in the 1950s. Major socio-
economic changes came to rural North Vietnam with the implementation of land 
reforms. From 1954 to 1957, 810,000 hectares belonging to French plantation owners, 
the Church and local landlords, as well as public lands, were distributed to 2.1 million 
peasants households. The land and tools of the peasant households were pooled and all 
agricultural work was done collectively under the unified management of the 
cooperatives. Until 1993, any land market transaction was prohibited (Prosterman and 
Hanstad 1994: 4). No organisation or individual could appropriate, buy, sell or lease 
land, or transfer it in other ways. It was ruled that the collective land should only be 
used in common by members of the cooperative; leasing land would involve a rent 
which implied the exploitation of man by man (Ninh V.L. 1994: 99). 
The 1993 Land Law brought about great change in the land tenure system as, while it 
ensured, that land still belonged to the state, land u~e rights could be privately held for 
long periods as well as transferred (Article 73, 74, 75-see Box 6.2). Since the Land Law 
188 
has been implemented, land markets have gradually developed, though land transactions 
had in fact taken place before the 1993 law. 
Renting of farmland has been the most developed activity of land markets in rural areas 
in northern Vietnam. The number of households renting land for agricultural purposes 
makes up 11.9 percent of total farm households. Most of them (83.3 percent) have been 
the middle-income families, while only 16. 7 per cent have been high-income families. 
In contrast, among the households (7.5 percent of total farm households) who have 
rented land out, poor families have accounted for 53.3 per cent, middle-income families 
comprised 20 percent, and rich families made up 26. 7 per cent (Do K.C. 2000: 24). 
A study by the Ministry of Rural Development and Agriculture on land markets was 
conducted in 1998 in seven agro-economic regions of the country. The study results 
showed that the level of development of land markets and its activities were different 
between these regions. Renting land and borrowing land have been popular in the 
northern region, but land sales have developed most in the southern region and the north 
mountain areas. About 40 percent of land rental was between relatives; 70 percent of 
borrowing activities took place between relatives; while land sales have almost all (85 
percent) been between households who have no lineage relationship. The price of 
farmland has averaged one to two million VN dong/sao ( 67 to 133 USD/360m
2). The 
periods of renting or borrowing land have been from one to five years. Bidding for the 
commune land, which is often infertile land, forestland or wetland areas, has been 
common in the northern region. 
In 1999, another survey of the types of transactions in land was conducted in three 
communes in the Red River Delta area. 26. 7 percent of farm households in Ham Son 
commune, 20 percent in Van Mon commune and 34 percent in Dong Du commune 
rented land. In Dong Du commune, which is a suburban area and where households' 
income primarily comes from off-farm work, 39 per cent of households leased out their 
field plots. Households who borrow land are often engaged in full time farm work. Few 
households are involved in selling and buying land, with only 6.6 percent of total 
households in Ham Son commune, 4.5 percent in Van Mon commune, and 3.0 percent 
in Dong Du commune selling land (Do K.C. 2000: 24). 
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The development of the agricultural land market, however, has faced some constraints. 
According to the Land Law, households and individuals have the right to transfer land-
use rights only in the following cases: when they move to another place; when they 
change jobs; or when they are unable to work. The restrictions on the transfer of land 
use rights may limit the development of a formal land market and give rise to illegal 
transactions between farmers. The high tax on land transfers has discouraged land sales, 
thereby restricting an efficient market in land rights. Other issues affecting land transfers 
should also be considered, such as the extent of government control of the land market, 
the private sector's contribution to the market, and the dissemination of knowledge and 
information concerning land market issues (Prosterman and Randstad 1994; and 
Kjellson et al. 2000). 
7.5. Impacts of land transferability on the adoption of soil conservation 
practices 
This study asks whether the right to transfer land-use rights has led to the development 
of the land market and how this right has affected credit supply and demand, land 
allocation efficiency, and hence investments in land productivity. The survey conducted 
in the four villages of the northern region of Viet Nam focused on the number of 
households renting land in and out, their perceptions of the rights to transfer land, the 
reasons that induced them to become involved in land transactions, and the involvement 
of land transferability in making decisions about land investments. 
7.5.1. Perceptions of farmers about the right to transfer land-use rights 
Of the 67 farmers interviewed in the survey, 80 percent were in favour of the transfer 
rights. For them the transfer right has placed a value on their farmland, giving them.the 
opportunity to obtain credit when necessary, to buy more land for farming, and reap the 
benefits from what they invest in their land. Only 5 percent indicated a negative attitude 
to these rights. These were poor households who believe that this right can facilitate the 
richer farmers buying more commune land, which might otherwise be provided to them 
on a subsidised basis if the rights to sell and buy land did not exist. The remaining 
households (15 percent) indicated their indifference to this right as most of them 
insisted that they do not want to sell the land because land is the inviolable asset of a 
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rural person. Some households who are engaged in off-farm work on a full-time or part-
time basis believed that their income may be unstable in the future, thus they wish to 
keep a piece of land despite the fact that their families may not need it for cultivation 
(Table 7 .1 ). 
T bl 71 P £ a e • • re erence o ff arm-h ouse h Id £ I d 0 s or an £ . ht trans er rig s 
Village Yes No Indifferent Total 
Thuy Dien 13 (86.6%) 0 (0%) 2 (13.4%) 15 (100%) 
Bai Yen 9 (75%) 2 (16.6%) 1 (8.4%) 12 (100%) 
My Giang 11 (73.3%) 0 (0%) 4 (26.7%) 15 (100%) 
Co Cham 21 (84%) 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 25 (100%) 
Mean 54 (79.7%) 3 (5.15%) 10 (15.1 %) 67 (100%) 
Standard error (SE) 0.0483 0.0253 0.0435 
95% CI 0.0711 to 0.901 -0.005 to 0.094 0.064 to 0.235 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
Farmers' preferences for types of land transaction were also different between the 
villages (Table 7 .2). Of the 54 households who were interested in the right to transfer 
land rights, in Thuy Dien and Bai Yen villages, h_ouseholds preferred the rights of 
exchanging (77 and 93.8 percent), bidding (80.4 and 75.2 percent) and borrowing (71.7 
and 80.6 percent) more than the rights of selling (56.2 and 61.7 percent) and leasing 
(58.3 and 66.4 percent). These households are primarily engaged in agricultural 
production, thus they need to exchange farm plots to overcome the fragmentation 
problem. Households who want to increase agricultural productivity may need more 
farmland in order to carry out efficient cultivation practices; thus bidding for land from 
the commune and borrowing land from relatives is popular. 
In contrast, in My Giang and Co Cham villages, 90.6 and 95.3 percent of respondents, 
respectively preferred the rights of leasing and selling more than exchanging ( 61.3 and 
49.3 percent), bidding (52.7 and 87.4 percent) and borrowing (52.7 and 67.6 percent). 
Most of the households in these villages do not work full time in agriculture; their 
income mainly comes from other work such as carpentry, tailoring or construction. Thus 
they do not need more land for cultivating, but they may want to rent out or sell the 
land-use rights to others. However, households in Co Cham village also want to bid 
more land from the commune or exchange plots with other farmers to establish fruit 
plantations. This is an activity that is not highly labour-intensive, and therefore 
complements off-farm activity. 
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Table 7.2. Preference of farmers for transaction types 
Transaction Thuy Dien Bai Yen My Giang Co Cham Standard 
type (% of ( 0/4 of (% of (% of error 
households) households) households) households) 
Leasing 58.3 66.4 90.6 95.3 0.181 
Selling 56.2 61.7 72.5 70.9 0.077 
Exchanging 77 93.8 61.3 49.3 0.193 
Bidding 80.4 75.2 52.7 87.4 0.150 
Borrowing 71.7 80.6 57.2 67.6 0.097 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
7 .5.2. The involvement of households in transferring land-use rights 
Not much land has been rented in or out in these villages. Out of 100 households in the 
four villages, only seven families rented more land for agricultural purposes and ten 
families leased their farmland to others (Table 7 .3). Most farmers said that they do not 
have enough land to cultivate, especially in My Giang and Co Cham where land scarcity 
is more critical. For example, one farmer in My Giang village rents out land because he 
is an alcoholic, he lost his ability to farm, and his mother is old and very weak. One 
farmer in Co Cham village rents out land because in his family, only he works on the 
farm, and the rest of the family work off-farm. Another family rents out all their land 
because all of their incomes is from off-farm work. In Thuy Dien and Bai Yen where 
most households rely on farm production, they rented land in because they are interested 
in intensive investment to increase farm productivity. 
Table 7.3. Renting land 
Village Rent in Rent out Total of respondents 
(No. of households) (No. of households) 
Thuy Dien 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 25 
Bai Yen 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 25 
My Giang 2 (8%) 3 (12%) 25 
Co Cham 1 (4%) 5 (20%) 25 
Average 7 (7%) 10 (10%) 100 
Standard error 0.0255 0.03 
95% CI 0.020 to 0.120 0.041 to 0.159 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
Except in Co Cham, a very small percentage of households (5 percent of sellers and 14 
percent of buyers) were involved in selling and buying farmland (Table 7.4). In Co 
Cham village, 16 percent ( 4 out of 25) of households had sold land and 24 percent ( 6 
out of 25) bought more land; not because they wanted land for cultivation but because 
they may use land for other purposes than agriculture. In the other three villages, 
farmers were not interested in selling farmland, as they still need it for cultivation. The 
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scarcity of land and difficulties of accessing credit have inhibited farmers from buying 
more land. The high rate of land transfer tax is also a limitation on selling and buying 
land. There are similar survey results of selling and buying land between the four 
villages as the most 95% confidence intervals of the difference between villages in 
exchanging land have a negative or zero lower limit ( except Thuy Dien and Co Cham 
(0.02)) (Table 7.4). 
Table 7.4. Selling and buying land 
Village Sellers Buyers Total of respondents 
(No. of households) (No. of households) 
Thuy Dien 0 (0%) 2 (8%) 25 
Bai Yen 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 25 
My Giang 0 (0%) 3 (12%) 25 
Co Cham 4 (16%) 6 (24%) 25 
Mean 5 (5%) 14 (14%) 100 (100%) 
Standard error 0.032 0.033 (SE) 
95% CI 0.07 to 0.093 0.072 to 0.208 
95% confidence intervals of the difference between villages in exchanging land 
Thuy Dien Bai Yen My Giang Co Cham 
Thuy Dien - -0.03 to 0.07 -0.03 to 0.05 0.02 to 0.14 
Bai Yen - -0.04 to 0.06 -0.01 to 0.13 
My Giang - 0.00 to 0.14 
Co Cham -
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
Farms in these villages are fragmented, especially in Bai Yen village, and farmers wish 
to consolidate their farm plots by exchanging plots with other farmers. However, the 
land exchange market in these areas has developed only slowly, even though the 
government has encouraged farmers in this direction. Only 13 per cent of households 
have exchanged land because the rules and regulations governing this transaction are not 
clear (see Table 7 .5). There are similar survey results of exchanging land between the 
four villages as the most 95% confidence intervals of the difference between villages in 
exchanging land have a negative lower limit ( except My Giang and Bai Yen (0.02)) 
(Table 7 .5). 
Although farm households are strongly interested in the right to transfer land-use rights, 
it appears that agricultural land markets have not developed very far as only a small 
number of households have been involved in land transactions activities (Table 7 .6). 
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Table 7.5. Exchanging land 
Village Between farmers and Between farmers and Total households 
their relatives the outsiders 
(No. of households) (No. of households) 
Thuy Dien 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 25 
Bai Yen 2 (8%) 4 (16%) 25 
My Giang 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 25 
Co Cham 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 25 
Mean 7 (7%) 6 (6%) 100 (100%) 
Standard error 0.026 0.024 
of the mean 
95% CI 0.02 to 0.12 0.013 to 0.107 
95% confidence intervals of the difference between villages in exchanging land 
Thuy Dien Bai Yen My Giang Co Cham 
Thuy Dien - -0.09 to 0.33 -0.07 to 0.33 -0 .18 to 0 .18 
Bai Yen - 0.02 to 0.38 -0.09 to 0.33 
My Giang - -0.07 to 0.33 
Co Cham -
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
Many reasons may account for this situation: scarcity of arable land; high taxation of 
transfers; restrictions on rights to transfer land; the traditional belief of peasants to hold 
land even though they may not cultivate it; and farmers may not yet have confidence in 
the availability of alternative income-earning opportunities. 
T bl · 7 6 B. dd. t 1 d a e • • I m~ or an 
Village Low income Middle income High income Total of respondents 
Thuy Dien 0 0 2 (8%) 25 
Bai Yen 0 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 25 
My Giang 0 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 25 
Co Cham 1 (4%) 0 0 25 
Mean 1 (1%) 2 (2%) 7 (7%) 100 (100%,) 
Standard error 0.01 0.014 0.026 
95% CI -0.01 to 0.03 -0.007 to 0.047 0.020 to 0.12 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
7.5.3. Causes of transferring land 
The results of the interviews of farmers who have been involved in land transfer show 
that the main reasons for selling land are economic hardship, changes to non-farm work, 
and the lack of necessary inputs for farming (Figure 7.1). Among the sellers, 76.2 
percent gave as one of the reasons for selling their land the maintenance of their 
families; 66.3 percent have sold their land because of changing occupations; and 54. 7 
percent sold land in order to buy farming inputs and equipment. The other important 
reason given for selling land was repayment of debts. It was found that 41.6 percent 
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households have sold land in order to repay loans. Thus the right to transfer land-use 
rights had some impact on credit demand by farmers and on land allocation efficiency. 
Figure 7 .1. Reasons for selling land 
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Reasons for selling land 
1. To buy equipment and inputs 
2. Maintenance of family 
3. Repay loan 
4. Construct house 
5. Inheritance 
6. Change profession 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
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As can be seen in Figure 7 .2, the most important reason for buying land was investment 
in farm production. About 72 percent of households bought land for agricultural 
purposes. Reasons given such as constructing houses, gifts for their children, or 
consolidation were not nearly as important. 
Figure 7 .2. Reasons for buying land 
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Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
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7 .5.4. Effects of land transfer rights on investment in land improvement 
The survey results in Table 7. 7 show that there is not a strong relationship between the 
right to transfer land-use rights and farmers' decisions on investments in long-term land 
improvements. Among the 53 households who have practised soil conservation 
measures in the four villages, only 7 families (13.2 percent) have been concerned about 
the transfer rights of land. Most farmers (81.2 percent) said that they did not take into 
account this right in making their land investment decisions. 
Farmers who perceived a relationship between the transfer rights and their investment 
decisions said: 
We really need the rights to sell, lease, exchange and inherit the land-use rights because 
when we invest in soil conservation measures, we use a lot time, money and labour on 
their fields, thus we don 't want to lose all these capitals in cases of changing our 
professions or moving out of this village if we do not have rights to sell or lease out our 
land. Moreover, we need to have a larger plot to apply some conservation techniques 
and saving time and labour we invest in that work, the rights to exchange farm plots is 
very convenient for us to avoid land fragmentation. The rights to transfer land have 
also helped us to borrow money easier from the banks or lenders. However, it would be 
better if the government can remove some restriction on transfer rights, reduce or 
remove taxes of transfer land, and facilitate more on right of exchange (Farmers in 
Thuy Dien and Bai Yen villages - Field notes Tran 2000). 
Table 7.7. Impact of the right to transfer land on soil conservation decisions 
Village 
Do transfer rights affect your conservation decisions? 
Yes No Indifferent Total 
Thuy Dien 3 (20%) 1 (6.7%) 11 (73.3%) 15 
Bai Yen 2 (25%) 0 6 (75%) 8 
My Giang 1 (12.5%) 2 (25%) 5 (62.5%) 8 
Co Cham 1 (4.5%) 0 21 (95.5%) 22 
Avera~e 7 (13.2%) 3 (5.7%) 43 (81.1 %) 53 
Standard error 0.0465 0.0317 0.0.0537 
95% CI 0.041 to 0.233 -0.006 to 0.119 0. 706 to 0.917 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data . 
. Due to the small number of households acknowledging the importance of transfer rights, 
· these findings do not support the hypothesis that the right to transfer land-us~ rights has 
significantly affected farmers' decisions about investment in long-term land 
improvement. However, this result is inconsistent with the answers given to the 
question about whether they prefer to have land transfer rights. In Table 7 .1, 80 per cent 
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of farmers were in favour of this right, apparently because it gave them the opportunity 
to obtain credit for investment and to reap the benefits of their investment in the land. 
This inconsistency may result from the farmers being in favour of transfers because the 
transfer rights provide the possibility of realising their investment in land if they wish. 
Transfer rights could also enable them to move off the land if they choose to. However, 
in practice, not many farmers transfer their land. The reason for this could be that 
current villagers may not consist solely of full-time farmers, but may be part-time or 
absentee farmers. The farmers who work full time on farm may have strong 
conservation objectives as specified in the basic hypothesis. A number of farmers 
currently work off-farm but they may not be intending to work off the land in the long 
term. These absentee farmers may intend eventually to return to their farms to work and 
this may explain their reluctance to sell their land. This reluctance may be strengthened 
by the desire to preserve their social, cultural and religious links to the farmland and the 
village. 
7.6. Conclusion 
The 1993 Land Law in Vietnam was a remarkable change in individual land tenure 
security as compared with the previous land tenure arrangements. The important change 
in the current land tenure regime is not only granting land certificates with long-term 
use rights, the law has also granted the rights to transfer land-use rights to individual 
-., 
households including the rights to sell, lease and inherit. These rights have contributed 
to the security level of the land tenure system, and hence influenced agricultural 
productivity through the development of the land market. 
From the survey it appears that most farmers believe that the right to transfer land-use 
rights has placed a value on their farmland, giving them the opportunity to obtain credit 
when necessary, buying more land for farming, and reaping benefits from their 
investments in their fields if they change to non-farm work or they move out of the 
village. The development of the land market has also contributed to the efficiency of 
land allocation as the land can pass to the more productive farmers. However, because 
of some constraints on transfers, as well as the scarcity of arable land, the land market in 
this region has developed only slowly. Many households who did not work full time on 
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the farm or even completely work off-farm still keep farmland but not for agricultural 
purposes. This situation places obstacles in the path of efficient land allocation. The 
continuing development of renting land and exchanging farm plots between households 
and bidding land from the communes is important for resolving the land fragmentation 
problem which has limited agricultural productivity and agricultural investment. 
This study did not find much direct evidence to support the hypothesis that land transfer 
rights have positively affected the adoption of soil conservation measures by farmers. 
Only a few of the survey farmers said that the right to transfer land-use rights positively 
affected their demand for land improvement. However, this response is inconsistent 
with the very significant responses indicating that they perceived their right to transfer 
land-use rights allowed them to reap future benefits from investments and to consolidate 
their farm and have access to credit. 
Government action to reduce land transfer taxation and reduce restrictions on 
transferring land rights may facilitate the development of the land market in North 
Vietnam and hence stimulate agricultural productivity. 
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Chapter 8. Mortgaging land-use rights and investment in land 
improvements 
8.1. Introduction 
One of the necessities for the development of agricultural production is access to credit. 
Problem associated with the availability of credit and in developing countries have been 
the subject of considerable debate among policy makers and academics. For most of 
them, the inadequacy of credit is perceived as a maJor constraint to increasing 
agricultural productivity, especially through investments in land improvement. 
Traditionally, informal credit markets have played an important role in rural areas of 
developing countries. However, farmer indebtedness and the high interest rates charged 
by these informal sources have been serious concerns for a majority of the rural 
populations. 
Before the 1993 Land Law, farmers in North Vietnam had no collateral to offer banks as 
security for loans; they usually obtained credit from informal sources which imposed 
high interest rates. Because of the lack of capital, farmers could not invest in land 
improvements. To resolve the problem of credit access, the government granted the 
right to mortgage land-use rights associated with the right of land transfer. 
This chapter examines whether the right to use land rights as collateral has improved 
farmers' access to capital, particularly from formal sources, and whether the differences 
. • 
in interest rates between the formal and informal sources affects their access to credit. 
The constraints on mortgaging land-use rights to the banks are also investigated. Finally, 
the chapter studies the effects of being able to use land-use rights as collateral on 
farmers' perceptions of, and their actual investments in, increasing land productivity. 
The critical review starts with a discussion of the securitisation of loans when land 
rights have been used for collateral. Discussion then extends to the advantages and the 
shortcomings of institutional credit and other loan sources. The information collected 
from the survey in four villages in the northern region is used to test the hypothesis that 
lack of access to formal credit may constrain decisions about land conservation by farm 
households. 
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8.2. Security of land tenure with the right to mortgage land-use rights 
8.2.1. The role of credit in rural development 
Credit has an important role in the development of the agriculture sector. Increasing the 
flow of credit is essential for accelerating agricultural development by raising its 
productivity. The demand for credit by rural households derives from the demand for 
agricultural investment, for consumption smoothing, and for non-farm investment. 
Agricultural credit has the crucial role of facilitating access to inputs, particularly those 
embodied in new, high-yielding technologies. When credit is easily available, farmers 
switch quickly to new technologies and achieve faster productivity growth. Due to the 
uncertainties of agriculture, a large proportion of cultivators find it impossible to 
manage from one harvest to another without recourse to borrowing (Gill 2000: 1 ). 
Rural households borrow funds to finance consumption and/or to expand their 
agricultural activities. Some farmer use borrowed funds for long-term investments on 
the farm; others use them for financing working capital or repayment of old debts (Floro 
1987: 17; and Qureshi 1984: 21). Kamakar (1999: 37) pointed out that credit cannot be 
created merely by increasing the money supply; nor is capital available for development 
purposes if farmers divert savings for consumption purposes. Rural credit agencies can 
thus encourage the efficient allocation of tangible wealth as new investment through 
intermediation between savers and investors; and also increase the rate of accumulation 
of capital by providing increased incentives to save, invest and work. 
8.2.2. Informal credit markets 
The informal credit market in developing countries is usually composed of the informal 
moneylenders such as traders, millers, larger farmers, friends and relatives, landlords, 
the credit unions and credit cooperatives. These lenders serve the -financing 
· requirements of small scale and subsistence agriculture (Llanto 1993: 3). The lending 
behaviour of individual moneylenders is determined by a number of complex reasons: 
self-interest and interlinking of transactions involving credit, land use, marketing or 
labour arrangements. The informal credit market is characterised by the multiplicity of 
agents, intimate contact between creditor and borrower, the multiplicity of interest rates, 
the lack of formal procedures and the unregulated nature of business (Singh 2001: 4). 
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The informal credit sector does not always act in isolation from the formal sector as 
moneylenders access bank credit which they in tum re-lend to small rural borrowers. 
The rural poor - landless, artisans, agricultural labourers, small farmers and small 
fishermen - have almost always been excluded from the formal financial services 
because they do not have any resources, and do not save for their future requirements 
(Karmakar 1999: 36). 
In many developing countries, there is a large gap between the interest rates charged in 
the informal and formal credit markets. Interest rates charged by moneylenders may 
exceed 75 percent per year. The high interest rate is attributed by many to the monopoly 
power of the village moneylender (see, for example, Hoff and Stiglitz 1990: 235; and 
Karmakar 1999: 347). The key factors believed to determine interest rates in the 
informal sector are the size, duration and required collateral of the loan. For instance, by 
pledging land as collateral the borrower obtains a lower interest rate than by pledging 
jewellery. In Thailand, except for the commercialised Central Plains, the informal 
interest rate is usually around five to seven percent per month for a loan of 8,000 baht 
(US$ 320) for a period of six months, with no collateral but with the land title deposited 
with the creditor. Some of the more remote provinces report a rate of 10 percent per 
month (Siamwalla et al. 1990: 285). 
However, informal credit markets play a significant role in channelling credit to the 
poorer sections of society and assist in generating employment, income and output. It is 
estimated that informal markets provide more than half of the rural credit in most Asian 
countries. Informal lenders are able to avoid legal fees and reduce transaction costs 
relating to loan appraisal and documentation to levels below those for institutional credit 
sources due to the informal credit markets having no restrictions on capital subscription, 
liquidity, and lending and deposit rates. Moreover, credit from informal sources is 
perceived as more reliable due to its timely availability and also its availability for 
consumption purposes. As well, informal credit is more readily available to borrowers 
whose credit needs are usually neglected by the formal sector because of high risk 
factors, lack of collateral and the high costs of transacting and administering small loans 
(Karmakar 1999: 346; and Singh 2001: 9). The World Development Report 1989 
observes: 
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Informal financial arrangements reduce transaction costs and risks in ways 
denied to formal institutions. Moneylenders, for example, can operate out of 
their own homes or on the street, maintain only the simplest accounts, and mix 
fmance with other business. The services they provide are outside the review 
and control of the monetary authorities. The remaining costs can be fully 
reflected in implicit or explicit interest rates. 
(1989:113) 
Therefore formal lenders have not been in a position to replace informal lenders with 
regard to small borrowers, even with fairly widespread networks of credit institutions 
(Sarap 1991 ). Similar observations about the persistence of informal credit activities in 
other developing countries have been made by Siamwalla et al. (l 990), Floro (1987), 
Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) and Teranishi (1994). These studies has supported the 
argument of Ghate (1992) that 'there continues to exist in most Asian countries a 
heterogenous and dynamic informal financial sector which is largely hidden from view 
but is almost as important in aggregate terms'. 
For example, it was observed that in the Nawadhi village in Bihar in eastern India, the 
poor borrowed money from private lenders with interest rates varying between five 
percent and 10 percent per month, although formal credit was available at interest rates 
as low as 10 percent or even six percent per annum (Basu 1994). The reason was that 
the poor were unable to provide suitable collateral or guarantees to the formal lenders. 
Moreover, the poor do not want to obtain loans from formal sources because of the 
bureaucratic administration and corruption involved in gaining access to official credit 
(Gill 2000: 12). Nevertheless, while informal finance tends to be particularly suited to 
the requirements of small and poor borrowers in agriculture, and small traders and 
businesses, formal finance is better suited to the needs of the large and medium sized 
firms, organised trade and commercial households (Ghate 1992: 861). 
8.2.3. Formal rural credit markets 
· The formal rural credit sector is composed of commercial banks, thrift and development 
banks, rural banks and credit-guarantee institutions. The main functions of the formal 
institutions are to grant loans in accordance with existing rules and regulations, accept 
savings and time deposits, and lend money against personal security and against 
mortgages on real estate, (Llanto 1993: 6). Adams and Nehman (1979: 7) define formal 
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credit as funds coming from banks, cooperatives and other officially recognised 
financial institutions. 
The formal agricultural credit market tends to provide credit for various types of clients 
such as farmers, including the poor, small traders, and small-scale industries. However, 
in spite of the sizeable expansion of institutional credit agencies in rural areas under 
government-directed credit programs, and even in spite of the higher interest rates of the 
informal credit sources, the major proportion of borrowers rather receive credit from the 
informal markets. Von Pischke (1991: 172) concluded that 'formal agricultural credit is 
generally used by far fewer than half of farm households, and in the majority of 
developing countries probably does not reach more than 20 percent'. This conclusion 
was supported by the empirical evidence from the study of Ghate (1992: 859) who 
concluded that: 'the share of rural informal credit accounts for one-third to two-thirds of 
total rural credit in Bangladesh and China, about two-fifths in India, Sri Lanka and 
Thailand and two-thirds to three-quarters in Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and the 
Philippines'. 
High transaction costs is one of the limitations of the formal rural credit markets. The 
procedure of lending money is a complex process with the collateral requirements, the 
collection of necessary information about the borrowers, and the regulations on deposit 
and lending rates. Thus, it is claimed that formal lending institutions intentionally tend 
to raise transaction costs for small borrowers to discourage them (Adam and Vogel 
1986: 482; and Adam and Nehman 1979: 174). The financial transaction involves 
complex processes: in the process of intermediation, lenders have to collect and analyse 
information to assess the capacity and willingness of borrowers to pay back the loans; in 
the process of searching for appropriate lenders, borrowers have to demonstrate their 
creditworthiness; and participants in financial transactions have to negotiate the terms 
and conditions of contracts, and monitor the execution of the contract. In developing 
countries information on the creditworthiness of potential borrowers is often restricted 
and costly to collect (Tran T.D. 1998: 4). 
The failure of the supply-led approach in the Philippines is evidence of the limitations 
of the formal credit markets. The reasons given for the declining supply of formal 
agricultural credit have included the severely imperfect information in rural credit 
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markets, the huge transaction costs of small loans, the collateral requirements, and the 
carelessness of the banks in screening borrowers and approving loans (see Box 8.1 ). The 
study of Braverman and Guasch (1989) also showed that despite the expansion of 
targeted credit programs in developing countries, only a small fraction of the farmers 
seemed to have benefited. It was estimated that only about five percent of farms in 
Africa and 15 percent in Asia and Latin America received formal credit. Moreover, 
there was an inequitable distribution in access to formal credit as only five percent of 
borrowers received 80 percent of the credit. 
It is widely believed that the operation of the formal credit sector in many developing 
countries has significantly affected the rural economy, altering both the levels of income 
and income inequality through the differential access to credit enjoyed by large farms 
(Kochar 1997: 762). However, the formal credit sector has benefited from greater 
economies of scale and scope. Von Pischke ( 1991) mentioned the following advantages 
of formal finance: 
Advantages of formal finance include the confidentiality of institutional 
finance, ability to deal in relatively large amounts, confidence provided by 
documentation and legal practice within the formal sector, specialisation and 
related economies of scale and growth of markets, and the convenience of 
transcending or complementing face-to-face relationships through postal and 
electronic communication systems that transfer fmancial claims quickly and 
cheaply 
(1991: 211) 
The formal and informal credit markets sometimes play complementary roles. When 
available, formal credit reduces but does not eliminate informal borrowing because 
informal and formal loan products .differ in terms of loan size, collateral requirements, 
conditions tied to use of the loan, transaction costs, and repayment schedule (Diagne 
and Zeller 2001: 14). For example, in many villages in India, short-term credit comes 
· from the informal sector while investment credit comes from the formal sector (Chandra 
1993: 94). Moreover, in operating the informal credit market, the traders and 
· moneylenders need funds from the banks. It is now being increasingly recognised that 
the formal and informal financial markets have comparative advantage in their 
respective areas of operation (Singh 2001: 13). 
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Box 8.1. The failure of supply-led finance in the Philippines 
For about 20 years, the Philippines government funded a number of rural sector credit programs which 
attempted to provide access to formal credit at subsidised rates. The programs were to encourage small 
farmers to adopt new technology to increase farm yields and offset the policy biases against agriculture. 
Various incentives and regulatory schemes such as credit quotas, deposit retention schemes, and highly 
subsidised loans from the rediscounting window of the Central Bank were part of this approach. Interest 
rates and loans were regulated. 
The expected access to bank credit by small borrowers did not materialise except in cases where the 
government was willing to provide credit subsidies to banks. Even then, the supply of formal 
agricultural rural credit declined from a level of 18 percent of total bank loans in 1966 to only 5 percent 
in 1975 and less than 10 percent in 1985. Various surveys conducted by the Technical Board for 
Agricultural Credit also showed that the proportion of farmers who borrowed from banks decreased 
from 37 percent in 1967-74 to 23 percent in 1981-86. Worse, credit subsidies were largely captured by 
formal lenders and not by the farmer-borrowers while savings mobilisation was neglected as rural banks 
depended on the Central Bank for over half of their loanable funds. Out of 1167 rural banks in 1981, 
only 856 were operational by 1986. 
Critics have commented that the supply-led approach failed to consider the particular nuances of rural 
financial markets: 
- the severe information asymmetries in rural credit markets; 
- the huge transaction costs of small loans; 
- the banks' preference for observable and hard collateral like land, and the weak incentive design 
which leads borrowers to shirk their loan-repayment obligations and induces banks to become less 
careful in screening borrowers or approving loans. 
Worsening the situation was the direct involvement of government line departments in the lending 
process which opened avenues for political interference and corruption in credit decisions. 
Source: Llanto (1993). 
8.2.4. Access to credit with collateral 
Lenders usually require collateral as proof of the borrower's intention to repay and as 
surety in the event that the borrower does not repay the loan. Collateral is demanded as 
surety by formal and informal lenders alike, because very often it is difficult to screen 
and monitor the borrowers directly (Gill 2000: 86). Udry (1990: 252) argued that: 
'Collateral pledged in exchange for the receipt of a loan directly reduces the cost to the 
lender of a default on a loan; it can reduce the moral hazard associated with lending by 
providing an added incentive for the borrower to repay; and it can alleviate the problem 
of adverse selection by screening out those borrowers most likely to default'. 
Business people and farmers receive loans with three types of guarantees/collateral: real ' 
estate, movable property (property-like inventory, accounts receivable, livestock or 
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industrial equipments), and their reputation. Typically, real estate is the best collateral, 
movable property is the second best, and reputation is the least preferred. As security 
moves from real estate to reputation, lenders will extend smaller loans and charge 
higher interest rates (Bogetic and Fleisig 1997: 162). The type of collateral demanded 
and offered depends on its segmentation between the formal and informal credit market. 
Formal credit markets rely heavily on land as collateral, as land wealth is correlated with 
income in rural areas. Therefore, the borrowers who have above-average incomes often 
have greater access to formal credit (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990: 243). In contrast, lenders in 
the informal sector are more flexible and accept a wider range of assets, ranging from 
household goods to land, and even crops. Borrowers who cannot offer land as collateral, 
or those whose need exceeds the amount, often tum to the informal sector by offering 
other, less marketable assets as security for their loans (Gill 2000: 86). 
However, it often happens that a borrower puts a higher valuation on land than the 
lender. This is particularly true of formal credit institutions where land under-:yalued as 
a form of protection for the lender in the event of a collapse in the market for the output 
servicing the loan. This reduces the borrowing capacity of a household offering land as 
collateral. Pledging of crops as security is beneficial for the lender as it yields income, 
and for the borrower who not only finds a ready market for his crop, but is also able to 
save his land from being mortgaged. Personal surety is useful only where the lender is 
well aware of the borrower's status and has a favourable personal valuation of him. This 
surety is also used when small amounts are to be borrowed in the informal market by a 
poor borrower. 
8.3. Access to credit in North Vietnam 
As in many other developing countries, farmers in Vietnam face problems in accessing 
credit. Prior to the land reform in 1988 and particularly during the Collectivisation 
period, farmers in North Vietnam could not access credit from formal institutions. The 
state-owned banks and credit cooperatives provided credit only to state enterprises and 
production cooperatives. Farmers could only obtain credit from informal sources which 
charged very high interest rates. 
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The Doi Moi policy that began in 1988 has changed the face of rural credit services 
significantly. The clarification of land-use rights, especially the right to mortgage has 
been very significant for the development of credit markets. According to Article 77 of 
the 1993 Land Law, any household or individual with the right to farmland or forestry 
land can use their land-use rights as collateral in order to obtain credit from a state 
commercial bank or a credit organisation, except foreign banks (World Bank 1998: 37). 
Since 1997, the government has had a national poverty alleviation strategy. The focal 
point of this strategy is to give the poor opportunities to better their livelihoods. 
Improving micro-finance services in the rural areas has been identified by the 
government as one of the most tangible ways to assist low-income households (Dao 
V.H. et al. 1999: ix). 
Despite the fact that a great deal of effort has been made by formal financial institutions 
to meet the demand for credit, 51 percent of households remain unable to access these 
services. Many are still forced to obtain funds from the informal sector. It is estimated 
that there are 6. 7 million low-income households in Vietnam, only 26.8 percent of , 
which have access to the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD). A further 16 percent borrows from Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP), 
People's Credit Fund (PCP), and Rural Shareholding Banks (RSHBs). The rest seek 
funds from informal sources (Government's Consulting Group 1998: 15). 
8.3.1. Formal sources of credit 
The formal finance sector is dominated by five groups of financial institutions: five 
state-owned commercial banks, foreign banks, joint stock banks, the People 's Credit 
Fund (PCP), and Credit Cooperatives. However, only four - VBARD, VBP, PCFs and 
Credit Cooperatives - are providing loans to rural households. 
• VBARD was the first formal credit institution to be separated from the State Bank 
of Vietnam with the mission of providing credit to the farming and _ other rural 
households. VBARD is the largest financial institution, providing over 75 percent of 
the total credit extended by formal financial institutions to rural households and 
approximately 30 percent of the credit provided to low-income households. On 
average, 75 percent of VBARD loans are under 12 months and VBARD mainly 
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applies a lump sum repayment method. The capital being repaid as the final 
payment. 
• VBP has the mission of providing credit to rural poor households and to promote the 
poverty alleviation program. This bank was established to make use of VBARD 's 
existing network and carry out its functions. Representative offices are located at 
provincial and district levels. As of February 1998, the bank had made loans totaling 
VNDong 1200 billion, reaching 1.2 million poor rural households. VBP cannot meet 
either its social welfare objectives or its financial self-sufficiency ones. The supply 
of funds is inadequate and is entirely reliant on government funding because of the 
subsidised lending approach. 
• PCFs have been operating as rural credit cooperatives since 1993. They provide 
financial services to rural households on site. The operating principle of the PCFs is 
to mobilise people's capital and then to lend it to other members. The average loan 
size is VNDong 4.2 million and a member is not required to make deposits in order 
to be eligible for a loan. For larger loans, borrowers often mortgage theh· land-use 
certificate or other valuable assets for collateral. Loans are generally short term, of 
six to nine months. 
• RSHB is a formal financial institution that delivers credit to specific areas at the 
commune level. Most of the RSHBs were the outcome of the reorganisation or 
merger of rural credit cooperatives. The government has a 10 percent share in them. 
With limited funds, the priority target markets the RSHB has set excludes the poorer 
segment of society. Lending procedures are simple with staff relying on their 
knowledge of and close relationship with borrowers who are often family or friends. 
Borrowers have preferred the SRHB to the commercial banks because of their 
accessibility and the institution's fast, simple processing. 
Under recent regulations, loans of less than 5 million VNDong, do not requir~ collateral. 
However, in practice, fixed assets are usually demanded as the basis for loans. The fixed 
assets include land-use right certificates, houses, and other fixed assets located on the 
land. Movable assets such as animals, televisions, and bicycles do not qualify as 
collateral. Moreover, the list of assets and their total value must be certified by the local 
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people's committee (Dao V.H. et al. 1999: 12). The strengths and weaknesses of these 
formal credit institutions are described in Box 8.2. 
Box 8.2. Strengths and weaknesses of formal financial institutions 
Organisation 
VBARD 
VBP 
PCFs 
Source: Dao V.H. et al.(1999). 
Strengths Weaknesses 
• Largest network to provide • Unofficial fees raise the 
credit service in rural area. cost of borrowing for 
• Willingness to rmprove clients. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
outreach by following • Willingness to rmprove 
collateral free group lending outreach comes from 
up to a ceiling of V ndong government rather than 
million, intercommune from VBARD' s strategy. 
transactions offices and • Many rural areas still not 
mobile banking operations covered. 
• Mixed commercial credit 
with government subsidised 
programs. 
Focus lending to the rural • 
poor. • 
Impressive outreach • 
achieved in a short time. 
Good relationship with 
local government. 
Market approach credit • 
service. • 
Owned by its members. 
Focus on local savmgs 
mobilisation. 
Subsidised credit 
No financial sustainability 
Deeply depend on VBARD 
(staff, offices). 
Most loans are short-term . 
Initial growth is focused on 
richer areas and richer 
clients. 
• Commune-based credit 
service. 
8.3.2. Informal sources of credit 
Informal credit sources include families, friends, relatives, traders, unregistered private 
moneylenders and traditional rural credit associations (Dao T.T. 1995). 
• Private moneylenders provide credit on a range of terms such as seasonal and daily. 
It is estimated that in each village there are 2 or 3 permanent and 5 to 10 seasonal 
private moneylenders. The services are flexible but bear a high opportunity cost. 
Credit is provided to anyone at anytime, regardless of whether the borrower is poor 
or not. The negotiated monthly interest rate is from 3-10 percent per month. 
• The credit from friends or relatives is normally free of interest and loan terms are 
flexible. The loan terms depend on the relationship between the lenders and 
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borrowers and on the availability of extra income sources. The poor are not likely to 
borrow from relatives or friends because of the social implications. 
• Ho is a traditional rural credit association in North Vietnam. It is a small credit 
group organised by local people. Each group comprises from 5 to 20 members. The 
members often have the same occupation e.g., a group of farmers, a group of traders, 
or a group of war veterans. Each group operates as an individual organisation having 
no relationship with other groups or to formal institutions. Members deposit savings 
to form funds, which are lent to members in rotation. 
• Phuong is another traditional credit association, which is favoured by the minority 
ethnic groups. The groups of Phuong are smaller than in the Ho, varying from 5 to 8 
members. Phuong do not charge interest on loans. 
Box 8.3 demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of these informal and several semi-
formal financial schemes such as the national programs, social organisations and 
international N GOs. 
8.4. Impact of the ability to mortgage land rights on the adoption of soil 
conservation investment in North Vietnam 
The establishment of formal credit services, particularly the right to use land-use rights 
as collateral, should have given greater credit access to rural households in the North 
Vietnam. However, there are a number of limitations in the credit law and credit 
services such as in lending procedures, loan applications, lending interest rate, loan 
amount, loan duration and scheduling, and mortgage mechanism. These constraints may 
limit farmers' access to credit, and hence affect farmers' access to inputs and improved 
technology and agricultural productivity. This section uses the data collected from the 
survey conducted in the four sample villages in northern Vietnam to test this 
assumption. In particular, it focuses on the effects of access to credit on the adoption of 
soil conservation measures by farmers in the region. 
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Box 8.3. Strengths and weaknesses of semi-formal and informal financial schemes 
Organisations 
National pro grams 
Social organisations 
International NGOs 
Informal financial services 
Source: Dao V.H. et al. (1999) 
Strengths 
National network. 
Strong government backing and 
support from local government. 
Combine credit provision with 
technical assistance 
Larger national networks 
reaching to the commune and 
village levels. 
Have tried different rmcro 
finance schemes. 
Loan repayment are higher than 
other formal credit. 
Useful for poor members 
Effective in reaching the poor 
Target customers are clearly 
identified. 
Market approach. 
Have a good expenence and 
knowledge of rmcro finance 
programs. 
Appropriate assistance 
Focus on sustainability and self-
management of grassroots poor. 
Convenient, simple and local. 
Market interest approach. 
Lender and borrowers know 
each other well. 
Good local savings mobilisation. 
Independent operating. 
Weaknesses 
Subsidised credit. 
No financial sustainability. 
No saving mobilisation. 
Inadequate skills, staffing for 
credit service. 
Political and social target over 
economic efficiency 
No credit provision function 
No institutional sustainability in 
terms of financial services. 
Lack of skills and staff for large-
scale intervention in savings and 
credit. 
Insufficient understanding of 
financial sustainability of credit 
schemes; depending on outside 
support. 
High operating cost 
Isolated and small coverage. 
Low financial fund. Dependent 
on concessional funds. 
High cost to the poor . 
Very poor are excluded. 
Loan in kind at high interest 
rate. 
Isolated operation. 
Are not encouraged to become 
formal credit organisation. 
8.4.1. Farmers' preferences about the right to mortgage land-use rights 
The majority of farmers (91.5 per cent) in the four villages are in favour of the right to 
use land rights as collateral to access credit. Only a few farm households (2.9 per cent) 
did not favour this grant of right because they believed that if they could not repay loans 
in time, their land-use rights will be seized. A few farmers (5.6 per cent) were not 
interested in the mortgage right. These people are the poorest in their village; they do 
not have other valuable assets to use with land-use rights as collateral (field note). 
My family now consists of only two people, my son and me. I am 65 years old and my 
son is not very healthy. We are very poor. We try to farm our field plots for subsistence. 
We don't dare think about borrowing money to invest in farm because we don 't have 
enough labour. And if we want to borrow money from the bank we don 't have any 
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valuable assets to pledge it together with the land (Mrs Nguyen Thi Hien, Thuy Dien 
village - field notes). 
One middle-income household in My Giang village was indifferent to the right to 
mortgage land due to the family's income from a non-farm source (they are tailors); they 
are not interested in mortgaging their land to obtain working capital (Table 8.1 ). 
Table 8.1. Preferences of farmers about the right to mortgage farmland 
Village Yes No Indifferent Total 
Thuy Dien 14 (93.3%) 0 1 (6.7%) 15 
Bai Yen 12 (100%) 0 0 12 
My Giang 13 (86.6%) 1 (6.7%) 1 (6.7%) 15 
Co Cham 22 (88%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 25 
Mean 61 (91.5°/o) 2 (2.9%) 4 (5.6%) 67 (100%) 
Standard error 0.0349 0.0208 0.0289 
95% CI 0.842 to 0.979 -0.011 to 0.071 0.003 to 0.116 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
8.4.2. Farmers' purposes in using credit 
The survey results in Figure 8.1 show that the rural households in the northern region 
access credit for many purposes. The largest percentage (67.6 per cent) of respondents 
are farmers who want to borrow money for the purchase of equipment and other inputs 
for agricultural purposes. Over half (57.3 per cent) of the interviewed farmers borrowed 
money for constructing their houses. Nearly half (49.2 per cent) of respondents try to 
obtain credit for maintaining their livelihoods, presumably as working capital. _There are 
not many farmers (38.7 per cent) borrowing money for land investment purposes. The 
evidence about access to credit in rural areas shown in Appendix 8.1 supports this 
conclusion. Over 30 per cent of households need credit for other purposes such as for 
trading, doing business, or even for gambling. 
212 
Figure 8.1. Reasons for borrowing money 
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Purposes in using credit 
1. Buy equipment and other inputs for farm production 
2. Build house 
3. Maintenance of family 
4. Investment in soil conservation 
5. Other consumption 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
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8.4.3. Access to credit from different sources 
As reviewed in the previous section, although the establishment of the formal financial 
services has facilitated farmers access to credit, farmers still obtain credit from informal 
sources. Among the 67 interviewed farmers, 22 did not borrow money from any 
financial source while the remainder has borrowed money from formal or informal 
sources or both. As can be seen in Figure 8.2, among the 45 farmers who have accessed 
credit, only 22 percent have obtained both formal and informal credit. About two-thirds 
(72 percent) have borrowed money only from the banks. About 46.5 percent have 
obtained credit only from informal sources. 
Findings from the survey show that farmers who can only borrow money from informal 
sources are unable to meet the criteria of collateral requirement of the banks, or/and do 
not want to pledge their land-use rights, or consider the short-term nature of their loans 
and other bureaucratic administrative processes. Farmers who have credit access from 
both sources want to borrow a larger amount of money than the maximum amount of 
loan (10 million VNdong/USD 710) that banks can lend. A number of those farmers in 
Thuy Dien, Bai Yen and Co Cham villages need more money for their investments in 
plantations and non-agricultural investment purposes; thus they borrow money from 
both credit markets. 
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Figure 8.2. Sources of loans 
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Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
both 
It is difficult to establish the fruit plantations because we do not have enough capital for 
its operation. The banks lend us only a maximum amount of 10 million VNdong but we 
need more than that for our investments. So we must go to borrow more money from 
other sources of credit such as friends, relatives or traders. Sometimes we could not 
afford their interest rates which are several times higher than the interest rates of the 
banks ( Groups of farmers in Bai Yen and Co Cham villages - field note Tran 2000). 
Although 91 percent of all respondents like the idea of having the right to mortgage 
their land to access credit, the proportion of farmers who actually mortgage their land-
use rights to the banks is relatively small. Of the 29 farmers who borrowed money from 
the banks, only 13 of them (45 percent) had mortgaged their land-use rights because 
their loan amounts were over the five million VNdong (USD 355) limit which required 
collateral. The remainder only borrowed small amounts (Table 8.2). The reasons for the 
small proportion of farmers mortgaging their land rights are discussed below. 
Table 8.2. Number of farm households using farmland as collateral 
Village Yes No Total of respondent 
(household number) (household number) who apply for credit 
from banks. 
Thuy Dien 4 (44.4%) 5 (55.6%) 9 
Bai Yen 3 (42.9%) 4(57.1%) 7 
My Giang 0 3 (100%) 3 
Co Cham 6 (60%) 4 (40%) 10 
Average 13 (45%) 16 (55°/4) 29 (100%) 
Standard error 0.0923 0.0923 
95% CI 0.267 to 0.629 0.371 to 0.733 
Sources: Tran (2000). Field data. 
The survey results in Table 8.3 give an idea of the relationship between the rights to use 
land as collateral and farmers' decisions on investments in long-term land improvement. 
Among the 53 households, which have practised soil conservation measures and/or 
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invested in plantations of fruit trees in the four villages, many of them (71.6 percent) 
saw the right to mortgage their land-use rights as being important in their decisions. The 
remainder who did not take this right into account in their investment decision may have 
capital from off-farm work, or from the informal credit market, and/or their 
conservation measures are simple and do not need large amounts of money. Others did 
not want to bother with the bureaucratic procedures involved. 
Table 8.3. Ability to mortgage land-use rights has an impact on long-term land 
investment decisions? 
Village Yes No Total 
Thuy Dien 8 (53.3%) 7 (46.7%) 15 
Bai Yen 7 (77.8%) 2 (22.2%) 9 
My Giang 5 (71.4%) 2 (28.6%) 7 
Co Cham 18 (81.8%) 4 (18.2%) 22 
Mean 38 (71.6%) 15 (28.4%) 53 (100%) 
Standard error 0.062 0.062 
95% CI 0.598 to 0.838 0.162 to 0.404 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
The reasons that not many farmers have mortgaged their land right to access formal 
credit range from the borrowing conditions such as collateral requirements, the amount 
of the loan, the duration of the loan, bureaucratic procedures, the level of interest rates, 
and fear of losing their land (see Figure 8.4). Of the 67 respondents, 66 percent 
complained about the difficulties of collateral requirements as the banks ask them to 
pledge the land right certificate together with other valuable assets. Around 9,0 percent 
complained about the high cost of the loans with interest rates of 1 to 1.2 percent per 
month. 
The limits on the loan size is another problem as 82.3 percent of the interviewed farmers 
said "it was only easy to borrow under 1 million VN dong (USD 70), although the rule 
set the maximum amount of loan can be 10 million VN dong, but it is difficult to borrow 
that much because of the complexity of the mortgage mechanism and the lending 
scheduling. And in case we want to borrow the larger amount of money for agricultural 
and land investments, we are not allowed" (Tran 2000, field note). This complaint is 
consistent with other studies where farmers complain about regulation 499A, which 
says that the loan amount should be determined on the merits of the project and 
borrowers' capital. In practice, for loans below 5 million VN dong, the primary basis for 
determining the loan amount is the total value of listed assets. Customers applying for 
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the first time usually are able to borrow up to only 50-60 percent of the total value of 
listed assets. In some cases, they can only borrow the equivalent of 20 percent of the 
asset value (Dao V.H. at el. l 999: 78). 
The loan duration is also short, especially for farmers who are making investments in 
long-term land improvements which will take several years to generate returns. Most of 
the respondents (96 percent) believed that the one-year loan term is not long enough for 
investment purposes. Of the other concerns, 3 8 percent feared losing their land through 
mortgaging it to banks while 51 per cent pointed to the complexity of lending schedules 
(Figure 8.3). 
Figure 8.3. Farmers' perceptions of the constraints on their access to formal credit 
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5. Fear of losing land through mortgaging 
6. Lending procedures 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
In support of the above results, the responses of the 53 farmers who have practised long-
term land improvements illustrate the significant effects of the constraints of access to 
credit on land investment. Of those farmers, 71.6 percent said that the reason for not 
mortgaging their land rights was the high lending interest rate; 86.5 percent of them do 
not pledge their land rights because of the small amount of the loans; 94.3 percent said 
it was because of the short term of the loan; and 58.9 percent said that it was because of 
the mortgage mechanism (Figure 8.4). 
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Figure 8.4. Constraints on mortgaging land for long-term land investment 
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Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
The results of interviews with a number of local officials in the four villages also 
pointed to the limitations on access to credit by households in rural areas. 
Since they have been granted the rights to transfer and mortgage land-use rights, 
farmers can access to credit from the formal credit sources which offer lower interest 
rates than the informal sources. The number of farmers borrowing money from informal 
sources has reduced significantly, instead more farmers try to obtain credit from the 
banks. However, farm families are faced with · several constraints such as the 
availability of credit, saving facilities, lack of market information, insufficient 
collateral, high interest rate and other inconvenient lending procedures. Particularly, 
the poor farmers usually lack access to financial resources and where these are 
available from the formal sources they are unable to borrow enough because of supply 
and collateral constraints (Local government officers of the four villages, field.note). 
8.4.4. Access to credit and short-term conservation investments 
The limits on loan size and the difficulties of mortgaging land use rights do not 
significantly affect the short-term investments in soil conservation. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, some short-term conservation investments such as applying fertilisers to the 
fields in conjunction with intercropping and planting leguminous vegetables can provide 
benefits in a short run and the costs of such investments are not over the loan size limit, 
e.g. under 5 million VNdong. In particular, some investments that cost under 1 million 
VNdong are not affected by the loan size limit, loan term and collateral policy and are 
easy to repay (Dao V.H. et al 1999: 78). 
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For example, the average costs of using fertilisers in Thuy Dien village are 
N: 2,400 VNdong/kg 
P2O: 1,100 VNdong/kg 
K2O: 2,400 VNdong/kg 
In average, the amount of the fertilisers used for one annual crop, on a 1800 m
2 field are 
800 kgN, 400 kgP, and 200 kgK 
The survey results show that for one annual crop, the cost of applying fertilisers on a 
field (5 sao = 1800 m2) is 
800 kgN x 2,400 + 400 kgP x 1,100 + 200 kgK x 2,400 + 100 cong x 10,000 = 2112000 
VNdong 
(Tran 2000. Field data). 
Compared with the long-term conservation investments (planting perennial trees), it is 
not very difficult to borrow this amount of money from the banks and the farmers do not 
need to pledge their land-use rights for this loan size. Moreover, the increased crop 
yields in a year has led the farmers can easily pay off the short-term loan. 
8.5. Conclusion 
Since Vietnam has been moving towards a free market economy, the government has 
undertaken significant reforms of the financial system, especially in rural finance. In 
conjunction with the changes in the land law, the right to mortgage land-use rights has 
facilitated farmers' access to credit. The availability of credit is obviously important for 
agricultural productivity as input expenditures per hectare are significantly higher for 
farmers with credit. Previously, the informal credit sector was the only credit provider 
for farmers. In the Collectivisation period, only the cooperatives could access credit 
from the state bank; individual farmers had no right to borrow money from formal 
sources. 
However, the formal credit sector still faces several serious problems. This study has 
found that farmers prefer to have the right to mortgage land-use rights to obtain credit, 
whether from formal or informal credit markets. Although, some short-term investments 
are not affected significantly by the limited loan size, loan term and collateral policy and 
are easy to repay, farmers usually combined short-term and long-term investments in 
conserving soil fertilities. Thus they want to access credit for investment in agricultural 
-,. 
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productivity and long-term land improvement. But the present rural finance system does 
not cover adequately the smallholders who remain important for agricultural growth. 
The complexity of the lending schedule, the high interest rates of loans, the short terms 
of loans, the limited amount of loans, the unclear requirements for collateral as well as 
the mortgage mechanism are significant constraints on farmers' access to credit. These 
constraints result in a small proportion of farmers borrowing money from the banks, and 
although the informal sector share is declining, it remains an important source of 
finance for rural households in northern Vietnam. Therefore, the government must 
continue to improve the formal credit sector in terms of lending mechanisms, increasing 
loan size and loan terms, reducing interest rates, and simplifying the administrative 
processes in lending. 
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Chapter 9. Institutions and enforcement for protecting land-
use rights and land conservation investment 
9. 1. Introduction 
In many developing countries land reform has not only involved efforts to redefine 
property rights, it has also focused on mechanisms to protect those rights and to enforce 
obligations or responsibilities that come with those rights. It has been assumed that a 
robust administrative system with the relevant regulations and enforcement mechanisms 
can protect property rights and enforce responsibilities. In northern Vietnam, as well as 
in many other areas in the world, where land tenure regimes have been defined clearly, 
there have still been conflicts over land use because of the weaknesses of enforcement 
mechanisms and inefficient institutions. 
Previous chapters have analysed how well land-use rights were defined in the various 
periods and how these rights affected farmers' attitudes toward soil conservation 
investments in North Vietnam. This chapter investigates the mechanisms for protection 
of land-use rights and enforcement of responsibilities through assessment of the 
operation of the administrative system and its regulations in respect of land tenure 
regimes. The effectiveness of implementation of the 1993 Land Law depends largely on 
the regul,ations of the government and its administrative structure. The incentives for 
farmers to invest in long-term land improvements have been significantly affected by 
the granting and exercise of land-use rights. In particular, in forest areas where there is 
still conflict over land rights, effective regulations and strong institutional arrangements 
are the most important factors contributing to farmers' attitudes about land 
management. 
This chapter is organised into three main sections. The first section is a cross-country 
review of regulations and enforcement procedures, especially in those countries 
undertaking transition. The effectiveness of self-enforcing mechanisms and the 
governance of state enforcement are also assessed in this section. The second section 
provides an overview of the operation of the administrative system and regulations in 
land management in North Vietnam. Data collected during the survey in the four 
villages in this region are used to analyse the effects of enforcement institutions on the 
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protection of land rights. In addition, the compliance of farmers with any obligations 
that accompany their land rights is analysed in this section. Based on these analyses, 
recommendations about the more effective protection of land-use rights and 
enforcement of farmers' responsibilities are made in the final section. 
9.2. Regulations and enforcement 
In the developing world, institutional change 1s an important issue. In the area of 
resource management, an important institution is to define clearly property rights and 
property rules. These rights and rules should be protected by enforcement procedures. 
D,ifferent enforcement mechanisms have been used in different areas in the world. It is a . 
controversial issue as to which enforcement mechanisms are most effective. North 
(2000: 8) stated 
We all know that norms of behaviour, conventions and codes of conduct are critical to the 
way in which societies work. But we are far from understanding how they work and how 
they evolve through time, or what makes them work well or poorly. This is enforcement. 
There is no such thing as. perfect enforcement of any set of rules and informal constraints. 
We have to study how that imperfection works, how well we do with various kinds of ways 
of enforcing both formal rules and informal norms .. 
9.2.1. Types of enforcement 
Property rights should be secure from involuntary seizure or encroachment by others 
(T:i.etenberg 1996:: 41). According to new institutional economics theory, the power and 
economic scale of a single agent or the state are determining factors in the enforcement 
of property rights. There are three types of enforcement that reflect the relationship 
between property rights and political structures in a society:. private enforcement of _ 
private rules, private enforcement of public rules, and state enforcement. 
Private enforce,nent of private rules 
This arrangement exists in a community where there are no legislative or judicial 
bodies, no enforcement agencies, and no common rules, for example, in communities 
where land resources are scarce, people live together in groups, practise the division of 
labour and trade among themselves . In order to protect private property rights, a large 
share of ilie resources of each household would have to be allocated to the private 
protection of life and non-human assets and to efforts at forming coalitions with other 
individuals to carry out these functions (Eggertsson 1990: 59). 
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Private enforcement of public rules 
This kind of arrangement has been found in various communities. The political system 
in those communities included a constitution, a legislative assembly, and a system of 
courts, but the government was without an executive branch, and there was no police 
force or military and hence private enforcement of law. It is costly for individuals who 
have to defend their rights by private enforcement. For example, in the Icelandic 
Commonwealth where the private enforcement of public rules existed, individuals 
sought support to help enforce their rights (Eggertsson 1990: 60). 
In a stateless society, property rights in land are often restricted to user rights whereby a 
household has exclusive rights to use certain plots of agricultural land. The land can be 
inherited, but there is no right to sell the property. Therefore, an individual cannot use 
surplus harvests to reduce neighbour to a state of dependence by purchasing his land 
(Posner 1980: 23). In all societies, variations in individual abilities and tastes tend over 
time to generate unequal distribution of wealth. Wealth is correlated with political 
power; a stateless society drifts towards concentrated power, and possibly some form of 
feudalism, unless the process of wealth concentration is constrained by the institutional 
structure. 
It is possible to develop incentives for the self-enforcement of public rules, which is 
different from the private enforcement of public rules. If individuals act in a self-
enforcing manner, this lowers the monitoring and enforcement costs that the 
government would otherwise have to bear. In other words, when the rights and 
obligations are a matter of the resource-users' interests, they will fully comply with the 
rules made for the use of the resources (Young 1992: 160). When individuals have 
control over assets that are part of a natural resource, they will act to protect that asset. 
An example is the rights to fish. If people own the rights to fish, they will act to ensure 
that the resource is not over-fished, and they will prevent illegal fishing. 
State enforcement 
This arrangement exists where the state sets the rules or defines the basic structure of 
property rights, arbitrates in disputes, and enforces the rules. Rules imposed by the state 
and its agencies include constitutions, statutes, common law, and executive decrees. 
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Nowadays, there is vast involvement of the state in economic life, spanning both the 
definition and the enforcement of property rights and the direct allocation of resources. 
By providing law and order at relatively low costs, the state expands the community's 
frontier of production possibilities. The relationship between the ruler and his subjects 
can be thought of in terms of a contract (Eggertsson 1990; North 1987; and Keefer and 
Shirley 2000). The structure of a contract depends on the legal system, social customs, 
and the technical attributes of the assets involved in the exchange. The state protects 
rights of private individuals by enforcing legitimate contracts through use of its 
monopoly over violence and the judicial system. 
9.2.2. Enforcing regulations 
Under regulatory systems an action is either permitted or it is not. All rules contain 
prescriptions that forbid, permit, or require some action or outcome. Working rules are 
those actually used, monitored, and enforced when individuals make choices about the 
action they will take. Working rules are always monitored and enforced by those 
directly involved. Working rules may or may not be closely similar to the formal laws 
that are expressed in legislation, administrative regulations, and court decisions (Ostrom 
1990: 51 ). 
It is useful to understand three levels of rules (Operational, Collective-choice, and 
Constitutional rules) that affect the actions and outcomes obtained in using common 
pool resources. Ostrom (1990) and Oakerson (1992) showed that the linkages among 
these rules and the related level of regulation at which humans make choices and take 
actions are important for enforcement choices. The processes of appropriation, 
provision, monitoring, and enforcement occur at the operational level because the 
decisions are made by appropriators concerning the use of resources. Various types of 
rules can serve to limit user behaviour in the interest of maintaining the yield of the 
common. Limits may be imposed on both the duration and type of use, as well as on the 
amount of the resource flow that can be appropriated during a time period. -Some types 
of use may be compatible; others may be sharply conflicting. Thus operational rules 
directly affect the decisions about who should monitor the others and how, what 
information must be exchanged, and what rewards or sanctions will be assigned to 
different combination of activities. 
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Collective-choice rules affect operational choices indirectly as the rules are used by 
appropriators, their officials, or external authorities in making the resource management 
policies or operational rules. The adjudication of policy decisions also occurs at this 
level. Rules that establish conditions of collective choice to allow a group of 
appropriators to manage their commons can be understood as a common property 
arrangement. Individuals are no longer entirely free to decide for themselves how to 
make use of the commons; they have to participate in a process of collective choice that 
sets limits on individual use. 
The processes of formulation, governance, adjudication, and modification of 
constitutional decisions happen at the constitutional level. Constitutional-choice rules 
determine who is eligible to make decisions and the specific rules to be used in the set 
of collective-choice rules, and hence in the set of operational rules (Figure 9 .1 ). Most 
frequently, several collective-choice arenas affect the set of operational rules used by 
appropriators for making choices about harvesting and investment strategies in a 
common pool resource. Decisions made in national legislatures and courts for access to 
all resources, when given legitimacy in a local setting and enforced, are likely to affect 
the operational rules that are used in particular locations. 
Figure 9.1. Linkages among rules and levels of regulation analysis 
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Source: Ostrom (1990). 
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Rules do not guarantee the emergence of a particular pattern of behaviour. Individuals 
choose strategies for relating to one another and to the commons. On the commons, an 
individual must practice restraint when the beneficiaries of his or her restraint consist 
mainly of others. At the same time, each individual draws a large benefit from the 
restraint practised by others. Individuals can agree to a pattern of mutual restraint, and 
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mutually enforce such a pattern. Free-riding behaviour erodes reciprocity as one 
individual may choose not to contribute in the expectation that others will continue as 
before ( Oakerson 1992; and Fernandez 1996). Therefore, Ostrom suggested that small-
scale communities are more likely to have the formal conditions required for successful 
and enduring collective management of the commons. Among these conditions are the 
visibility of common resources and behaviour toward them, feedback on the effects of 
regulations, widespread understanding and acceptance of rules and their rationale, the 
values expressed in these rules, and the backing of values by socialisation, standards, 
and strict enforcement (McCay and Acheson 1996: 23). 
Property rules can only be protected by effective enforcement mechanisms. Enforcement 
may be undertaken by others directly involved, hired agents, external enforcers, or any 
combination of these enforcers. The enforcing regulations in each land tenure system 
have considerably affected land management processes because the protection of land 
use rights and land resources depend on the enforcement mechanism. Young ( 1992: 
158) pointed out that unless regulations are enforced conscientiously and equitably, it is 
often better to repeal them so that the remaining set of regulations retain credibility. 
Many scholars have argued that the mechanism of self-enforcement of customary tenure 
has served to protect resources and people from over-exploitation as an identifiable 
group of users holds the rights and responsibilities for the use of the land resources 
under the invisible bodies of rules and regulations (McCay and Acheson 1987; Ostrom 
1990; Oakerson 1992; and Berkes and Folke 1998). In a community, the communal 
members are the allocators and enforcers of rights to land within the boundaries of the 
commune. 
The institutional arrangements in communes improve sustainable land management 
because the rules of co-owners protect individual shares in the yield of the land 
resources and also protect the total yield of the land resources (Oakerson 1992: 47). 
Runge (1982: 32) has also pointed out that common property institutions -can be well 
adapted to problems of resource management in developing economies as its major 
implication is that inferior outcomes such as over-exploitation of natural resources, 
mainly from the inability of interdependent individuals to coordinate and enforce 
actions in situations of strategic interdependence, can be minimised. 
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In many developing countries, common property provides a complex system of norms 
and conventions for regulating individual rights to use a variety of natural resources, 
including forests, range lands, and water. In this system, institutional rules specifying 
joint use by a village or other well-defined group prevail as a form of resource 
management. An institutional arrangement of common property may be viable as 
private property on grounds of both efficiency and equity. In many cases, these 
institutions may play a key role in the effective management of scarce natural resources, 
complementing and combining with private rights (Runge 1992: 18). The above point of 
view has been analysed carefully by Ostrom (1990). She examined the organisation of 
mountain grazing and forest common-pool resources in Switzerland and Japan and 
irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippine islands. 
Ostrom argued that these resource systems, as well as the institutions, have survived for 
long periods of time (100 to 1000 years) as in these institutional arrangements, 
appropriators have devised, applied, and monitored their own rules to control the use of 
their common-pool resources. The success of common-pool resource institutions has 
been proved in that the Swiss and Japanese mountain commons have been sustained, if 
not enhanced, over the centuries while being used intensively; keeping order and 
maintaining large-scale irrigation works in the difficult terrain of Spain or the Philippine 
islands have been similarly remarkable achievements. In all instances the individuals 
involved have had considerable autonomy to manage their own institutions. 
In these cases, the appropriators designed basic operational rules, created organisations 
to undertake the operational management of their common-pool resources, and modified 
their rules over time in light of past experience, and according to their own collective 
choice and constitutional choice rules. These groups of self-organised principles solved 
the problems of commitment and mutual monitoring. Widely diverse monitoring 
arrangements were used. Appropriators themselves played a major role in monitoring 
each other's activities. These commitments and monitoring are strategically linked and 
monitoring produces private benefits for the monitor as well as joint benefits for others 
(O,strom 1990: 58-61). 
More evidence illustrated this point clearly in the case of the long-serving village 
institutions in Japan described by McKeen (see Chapter 3). Community-based tenurial 
226 
systems in Mexico are similar to other self-enforcing systems elsewhere in the world. 
Each community-based tenurial system is constructed of linkages into institutions that 
pervade the lives of community members. This develops into an invisible body of rules, 
regulations and processes that guide decision-making (Ostrom 1990; and Ostrom et al. 
1992). In this tenure system, tenurial rights and responsibility are defined by local 
communities within the basic framework established by the state. The local community, 
not the national government, is the primary allocator and enforcer of rights to resources 
within the boundaries of the community. Responsibilities are defined by the community, 
and the role of the national government is to protect the community's rights to its 
resources against the claims of outsiders (Alcorn and Toledo 1998). Therefore, a 
community-based tenurial system with the appropriate supports of the state can be a 
sufficient condition for ecological sustainability in many situations. 
However, the institutions designed and self-enforced by appropriators in many other 
cases are in a fragile condition. Tensions in the structure of joint-use rights adopted by a 
particular village or group may arise because of a variety of complex reasons, including 
population pressure, changes in technology, climate, or political forces. Thus the 
cooperation between individuals may be broken. Sugden (1984) has argued that the 
more homogeneous a community, the more likely are optimal outcomes; the more 
heterogeneous, the more difficult coordination becomes. As the heterogeneity of the 
group increases, and the resource constraints facing it become more severe, common 
property rules may become increasingly difficult to maintain. Nevertheless, in any 
heterogeneous community, the coordination norms still offer their own incentives to be 
kept and some enforcement may readily emerge from inside the group, as well be 
imposed from outside it (Runge 1992: 30). 
Enforcement from outside in many cases may help achieve improvement in the 
institutions, if the costs of such enforcement are affordable and the administrative 
officials work effectively. Where local-level rule making has broken down, it is 
necessary for local interests to request assistance in_ enforcing property rights that local 
authorities alone cannot guarantee. However, it has been argued that rather than starting 
with enforcement mechanisms from outside, it is better to let individuals have full 
freedom first to create self-binding property rules that best serve their needs. Outside 
enforcement may follow, if needed. Thus, property rules will be better suited to these 
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needs and more likely to succeed if they are based on this premise, and relevant 
enforcement mechanisms may be chosen depending on each case. 
For example, Sri Lankan fishers, who devised an ingenious system for rotating access to 
an inshore fishery, found themselves unable to enforce an additional rule to prevent the 
entry of new appropriators. With too many appropriators, the profits obtained by local 
fishers have steadily declined as rents have been dissipated. The rotation system evolved 
in an era in which the number of nets varied around 20, and the system produced 
relatively equal and profitable incomes for all net owners. Until the late 1930s, fishing 
in Mawelle beach was largely for subsistence and to produce dried fish for a winter 
market. But demographic pressure (the population of Mawelle grew by 70% between 
1901 and 1931 ), market opportunities, and the relationship between internal rules and 
external rules changed that situation markedly (Alexander 1982). 
Therefore, it was necessary for external enforcement from the government to limit the 
number of nets. However, without an effective administrative system, the national 
officials failed to enforce their rules. In this case, instead of enforcing entry rules 
limiting the number of nets, national officials could be convinced with promises of 
votes to intervene and prevent the enforcement of a national rule considered _  desirable 
by most local fishers. Private ownership may have been the only viable institutional 
arrangement in this case, not because it was the only way but because the external 
regime was unwilling to allow local rule determination and enforcement. External 
intervention to prevent rule enforcement against political favourites undermines the 
viability of common property arrangements (Ostrom 1990: 157). This has happened in 
many developing countries where institutional capabilities are generally weak, 
enforcement is difficult, and monitoring expensive. 
9.2.3. Administrative systems 
The enforcement of regulations is shaped by the interaction of transaction costs, and 
economic, administrative and organisational constraints. Administrative structures 
provide the means through which legal proceedings take place. They have embedded 
monitoring and control mechanisms that complement some of the functions of legal 
traditions (Fernandez 2000: 259). It is essential for any property rights regime that an 
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authority system should be able to ensure that the expectations of rights holders are met. 
Compliance, protected and reinforced by an authority system, is a necessary condition 
for the viability of any property regime (Bromley 1991: 27). 
In almost all developing countries, sub-national administrations are inefficient and 
unresponsive to the residents of the jurisdictions in which they operate. In many 
countries, government offices at all levels lack a sufficient number of highly trained 
personnel (Ostrom 1993: 196). It has been said that since bureaucrats lack the discipline 
of the "bottom line", they are slothful in management and not sufficiently aggressive in 
promoting the interests of the owners (Bromley 1991: 177). The lack of administrative 
capacity to implement government policy and lack of a comprehensive system of 
registration or documentation of rights is often a source of frustration for landowners 
due to the conflicts of interests between them or between landowners and government 
officials (Chapter 3). A central issue in land use control is to assure that the 
administrative process provides public policies suitable for the allocation needs of 
competing interests. All organisations must follow the needs of self-maintenance, which 
promote the stability, integrity, and continuity of control over their public domains 
(Williamson 2000; Ng'weno 2000). 
Land administration is one of the currently important issues in respect of sustainable 
development. In 1999, the 25 position papers prepared by international experts for the 
Bathurst Workshop provided an in-depth view of the diverse and complex issues facing 
land administration systems. The experts came from a range of developed and 
developing countries and a diversity of disciplines and experience, including surveyors, 
lawyers, planners, valuers, information technologists, government administrators, 
academics and representatives from the private sector (Grant et al. 1999). 
The workshop concluded that most land administration systems today are not able to 
cope with the increasingly complex range of rights, restrictions and responsibilities in 
relation to land, which are influenced by such factors as water, indigenous land use, 
noise and pollution. Many land administration systems need to be re-engineered, to be 
more service-oriented to meet the requirements of a greater variety of users. Land 
administration systems are increasingly required to handle vast amounts of data. Clear 
management systems and institutional arrangements are necessary to efficiently 
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administer land-related data sets and to ensure continuing financial support. One of the 
major challenges will be to build an infrastructure that is sufficiently robust to, amongst 
other things, effectively support the goal of enhancing security and access to credit, 
while at the same time being sufficiently simple and efficient so as to promote and 
sustain widespread participation. 
In the context of developing countries, moving away from a sole focus on the cadastral 
as the only source of information and having other information to be part of the land 
administration infrastructure will allow: 
• improved administration of rural areas 
• regularisation of informal settlements and the management of these areas over time 
• an increase in the amount of information available 
• improved conflict management in land disputes 
• diversification of tenure types 
(Grant et al. 1999: 10) 
A land administration infrastructure requires a legal framework which enforces the rule 
of law. Such a framework requires not only good laws but also legal institutions, 
professionals and government officials who are versed in the law, and a justice system 
which enforces the law. Such a legal framework is essential to ensure that land holders 
are secure in their occupation, they are not dispossessed without due process and 
compensation, and the land market can function with confidence and security 
(Williamson 2000: 9). 
Figure 9.2. Relationship between sustainable development and land administration 
Good Land Better Land Better Land Better Land 
Information Policy Administration Use 
and Management 
Source: Grant et el. (1999). 
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It is concluded that sustainable development is not attainable without sound land 
administration. This relationship is shown in Figure 9.2: 
9.3. Land administration and enforcement in North Vietnam 
9.3.1. Land administration system 
Social institutions, land distribution systems, production organisations and 
psychological characteristics of the peasants have been taken into account by 
Vietnamese policy makers in designing and implementing agricultural and land policies. 
The administrative systems have changed along with the changes in land tenure regimes, 
which in tum affected agricultural productivity. 
In Viet Nam, the family has long been both a fundamental part of society and a 
production unit. Families banded together to live in a selected area to cultivate land. 
Usually, they worked together to reclaim land, dig canals and dredge rivers in order to 
water and drain the paddy fields, to organise their living, and later formed a village. 
Like other rural communities, the Vietnamese village had a dual character in terms of 
land ownership: land formally belonged to the state or to the whole village. That meant 
the land was periodically ( every three to five years) re-distributed to all families in the 
village to cultivate. Part of the crop had to be delivered to the state in the form of tax 
and contributions to the village fund, while the remaining food crops and animals were 
left to the families. Handicraft output, tools, and houses also belonged to the family. The 
location of the village and its borders were imprinted in the minds of its inhabitants, or 
were written down in the village rules, and these were subsequently recognised by the 
state. 
Each village had its own management board. This board was the Council of Elders, 
elected by the inhabitants, in which the heads of family clans played an important role. 
In general, the management board of the village comprised the following: 
• Village Chief (Ly truong): was selected by the village's male inhabitants. Along 
with assistance whom he chose, he had the duty to enforce all policies and measures 
laid down by the Council of Notables (Hoi dong ky muc) and carry out all orders 
given to the village by superior authorities. 
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• Council of Notables (Hoi dong ky muc): comprised people who had property, 
education, and academic, administrative or honorific ranks. It was the decision 
making body of the village, which discussed and made decisions on all problems 
relating to the village inhabitants, such as the distribution of public lands, levying of 
taxes, military service, devising village rules, holding trials, administering the 
economic, cultural, and social activities of the village, and ensuring its security. 
Each village had its own rules which in essence involved customary laws that were laid 
down over a long period, and which were passed on orally to successive generations. In 
the late 15th century, King Le Thanh Tong promulgated a law designed to 
institutionalise the formulation of village rules, which from then on were enforced on an 
increasingly widespread basis. Village rules contained regulations and criteria on how 
village affairs would be run, the obligations, rights and interests of each organisation, 
and how each village should be dealt with. Villagers strictly and voluntarily abided by 
the rules of their respective villages. In many cases, they even gave more respect to their 
village rules than to the laws of the state. Thus the Vietnamese village was a social 
institution with its own administrative system and regulations that has existed for 
thousands of years (Pha1n X.N. et al. 1999). 
During the initial period of French rule in Vietnam, the colonial authorities decided to 
maintain and use the existing management board of the village to enforce their control. 
. 
Later, in order to strengthen their control over the village, the French rulers successively 
implemented a number of changes. The Council of Notables was disbanded and 
replaced by the Council of Representatives of Family Clans elected by family clans in 
the village for specific terms. 
Following the August 1945 Revolution, the traditional village administrative board was 
disbanded and replaced by one comprising the Commune People's Council and the 
Commune People's Committee, both elected by the inhabitants and serving for specific 
terms. The commune became the grassroots administrative unit comprising several 
villages that were officially referred to as than. This change was more or less strictly 
enforced in the areas inhabited by the Kinh. However, in the areas where the ethnic 
minorities lived, the village elders and the village chiefs continued to enjoy high 
prestige and play an important role, even until today. 
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From 1954, during the collectivisation period, cooperatives were the key element of 
rural organisation in Vietnam. The cooperative was an administrative unit located 
mostly at the village level, having responsibilities for both agricultural production and 
the welfare of its members. Each cooperative was a relatively independent economic 
organisation, provided its quota of taxes and followed the general policies of the central 
government. At the village level, two other structures of state authority complemented 
the cooperative: the political section of the Communist Party and the People's 
Committee. The main duty of the Communist Party was to see that national policy was 
implemented at the local level, and it held power over all village and cooperative 
decisions. The People's Committee handled the daily logistics of the village, focusing 
on the general well-being of the villagers. During this period, two types of land 
management were established in the north. Most land was put under the management of 
cooperatives, except for home gardens. On some land, state enterprises were established 
to produce cash crops on a large scale (Le T.C. et al. 1996). 
Following the reform in 1988, the administrative system has changed along with the 
changes in the agricultural sector, especially in respect to the land tenure regime. 
Resolution 10 and the 1993 Land Law considerably reduced the role of agricultural 
cooperatives in agricultural production. The cooperative was stripped of its 
administrative functions in the allocation of land, capital, agricultural inputs and labour. 
Cooperatives are being transformed into an economic unit that competes with the 
private sector in the provision of agricultural support services. The People's Committee 
has become the primary government organ at the village level. Its nine-person staff 
includes the chair, vice-chair, financial officer, military-liaison officer, land 
management officer, statistician, secretary, public security officer, and cultural officer. 
The Committee is authorised to collect contributions from farmers to cover the cost of 
village services and administration. 
Government policy has strengthened the General Department of Land Management as 
the primary agency to oversee land management issues. A national directive issued in 
1994 provided for the establishment of Bureaus of Land Management at the provincial 
level and Boards at the district level. At the village level, the decree provides for land 
management officers, who work closely with the district-level Boards of Land 
Management. The village officers assumed responsibilities for land distribution and 
233 
management from the agricultural bureaus, which were handling these functions. The 
primary tasks of the village officers are to monitor and regulate land redistribution, land 
use and zoning, and to collect information on soils and land use (Le T.C. et al 1996; and 
Nguyen N.H. 1998). 
Responsibility for implementing legislation and passing decrees, and administrative 
guidance, is delegated to line ministries, state committees and appropriate provincial 
bodies. Enforcement of laws and regulations is the responsibility of the government at 
the national level and the People's Committee at the province, district and commune 
levels. Where force is required to enforce the law, the Committee can call upon the 
police in their locality. Costs of enforcement can be assessed against violators of the law 
(UNDP/UNICEF 1995). 
9.3.2. Regulation and administrative enforcement 
Because land in Vietnam is owned by the State, it is a common-pool resource. Through 
the allocation of land-use rights, individual households now have control of an income-
earning asset. The effectiveness of the land rights regime will depend upon how well the 
land-use rights are defined and enforced, and how well any obligations or 
responsibilities the farm households have towards the land are observed. The 
responsibility for the implementation of the land law in rural areas is shared at the 
central level between the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) and 
the General Department of Land Administration (GDLA). The latter organisation is 
responsible for land surveying, the organisation of cadastral mapping and registration, as 
well as for the completion of land use plans. These tasks are implemented at the local 
level by the Cadastral Survey Department, which sends officials to villages in order to 
carry out surveys, and help the households fill out application forms (UNDP 1996: 40). 
Since the 1993 Land Law was implemented, administrative officials have claimed many 
achievements as the successful outcome of allocating agricultural land and issuing land-
use rights certificates, and attempting to establish a land registration system. However, a 
number of shortcomings in allocating forest lands and enforcing regulations remain. 
These strengths and weaknesses of the land administration system in implementing the 
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land law and regulations can be analysed using data collected from the survey in the 
four villages and several departments of the central government in northern Vietnam. 
9.3.2.1. Dissemination of information on rules and regulations 
Household interviews reveal that information about the Land Law is disseminated 
poorly in most rural areas. The majority of farmers (71.~%) of the four villages said that 
they did not received adequate information to enable them to understand clearly the 
rules of allocating land, demarcating the plots of land allotted, assessing the quality of 
the land plots, transferring land, and borrowing money from the banks, as well as the 
process of enforcing these regulations and rules · (see Table 9.1). Only 20% of 
respondents believed that they receive enough of the necessary information about rules 
and regulations. Most of these people are the village managers, commune managers or 
officials who directly received the information about the Land Law from the provincial 
and central governments and have the responsibility to convey the information to the 
villagers. 
Table 9.1. Farmers' attitudes about the dissemination of information on the Land 
Law 
Poorly Adequately 
Village dissemenated dissemenated Indifferent Total of 
information information Respondents 
Thuy Dien 10 (71.4%) 4 (28.6%) 1 (6.6%) 14 
Bai Yen 9 (81.8%) 2 (18.2) 1 (8.3%) 11 
My Giang 12 (80%) 3 (20%) 0 (0%) 15 
Co Cham 17 (77.2%) 5 (22.8%) 3 (12°/4) 22 
Total 48 (77.4%) 14 (22.6%) 5 (7.56%) 62 (100%) 
Standard error 0.0531 0.0531 0.032 
95% CI 0.67 to 0.878 0.122 to 0.33 0.012 to 0.138 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
Other than these officials, some people attempted to obtain more information by 
themselves as they travelled to the towns or city to buy the law books and have them 
interpreted by more highly educated people or their children. The standard errors (0.05; 
0.05; 0.03) illustrate that the distribution of the sample means contains relatively not 
large dispersion, which means the responses of observations from four villages are not 
very different. The proportion of farmers who receive adequate information differed 
between the four villages The farmers living in Thuy Dien, My Giang and Co Cham 
villages (28.6 per cent, 20 per cent and 22.8 per cent respectively), which are located 
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close to urban areas can access information more easily than farmers living in Bai Yen 
village ( 18 .2 per cent), which is located in the highland areas. The small standard errors 
(0.06; 0.04) in Table 9.1 indicating the generally similar opinions of information 
dissemination between the four villages. Among the household interviewees, only 7 .6 
per cent were not concerned about this issue (Table 9 .1 ). 
The complaints about the inadequate, incomplete and erroneous information relayed to 
the villages are represented by the following compilation of quotations from survey 
respondents: 
'The land law was disseminated to us in a meeting of the village. We just memorised 
some main points that the land can be registered to individual households, we will have 
land certificates to ensure the land boundaries, and some rights on land. But we have 
not understood many other procedures and regulations for receiving these rights. Thus 
we are not sure of the stability of the new land policies. We do feel it is difficult or 
uncertain to use land certificate in access to credit or in land transaction. No one can 
explain clearly the land law for us even the village managers. We are also unclear 
about the criteria for dividing farm plots. Land disputes occur easily when the village 
manager cannot remember who has made a prior claim to which piece of land' (Group 
of farmers in Thuy <lien, Bai Yen, My Giang and Co Cham villages. Field data.). 
In order to understand the main reasons for the poor dissemination of information about 
the land policies, interviews were conducted with officials in village, district, provincial 
and central governments. Nearly all respondents (96 per cent) said that the main cause 
of the poor dissemination of information was the lack of resources. Further, 7 5 per cent 
of interviewees believed that lack of training for officials and cadastral officers is 
another major cause; while 66 per cent attributed the problem to inadequate public 
media; and nearly half of administrators perceived that they do not respond effectively 
to the requirements of farmers . The lack of participation of farmers in the land 
allocation process was another important reason given for conveying incomplete and 
inaccurate information. About 71 per cent of respondents recognised this_ problem 
(Figure 9.3). 
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Figure 9.3. Causes of inadequate and incorrect distribution of information on land 
policies 
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4. Lack of participation of farmers in decision-making processes 
5. Inadequate public media for disseminating information 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
The results showed in Table 9 .1 and Figure 9 .3 support the evidence shown in Box 9 .1, 
which pointed to the lack of correct and adequate information about land policy leading 
to land conflicts between farmers and inefficient use of land because farmers 
misunderstood the purpose of the new Land Law. A report by the UNDP in 1996 
pointed out that sometimes the basic message that the new legislation was to ensure 
long-term landholdings did not reach farmers, diminishing their confidence in the 
system. Generally, the dissemination of the new policies was not properly prepared as 
material was inadequate, and officials or cadastral officers responsible for informing the 
households lacked the necessary training. For example, in the northern province of Lao 
Cai, it was found that only 57 percent of commune-level cadastral officers have a 
secondary-level education. Moreover, there were no budgets available for the training 
required for such complicated work. The information and skill shortages at the outset of 
the process prevented its successful completion (UNDP 1996: 42). 
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Box 9.1. The need for information 
The Tay people living in Yen Chau district of Son La province in northern Vietnam are not happy with 
the new allocation policy. In the process of allocating the land, the communal leader called the village 
leaders to a brief meeting to announce the new policy, but without really explaining its implementation 
and purpose. Thereafter, the village leaders called meetings of their villagers. 
While in principle the land is to be rationally divided among households so it will be near their home 
and measurements and maps made of the borders of each household's land holdings, each of the 
villagers was only asked, "Where are you cultivating now?" When the villager indicated several areas 
where he was currently planting crops, the village leader and communal leader wrote it down and then 
asked how much land it was. The farmer said "about 100 meters", other protested "no, it is only 50 
meters", then they argued a while, and finally agreed on an amount and wrote it down. 
After finishing this work, the villagers were told that they could not go to other areas to plant any more. 
From that point on, they could only use the land that they were currently cultivating. The villagers 
protested. In the past, when their land was no longer productive, they could move to other areas, now 
the new policy will restrict their movements. They failed to understand why this is supposed to be a 
good policy. 
Had they received explanation on the purpose of the policy and the meaning of land use rights, and how 
the distribution of these rights prevented other people from moving in to exploit their land and its 
resources, they may have been less negative. And if they were allowed to participate more actively in 
the distribution of land, the outcome may have been suited to the needs of the village and they could 
have made arrangements among themselves on how to use the land most efficiently. 
Source: UNDP (1996). 
9.3.2.2. Process of issuing land use certificates 
At the time the survey was conducted, most of the households in Thuy Dien village had 
received their land-use rights certificates (Red Books), and thus they were pleased with 
the process of registered land use rights. This result is similar to the information 
received from the head of Lap Thach district (the district that the Thuy Dien village 
belongs to) that about 95 per cent of the commune had received their land certificates. A 
few households have not received the Red Book due to disputes over the land. In 
contrast, the results of surveys in the three other villages showed dissatisfaction among 
the vast majority of farmers (83.3 per cent, 73.3 per cent and 76 per cent) who 
complained about how slowly the process of issuing land certificates was progressing 
because the administrative officers were still working on some stages of the process 
(Table 9.2). 
T bl 9 2 P a e • • f . t . I d rocess o reg1s ermg an . ht use rig s 
Village Slow process Good process Indifferent Total 
Thuy Dien 3 (20%) 12 (80%) 0 (0%) 15 
Bai Yen 10 (82.6%) 1 (8.7%) 1 (8.7%) 12 
My Giang 11 (73.3%) 2 (13 .3%) 2 (13.4%) 15 
Co Cham 19 (76.0%) 4 (16%) 2 (8%) 25 
Total 43 (64.1 %) 19 (28.3%) 4 (7.6%) 67 (100%) 
Standard error 0.291 0.339 0.055 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
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According to the district land administrators in these three villages, although the district 
is responsible for the allocation and certification of land according to national and 
provincial criteria, the task of listing the size, current use and type of each household's 
holdings has had to be entrusted to the local management in each village. Villagers have 
been asked to make declarations of their current holdings. Then the announcement of 
the land use zones and adjustment of landholdings between households has taken place 
at a village meeting. 
The district Land Administration Department must collate the information contained in 
the allocation agreements in a cadastral book, and then prepare land-use right 
certificates for the approval by the Chairman of the district People's Committee. 
However, the process of issuing land certificates has been slow in many areas in the 
northern region because the district authorities do not have adequate resources and the 
low level of training of people undertaking comprehensive surveying, demarcating and 
registering of land (Smith and Tran 1994; and Smith 1995; see Figure 9.4). The costs of 
the land allocation process are another limitation in issuing land-use certificate as many 
poor farmers cannot afford it. The cost of the land allocation process is 21,000 
VNdong/ha and each farm household has to pay 5,000 VNdong more for the certificate 
(Nguyen H.N. and Gilliusson 1997). 
The results of in-depth interviews with administrative officers showed that most 
administrators (92.6 per cent) saw the unavailability of budgets as the main cause of the 
slow progress in issuing land-use rights certificates. Around 70 per cent of 
administrative officers said that the second most important reason is the shortage of 
skills to carry out surveying and cadastral work. In some areas, for example in Bai Yen 
village, inaccuracies were occurring in the surveying and measurement of land, and the 
differences between recorded and actual data led to the high costs. Over half of 
respondents (52 per cent) agreed that ineffective resolution of land conflicts is another 
cause leading to the slow process of land registration. Many of them (65 per cent) also 
believed that insufficient participation by farmers in the land registration process 
contributed to the delays in issuing land certificates. However, the poor transparency of 
provincial guidelines was not recognised as a major problem by many officials (31.5 per 
cent), as can be seen in Figure 9.4. 
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Figure 9.4. Causes of the slow and inaccurate process of registration 
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Source: Tran (2000) . Field data. 
9.3.2.3. Monitoring and resolving land conflicts 
The interviews with farm households and local officials showed that usually the local 
authorities have the responsibility to monitor the rules and obligations which should be 
carried out by farmers. However, monitoring mechanisms have not been focused on in 
most areas; and the conditions, the duties and procedures for doing so have not been 
clarified. Officials often monitor only the boundaries of the allocated field plots between 
farm households and sometimes the land transfer activities. 
From the interviews and observations in the survey, it appears that few conflicts over 
land occurred in Thuy Dien, My Giang and Co Cham villages. In contrast, land disputes 
have been frequent in the highland areas which comprise both agricultural and forest 
lands such as in Bai Yen village. The conflicts have taken place between farmers or 
between farmers and local officials. Provincial officials complained that, in general, 
households are very reluctant to accept allocations of bare hill land for purposes of 
afforestation. The disputes were caused by the inadequate grassroots dissemination of 
information about the rules, the lack of transparency of the allocation procedures, and 
the lack of manpower and other resources to enforce the rules and set priorities in 
allocating land to farm households. Usually, the local authorities have responsibility for 
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resolving land conflicts; however, not many conflicts have been resolved due to the 
weaknesses of the enforcement mechanism. 
For example, in Bai Yen village, the village manager has failed to draw the individual 
plots of land on the sketch map of village land resources. Confusion over boundaries 
between households has subsequently led to disputes over land. Land disputes have also 
occurred between households because village managers have failed to give priority in 
the location and quality of land allocations to households who are eligible under state 
policy. Families covered by state policies (families of war heroes, and the war 
wounded), families who have contributed to the revolution, and single member families 
to whom priority should be given, should be allocated land in more favourable positions 
than that of other families, in keeping with that family's production capacity and the 
ability of the local authority to make such arrangements (Smith 1995: 13). 
9.3.2.4. Obligations of land protection 
The Land Law of 1993 enacted the laws on protection of the rights to use land and the 
responsibilities to protect the land. Farmers have to use land according to government 
plans. However, the criteria for protecting land productivity have not been clarified in 
the Law (Articles 73 to 79 of the 1993 Land Law). Farmers in the four villages were 
asked if they can fulfil the government obligations in terms of protecting land 
productivity. As can be seen from the results in Table 9.3, one-fifth of households were 
not concerned about such obligations, while over half of the respondents (53.7 per cent) 
found that it is difficult to carry out obligations of land protection. However, a number 
of farmers (25.4 per cent) perceived that there are no difficulties in having responsibility 
for the land. They are households that have invested in long-term land improvement as 
they feel assured of the stability of the current land tenure regime. The relatively large 
standard error (0.15) shows that among the four villages, less farmers in Co Cham 
perceived the no difficult to carry out the obligation of land protection. 
In the survey, farmers were also asked about their perceptions in respect of their 
compliance with the rules and obligations of using land. The majority of them (86.4 per 
cent) said that they will comply with the rules and obligations if they can possess the 
land permanently. Similarly, many households (84.5 per cent) will comply with the rules 
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and obligations as they believe that their compliance is a condition for renewal of the 
land lease term. Most farmers (67.3 per cent) also recognised that if they participate in 
the process of making rules and obligations, they will comply with them more easily. 
Table 9.3. Perceptions of farmers about imposed obligations of land protection 
Village Difficult No difficulties lndiff erent Total 
Thuy Dien 8 (53.4%) 4 (26 .6%) 3 (20%) 15 
Bai Yen 5 (41.6%) 6 (50%) 1 (8.4%) 12 
My Giang 8 (53.4%) 3 (20%) 4 (26.6%) 15 
Co Cham 15 (60°/o) 4 (16%) 6 (24%) 25 
Total 36 (53.7%) 17 (25.4%) 14 (20.9%) 67 (100%) 
Standard error 0.076 0.152 0.081 
Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
In contrast, if the rules come solely from the governments, without the involvement of 
farmers, only 28.3 per cent of them may definitely comply with the rules. Around 23.5 
per cent of respondents said that they will observe the rules and obligations as they want 
to invest in improvement of the land (Figure 9 .5). Thus, when the conditions match their 
interests, farmers are willing to observe the rules and carry out obligations. 
Figure 9 .5. Reasons for farmers complying with rules and obligations 
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Source: Tran (2000). Field data. 
9.4. Conclusion 
The change in land tenure regimes from the Collectivisation period to the Renovation 
period was not simply the granting of the land use rights to individual households; it 
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also involved change in the administrative systems as well as in the enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure effective exercise of the land use rights. In implementing the 
1993 Land Law, the government authorities from the central, provincial, district and 
village levels have attempted to strengthen the administrative organisations and the 
enforcement of regulations in land allocation. However, there remain a number of 
weaknesses in disseminating the land law, issuing land-use certificates and land transfer 
contracts, and resolving land disputes. 
It is difficult for the village and district authorities in rural areas to fulfil the aims which 
the central and provincial authorities seek in implementing the new land law. The main 
problems are the inadequate grassroots dissemination of information about the new 
rules and regulations, the lack of transparency of the allocation process, and the 
insufficient participation of farmers who are most directly concerned the process of 
allocation. The study finds that the most important reason for these problems is the 
limited availability of resources for the village and district authorities to undertake 
accurate land surveys and demarcation, which can eliminate land disputes between 
households. The shortage of budgets for the proper training, required for cadastral 
officers and other administrators, and the lack of the involvement of farmers has led to 
the slow progress in the issuance of land certificate,s. Resolving conflicts over the land 
also requires the effective exercise of responsibilities of the local and provincial or 
central authorities. 
Obligations imposed on farm households to maintain the quality of agricultural land can 
be a very important part of a land tenure regime. Especially in the forest lands and other 
lands that are susceptible to degradation, or where bio-diversity needs to be preserved, 
there is a case for making farmers bear responsibility for meeting environmental 
benchmarks. Self-enforcement of these obligations would minimise the public cost of 
monitoring and enforcement of these obligations. However, to be effective, the farmers 
should realise some benefits from carrying out these responsibilities. Thus, the 
obligations written down in the Land Law that farmers have towards the land quality 
must be implemented with effective monitoring mechanisms, and conditions can be 
made upon the land use rights such as renewal of the land lease if farmers are willing to 
conserve land productivity. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusions: well-defined property rights in land 
encourage sustainable land use 
This research focuses on the question of the significant of the relationship between land 
tenure regimes and long-term land improvement in the context of sustainable 
agricultural development. The research aimed to develop policy recommendations for 
promoting sustainable agricultural land management in North Vietnam. Under the 
different land tenure regimes along with the changes in the social, political and 
economic regimes in Viet Nam, agricultural land has been managed in different ways. 
Land fertility may be degraded or improved depending on farming practices, which are 
affected in turn by the rights to use the land. The root causes of human-induced land 
degradation such as population pressures, market and policy failures, land tenure 
structure and institutional weaknesses have been discussed widely. Addressing how 
these factors influence land use and farming practices can help the policy-makers and 
other stakeholders to understand why farmers, landowners or land managers are often 
unwilling or unable to prevent soil degradation. 
The concepts of sustainability, sustainable resource management and property rights are 
the principles on which the analysis of this study is based. The basic challenge for 
sustainable agriculture is to make better use of available biophysical and human 
resources. The security level of a land tenure regime play an important role in the 
interaction between human and land resources and hence in making agriculture more 
sustainable. Land tenure security is understood as an individual rights to use a piece of 
land on a continuous basis, and the rights to reap the benefits of labour and capital 
invested in the land without the fear of interference by outsiders or of eviction. 
The basic hypothesis of this research is that insecure land-use rights can adversely affect 
the behaviour of farmers in respect of land improvement activities. The more secure 
land tenure is, the more incentives there is for farmers' investment in land conservation. 
In order to examine this hypothesis, an analytical framework is adopted that focuses on 
why and how land rights and rules influence farmers' attitudes towards land 
management and to what extent well-defined rights of access to land, rights to transfer 
land, of access to credit and appropriate enforcement of these rights can provide 
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incentives for adopting land conservation practices. The primary evidence used for the 
analysis came from four study sites within the North Viet Nam region - Bai Yen village 
in Hoa Binh province, Thuy Dien village in Vinh Phuc province, My Giang village in 
Ha Tay province and Co Cham village in Hai Duong province. 
As shown in this study, some extraordinary changes in agricultural development and 
farming practices have taken place since the 1993 Land Law was implemented in 
Vietnam. These changes are summarised below. 
Remarkable changes in security levels of land tenure systems 
In North Vietnam, serious degradation of agricultural land has resulted from 
unsustainable farming practices and the neglect of practices of long-term land 
improvement that stemmed from the insecurity of the land tenure system prior to the 
Renovation period. From a comparison of land managements in the Collectivisation and 
Renovation periods, the findings of the thesis are that the land tenure arrangements in 
the Collectivisation period were insecure and land tenure arrangements in the 
Renovation offer much more security. 
· Under Collectivisation, farmers did not have an individual land title such as a long-term 
lease; they faced the possibility of eviction and loss of their capital if they invested in 
the farm. Without land title and rights to inherit, sell, lease and mortgage the farmland, 
farmers were limited in their ability to access credit which was necessary for 
improvement of their own plots and other agricultural purposes. Credit was accessed 
from informal sources which charged very high interest rates. Moreover, the state or 
cooperative executives, not farmers, had responsibility for all management and 
investment in agriculture. The cooperative executives were usually underqualified and 
had little capital, production experience and poor technical qualifications which led to 
weaknesses in enforcement tasks. The survey data indicated that only four per cent of 
farmers in selected areas prefer to retain this cooperative system, while most of them 
wish to own the land permanently. 
In contrast, the current land tenure regime under the Land Law of 1993 is preferred by 
farmers as it granted long-term land-use rights to individual households. The lease titles 
are ensured by the provision land rights certificates that reduce the threat to a 
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household's land tenure caused by unresolved disputes over land claims. Moreover, in 
this land tenure system, the long-term lease to the state-owned farmland can be 
inherited, sold, bought, rented out and used as collateral for loans. Thus by receiving 
these rights, farmers manage their land individually with confidence to invest in 
agricultural productivity. The function of management of cooperatives has been 
changed. Cooperatives have given up their leading role in production and this role has 
been handed to individual farm households. Cooperatives now have to compete with 
private firms in the provision of support services to farmers. 
The changes in land tenure security from the Collectivisation period to the Renovation 
periods led to changes in farmers' attitudes towards long-term land improvement. Under 
the tenure regimes of state ownership but without individual tenure, farmers who 
worked on the cooperative fields had no rights to the use and management of farmland 
and the payment they received from their farm labour was based on the length of the 
time they spent in the fields. Thus they had no incentives to care for the farmland or 
invest in the land, as their income level was not related to agricultural productivity. 
Recently, farmers have been applying many soil conservation measures on their farm, 
both in terms of their labour and capital, as they have more confidence in the security 
level of the current land tenure regimes. 
However, there are a number of limitations in the 1993 Land Law and problems with its 
implementations such as difficulties in registering land certificates, constraints on land 
lease terms, the limitations on transferring and mortgaging land-use rights, and 
difficulties in enforcing these rights. These constraints that affect adversely the 
investment of farmers in land conservation need to be abolished or improved as set out 
in the following discussion and recommendations. . 
Long-term lease certificate is a security title for individual households 
Land and land certificates for land-use rights have been handed to households on a long-
term basis. This registration of land lease title is important in providing adequate and 
efficient mechanisms by which to safely transfer interests in land and to reduce the costs 
and risks in land transactions. Secure legal rights in the form of long-term lease rights 
can be expected to facilitate farmers access to cheaper, long-term and more extensive 
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credit because possession of a land title or certificate is often a precondition for formal 
bank loans. The study found that the majority of farmers agreed that having land-use 
rights certificates can ensure their rights to use of a confirmed land area over a long 
period; can ensure that they reap the benefits of investing in land improvements; and can 
ensure the legal sale of their land, provide easier access to credit, and reduce land 
disputes. 
However, the process of issuing land-use rights certificates must be improved and 
brought up to date in many areas, especially in the upland region and the regions with 
high population density. The contents of the certificate should be more transparent and 
more adequate information added: such as adding the name of the wife in addition to the 
name of the household head, so that she can have equal rights to use the certificate. 
Also, even though the law states that the rights to land have been increased to five rights 
- i.e., the rights to exchange, transfer, inherit, mortgage and lease - on a long-term use 
basis, these five rights need to be explained clearly on the certificate. Doing so, will 
ensure farmers have a better understanding of their rights and obligations under the 
lease contract. 
The lease terms of land-use rights - 20 years for annual crops and 50 years for perennial 
crops and forestland - has encouraged farmers to adopt soil conservation measures as 
this means that they will be able to reap the benefits from their investments. There is a 
difference between the effects of the land law on different terms of soil conservation 
practices. Adopting short-term soil conservation, the short-term of land lease may not 
play a significant role as with the long-term conservation. For instance, planting of 
perennials is a long-term investment as its conservation benefits can only be received 
after years of investment, while investment in fertilisers, pesticides and seeds has 
immediately pay off within a year in terms of increased yields. Nevertheless, most 
farmers favour having the rights to use land permanently. Moreover, the conditions for 
renewal of the land lease are not clear to farmers . Making these conditions clear is an 
important task to give incentives to farmers to carry out their obligations in respect of 
their land-use rights and for optimal investment in land because the time horizon is an 
essential condition in making investment decisions. 
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With respect to land distribution, one constraint is the fixed land allocation to 
households for at least 20 years, based on their household size. The farm size needs to 
be adjusted every three to five years according to the suggestions of the interviewed 
farmers. However, this administered solution does not help much compared to the 
alternative market reallocation of land. Establishing convenient conditions for field 
exchanges between farm households is necessary for the application of conservation 
technology and the reduction of the costs of labour and transport, because farm 
fragmentation in many cases makes use of mechanical equipment uneconomic. 
Transferability of land-use rights 
Granting the rights to transfer land to individual households has improved the security 
of land tenure. Under Collectivisation, land and farm equipment were pooled and all 
agricultural work was done collectively under the unified management of the 
cooperatives. Land market transactions were prohibited. Since the 1993 Land Law has 
been implemented, land markets have gradually developed in North Vietnam as farmers 
sell, buy, exchange and lease their farmlands. Most farmers involved in the survey 
believed that the right to transfer land-use rights placed a value on their farmland, 
provide them better opportunities to obtain credit, allowed them to buy more land, or 
exchange field plots to reduce land fragmentation, and reap the benefits from their 
investments in their fields if they changed to other work or they moved out of the 
villages. 
However, the findings of this study are the land markets in this region have developed 
slowly because of the scarcity of arable land; the traditional belief of peasants to hold 
land even though they may not cultivate it; constraints on the transfer c9nditions, 
regulations such as the high rate of taxes on land transfers; the unclear regulations 
covering land transactions, and restrictions on the transfer of land-use rights (Article 75 
of the Land Law allows for transfer of land-use rights, but only in certain cases). The 
common forms of land transaction in the region are renting land and exchanging farm 
plots between households and bidding land from the communes. 
However, the study did not find much evidence to support the hypothesis that land 
transfer rights have significantly affected the adoption of soil ·conservation measures by 
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farmers. This response appears contradictory in that while farmers said that land transfer 
rights did not affect their land conservation decisions, they believed that this right 
helped them to realize their investment in land and get out of farming if they like. In 
fact, they are not interested in selling their farmland. The reason for this contradictory 
situation may be that the current villagers are not solely of long-term farmers and some 
of them may not intend to work off farm in a long-run. 
The obstacles to development of land markets should be removed. Regulations relating 
to the lease term need to be clear so that there are no misunderstandings as to lease 
terms when land transactions are being negotiated (it is difficult to determine if the right 
to renew the term belongs to the original land user or to the transferee when the 20-year 
term expires). The very high land transfer taxes, which discourage land sales and inhibit 
the development of an efficient market in land rights, should be set at a low rate to 
encourage the transfer of land to the more productive farmers. The concern about 
landlessness and poverty should be addressed in other, more efficient ways, such as 
through freeing up markets for land, labour and capital in the industrial and services 
sectors, and the removal of barriers to the development of labour-intensive industries in 
these sectors. 
Land-use rights as collateral 
Prior to the Renovation period (Doi Moi) , and particularly during the Collectivisation 
period, farmers in North Vietnam could not access credit from formal lending 
institutions. Farmers could only obtain credit from informal sources at very high interest 
rates, which limited investments in land improvement. The policy that began in 1988 
has changed the face of rural credit service development significantly. The rights to 
mortgage farmland have been very significant for the development of credit markets. 
These rights have facilitated farmers ' access to credit, which is obviously important for 
agricultural productivity. 
An important finding of this study is that granting the right to use land-use rights as 
collateral to individual farm households has contributed to the increased security of land 
tenure. Farmers prefer to have the right to pledge land-use rights to obtain credit, 
whether from formal or informal credit markets and they want to access credit for 
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investment in agricultural production and long-term land improvements. In contrast with 
the preferences expressed by farmers, however, the study found that there was not much 
evidence of farmers using credit for soil conservation investments. In particular, a large 
percentage of farmers interviewed saw the right to mortgage their land-use rights as 
being important in their investment decisions, but not many farmers have mortgaged 
their land rights to access formal credit. 
Although the limits on loan size and the difficulties of mortgaging land use rights are 
not significantly affected the short-term investments in soil conservation, the present 
rural finance system does not adequately cover smallholders. The main constraints on 
farmers' access to credit are the complexity of the lending schedule, the high interest 
rates of loans, the short terms of loans, the loans limit, the unclear requirements for 
collateral, and the mortgage mechanism. Thus the government must continue to improve 
the regulations relating to the formal credit sector. Improvements in saving mobilisation 
and borrowing procedures, developing the financial market and applying the market 
interest rates, are necessary to enhance rural household access to credit. Enabling longer 
term borrowing of larger loans, and encouraging farmers to use their land-use right as 
collateral through having easier and clearer conditions for borrowing, will give farmers 
better access to capital to invest in land productivity. 
Institutions and enforcement mechanisms 
The effectiveness of the legislation and policies relating to land use depends heavily on 
the effectiveness of the administrative system and the enforcement mechanisms. The 
administrative systems have changed along with the change in land tenure regimes. 
Responsibility for implementing legislation and passing decrees, circulars, by laws, and 
administrative guidance has been delegated to line ministries, state committees and 
appropriate provincial bodies. The main tasks of village officers are to monitor and 
regulate land distribution, land use and zoning, and to collect information on soils and 
land use. In implementing the 1993 Land Law, the government authorities from the 
central, provincial, district and village levels have attempted to strengthen the 
administrative organisations and the enforcement of regulations in land allocation. 
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The conclusions drawn here are that the village and district authorities in rural areas 
have not been very effective in implementing the law. The majoricy of farmers 
complained about the inadequacy of the information provided, and that they do not 
understand clearly the rights and rules of allocating land, demarcating the plots of land 
allotted, assessing the quality of the land plots, transferring land, and borrowing money 
from the banks. As well, the process of enforcing these regulations is not effective. This 
problem of poor dissemination of information appears to have resulted from the lack of 
resources, lack of appropriate training for officials and cadastral officers, inadequate 
public media, and the lack of participation of farmers in the land allocation process. 
The process of issuing land-use certificates has been slow because the district 
authorities do not have adequate resources and because of the poor training of people 
undertaking comprehensive surveying, demarcating and registering of land. Monitoring 
the rules and regulations and resolving conflicts over land have not been exercised 
effectively. The obligations of farm households in respect of the protection of land 
productivity and the scope for the self-enforcement of such obligations have not been 
thought through and imposed clearly. 
Thus this study suggests several critical points, including that the administrative 
organisations must be strengthened, from the national to the local level, to match the 
comprehensive changes in the land law and policies. These changes should include the 
improvement of the administrative structure, the education of officials, the 
responsibilities of officials, and the participation of farmers in the process of land 
allocation and the enforcement of the rules and regulations. A more robust 
administrative system will avoid the problems of inadequate grassroots dissemination of 
information about the rules and regulations, the slow progress in issuing land 
certificates, and the inefficient enforcement. 
Monitoring and resolving conflicts over land require the effective exercise of the 
responsibilities of the local, provincial and central authorities as . well as the 
responsibilities of farmers. The close link between the operational rules, collective-
choice rules and constitutional-choice rules should be taken into account. The 
imposition of clear obligations on farm households to maintain and improve land quality 
is an essential task of the government. Self-enforcement of these obligations must be 
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encouraged because self-enforcing mechanisms would minimise the public costs of 
monitoring and enforcement. Therefore, farmers should participate in the process of 
establishing the rules and obligations, and conditions can be imposed upon the land-use 
rights, such as the renewal terms of the land lease, to provide incentives for farmers to 
carry out their obligations in protecting land resource. 
The current land tenure regime in Viet Nam is a combination of private and state 
property rights. Young (1992), Hanna et al. (1995) and Tietenberg (1996) have argued 
that entitlements and obligations should be as fully specified as possible and arranged to 
promote sustainable investment in resource use (see Chapter 2). From the findings of 
this study, except for a number of problems in coding and implementing the land law, 
the land tenure regime in Vietnam in large part meets the broad criteria of a well-
defined property rights regime appropriate for sustainable use and management. In 
summary, the outcomes of this study set out the following characteristics of this current 
land tenure system: 
Universality - the land resource is privately managed and titled on a long-term basis; all 
entitlements are specified 
Exclusivity - land-use rights are allocated exclusively, so that farmers have a secure right 
to prevent others from utilising their land in any way that diminishes its value to them 
Enforceability - the local authorities are authorised to secure land-use rights of farm 
households from involuntary seizure or encroachment 
Transferability - land-use rights are transferable from one household to another in 
voluntary exchange 
Collateral security - land-use rights can be used as security to finance investment 
associated with the use of the land 
Compensation - the law states that any modification of the rights/obligations which 
diminishes the value of land and investments upon it should be compensated. (This 
regulation has not been implemented widely, however). 
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Sustainability guarantee - farmers perceive that providing they continue to use the land 
sustainably, their heirs, assigns and successors will be entitled to use that land at least on 
a long-term leasehold basis. (However, to guarantee sustainability the entitlements for 
use of the land should be held in perpetuity) (Chapter 2). 
Taking into account farmers' perceptions, aspirations and obligations, the rights and 
rules on land use and the enforcement of these regulations of the 1993 Land Law has 
contributed significantly to promote sustainable land management in agriculture. 
Farmers in North Vietnam have been facilitated by the current land tenure arrangements. 
Farmers were granted the rights to use agricultural land individually in the long-term 
basis, thus with the security of land-use rights they now have, farmers can with 
confidence increase agricultural productivity to improve their livelihoods while at the 
same time they are encouraged to conserve land fertility, which is the goal of 
sustainability of agriculture (Figure 2.1 ). 
This research has been somewhat limited in its access to information for investigating 
all issues related to land tenure regimes and land management and the information or 
data have been collected only from some areas of the region. But while the findings of 
this study may not be fully applicable to all locations of the northern region, they should 
contribute to the development of principles for sustainable land management for the 
region and indeed the whole country. As a general conclusion of this study, it may be 
said that well-defining land-use rights and obligations of using land will give incentives 
to farmers to invest in the long-term land improvement. 
This thesis focuses mainly on the impacts of land tenure regimes on farmers' attitudes 
and practices with respect to long-term land improvements. Many other aspects of 
Vietnam's institutional arrangements, particularly those relating to land-use rights 
regimes and the implementation of the laws and policies relating to agricultural 
development, should be examined in order to fully investigate the security of land-use 
rights and build up an appropriate policy framework for sustainable agricultural 
management in Vietnam. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1. Relationship between secure title and productivity 
Secure ownership of land 
,,. ~ 
More security to farmer I More security to lender 
More demand for investment I More cheap, long-term credit 
~ More investment 
~ 
, 
~ 
(Input complimentary) ,,. 
More demand for variable inputs More cheap, short-term credit 
~ More variable use of inputs -
, 
~ 
~ 
Higher output per acre 
,,. 
Higher land value 
Source: Pearce, D.W. and Wardford, 1993. 
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Appendix 2.2. Design Principles Illustrated by Long-Enduring Common 
Property Resource Institutions 
1. Clearly def1ned boundaries 
Individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR and the 
boundaries of the CPR itself are clearly defined. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units 
are related to local conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or 
money. 
3. Collective choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying operational 
rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are 
accountable to the appropriators and/or are the appropriators themselves. 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions 
( depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from other appropriators, 
from officials accountable to these appropriators, or from both. 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve 
conflict among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by 
external government authorities. 
For CPRs that are part of large system: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Source: Ostrom 1993: 3. 
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Individuals or households with rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR and the 
boundaries of the CPR itself are clearly defined. 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 
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money. 
3. Collective choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by operational rules can participate in modifying operational 
rules. 
4. Monitoring 
Monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are 
accountable to the appropriators and/or are the appropriators themselves. 
5. Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions 
( depending on the seriousness and context of the offence) from other appropriators, 
from officials accountable to these appropriators, or from both. 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve 
conflict among appropriators or between appropriators and officials. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise 
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by 
external government authorities. 
For CPRs that are part of large system: 
8. Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance 
activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
Source: Ostrom 1993: 3. 
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Appendix 4.1. Questionnaires for the survey in northern Vietnam 
QUESTIONNAIRES OF FARMER HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
(Sample of 25 farmers in each site) 
Name .................................... ............................... Place ............ ........... ................ . 
D1stnct ............................................. .... ................................................................ . 
Date ................. ........... ................................................. ......................................... . 
Number in family ................................................................................... .............. . 
( 1) Status in family 
(2) Sex 
(3) Age 
( 4) Education level 
(5) Work on-farm 
(6) Work off-farm 
(7) How many months/year 
work off-farm 
(8) Years of settlement in 
this location 
(9) Years of farming 
expenence 
( 10) Income (kg/year; dong) 
(1) Status in family .......................... (2) Sex ................................ (5) Work on-farm 
1 = Head ............................. .. ............ 1 = male ............................... 1 = Full time 
2 = Spouse ........................................ 2 = female ............................ 2 = Part time 
3 = Son/Daughter ........................... (3) Education level ............... 0 = No 
4 = Relative ........................................ 5 = Grade 5 ....................... (6) Work off farm 
5 = Parent ........................................... 9 = Grade 9 ......................... 1 = Yes 
6 = Other ................................ .. ......... 12 = Grade 12 ...................... 2 = No 
...........................
.............. .............
.. .... C = College 
...........................
...........................
..... . U = University 
( 11) What are the sources of labour used for farming production? 
..... 1. only family labour ..... 3. both family and hired labour 
..... 2. only hired labour 
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QUESTIONNAIRES OF FARMING SYSTEM 
(Sample of 25 farmers in each site) 
(12) Plot number 
(13) How far from the house 
(14) Plot size (hectares) 
(15) Land type 
(16) Activity type 
(17) Type of farming practices 
(18) Sources of water supply 
(19) Type of fertilisers 
(20) Ownership type 
( 15) Land type 
1 =lowland 
2 = slope land 
3 = hilly 
4 = mountainous 
( 1 7) Type off arming practices 
1. = monoculture 
2. = multi-cropping 
3 = shifting cultivation 
4 = agro fores try 
(19) Type of fertilisers 
1 = chemical 
2 = green manure 
3 = crop residue 
4 = livestock manure 
(21) If rent in, how much land is rented? 
( 16) Activity type 
1 = growing rice 
2 = growing field crop 
3 = orchard/tree 
4 = home garden with livestock 
(18) Sources of water supply 
1 = rainfall 
2 = irrigation 
(20) Ownership type 
1 =own 
2 = rent in 
3 = rent out 
(22) If rent out, how much have you received from? 
(23) Why do you rent the land out? 
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QUESTIONS FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW OF FARMER HOUSEHOLDS 
(Sample of 15 farm-households in each site) 
A. Land management 
(1) What cropping patterns have you cultivated? 
..... 1. one crop 
..... 2. double crops 
..... 3. triple crops 
..... 4. agro fores try 
(2) How many kilos/year of chemical fertilisers are you using for your farm? 
.............................
........ .....................
.................... .........
.............................
....... 
(3) What are the difficulties you face in applying fertilisers? 
( 4) What are farming practices you have been carrying out? 
..... 1. mono-cultivation with annual crops 
..... 2. inadequate use of fertilisers 
..... 3. inadequate water use 
..... 4. shifting cultivation with shortening fallow periods 
..... 5. expanding fields to marginal areas 
..... 6. Intensifying cultivation on steep slopes 
..... 7. others (specify) 
( 5) Why do you continue this farming practice? 
(6) Do you consider that your farmland is being degraded (Collectivisation/Renovation 
period)? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(7) If yes, what is the main type of land degradation? 
..... 1. soil erosion 
..... 2. soil salinity 
..... 3. soil acidity 
..... 4. depletion of soil organic matter 
..... 5. others (specify) 
(8) What do you think are the main causes for land degradation? 
..... 1. inappropriate irrigation and drainage patterns 
..... 2. slope length and steepness 
..... 3. tree density 
..... 4. rapid population growth 
..... 5. inappropriate farming practices 
..... 6. ill-specified land use rights 
..... 7. weakness of enforcement 
..... 8. climate change 
..... 9. other 
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(9) Have you been applying some conservation practices? 
..... 1. yes 
...... 2. no, Why? 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
 • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • •
 • • • • • • • • 
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
............... 
(10) If yes, what are the conservation practices have you been using 
..... 1. intercropping with fertilisers application 
..... 2. contour made of green manure plants 
..... 3. gradual terracing 
..... 4. alley cropping with hedgerows of leguminous 
..... 5. agro fores try 
..... 6. others 
(11) Where did you have the know ledges in (10)? 
..... 1. From neighbours 
..... 2. From your children 
..... 3. From extension services 
..... 4. From your own experience of farming 
..... 5. Other (specify) 
(12) How do these conservation methods compare in terms of cost? 
......................
......................
......................
......................
............... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . 
( 13) What do you think are the significant constraints to adopting land conservation 
practices? 
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
................ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . 
( 14) Do you intend invest money and labour in land conservation? 
..... 1. yes, Why ............................................................................................................ . 
..... 2. no, Why ................................ ....... .......................................................................... . 
( 15) How much money and labour days do you spend every year on conservation 
practices? 
(16) What were the crop yields after one year, two years, three years or five years of 
applying land conservation practices? 
......................
.................... ..
........ .. ............
......................
............... 
( 1 7) If you were required by the government to adopt conservation practices, would you 
need any assistance? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
( 18) What assistance would you need? 
..... 1. labour 
..... 2. capital 
..... 3. extension services 
..... 4. stability of legislation 
..... 5. others 
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(19) What changes in agricultural policies and legislation could encourage land 
conservation investment? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..... .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(20) Would you prefer to receive permanent use rights to the state-owned land? Why? 
B. Land ownership 
(1) Have you had a land certificate (red book/green book)? 
Yes 
No 
(2) Do you think the rights and rules indicated in this certificate are clear in terms of 
use? 
Yes 
No, Whynot? 
(3) How long is the lease of farmland and of the forestland? 
(4) What is the length of the lease, particularly for land conservation purposes? 
( 5) Do you think that you can get the land lease renewed if you obey the rules? 
Yes, Why? 
No, Whynot? 
( 6) Do you plan to invest in land conservation after year 2013? 
Yes, Why? 
No, Why? 
(7) How does the current land lease term influence your decision of adopting land 
conservation practices? 
(8) What farming systems do you use now? Why? 
(9) What did you do in land management in 50 years and 20 years ago? Why? 
...................
...................
...................
...................
...................
......... 
C. Land transfer rights 
(1) Have you transferred your farmland to the other users? 
Yes 
No 
(2) Did you invest in land conservation before selling it? 
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Yes 
No 
(3) If yes, for how long? 
( 4) How much did your land cost? 
( 5) Was the value of your land greater or lesser after land conservation investment? 
( 6) Did you face the difficulties to obtain the transfer rights? 
Yes 
No 
(7) If yes, what are they? 
(8) What is the transfer tax? 
(9) What do you think about the tax of land transfer? 
(10) What are the influences of the transfer rights on your decision of long term 
investment in land conservation? 
(11) Currently, what are the your land conservation practices that reflect the negative 
effects of the transfer rights on it? 
(12) How does the land market encourage you to invest in long term land improvement? 
( 13) What should be made in changes in the regulations for land transfer? 
D. Access to credit 
(1) Have you borrowed money for agricultural investments? 
Yes, What particular investment have you been taking? 
No, Why 
(2) What was the source of your loans? 
State banks 
Private moneylenders 
Others ( specify) 
(3) How long is the loan? 
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( 4) How did the loan term affect your conservation plan? 
(5) What is the interest rate? 
( 6) Your opinion of the interest rate? 
Low 
Reasonable 
High 
(7) Have you experienced any difficulties in borrowing money from private 
moneylenders? If yes, what are they? 
(8) What requirements do the banks impose when you want to borrow money from 
them? 
(9) How do these requirements encourage or discourage you in borrowing money? 
(10) Has your farmland has been used as collateral? 
Yes, what do you think of this policy 
No, why? 
( 11) What are the constraints of using land as collateral? 
(12) What did you do with the borrowed funds? 
(13) What are the your future plan of borrowing funds? Why? 
D. Land distribution and farm size ceiling 
(1) If you could consolidate your holdings what would you do with it? 
(2) What do you think about the policy of farm-plot exchanges between farmers? 
(3) What is land size ceiling in this region? 
( 4) How does this limited land size affect land conservation practices? 
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F. Enforcement 
(1) Do you make decisions independently about farming activities? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(2) Do your neighbour help you to make those decisions? 
(3) If yes, what kinds of help? 
( 4) If not, does the cooperative help you to make decisions? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(5) Does the cooperative alone make decisions about your farming practices? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
( 6) What kinds of decisions does the cooperative participate in? 
..... 1. crop patterns 
..... 2. Input use 
..... 3. irrigation 
..... 4. marketing for production 
..... 5. others (specify) 
(7) What kinds of decisions do the cooperative make alone? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
.................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . 
(8) How do the decisions made by the cooperative constrain yields from your field? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
...................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(9) Does the Department of Agriculture impose land protection obligations? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(10) What are these obligations? 
(11) Do you comply with these obligations? 
..... I.yes, Why? ............................................................................................................... . 
.... . 2. no, Why? ............................................................................................................... . 
(12) What are the difficulties for carrying out the obligations of land protection? 
(13) What land policy would most assist you in carrying out these obligations? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
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.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.................... 
(14) If you have longer-term or permanent use rights to the state-owned land, will you 
carry out these obligations? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no, Why ........................... ........................ ......................................................... ... .
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . 
(15) Which land tenure arrangement gives you the best incentives to carry out the long-
term land improvement investment? Why? 
···························
···························
···························
···························
····························
 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.................... . 
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QUESTIONS FOR OFFICERS OF DISTRICTS AND THE CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 
( 1) How many households of the districts and province have been given land title? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . 
(2) Are any households losing land? If so, Why ........................................................... . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . 
(3) Have any households returned land to the village, being unable to farm it? 
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................
.......... 
( 4) What are the main causes for this? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
...... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . 
(5) Have the interests of farmers in land been taken into account when the land-use 
rights and rules are made? 
..... 1. yes, Why .........................................................................................................
 . 
. . . . . 2. no, Why .......................................................................................................... . 
( 6) Are the traditional culture and beliefs of local farmers taken into account when these 
rules are made? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(7) Have farmers participated in the process of rule making? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(8) If yes, how does their involvement give them incentives to comply with the rules? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
..................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . 
(9) How does their involvement give them incentives to monitor land use by others 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
..................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . 
(10) Are there many disputes over land? 
(11) Who has responsibility for resolving conflicts among the different parties with 
claims to the land? 
(12) Are the administrative officers reluctant to resolve these conflicts? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(13) If yes, Why? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.............. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(14) What difficulties does the district face in implementing the law? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.................... 
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.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . 
(15) What do you believe to be the benefits and problems with the current land law? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . 
( 16) What improvements in implementing the law should be carried out? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
.... 
(17) Should any agricultural policies, particularly land policy be changed to encouraging 
land improvement investment? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . 
(18) Have any policies, regulations and incentives for land improvement been 
established? 
..... 1. Yes 
..... 2.No 
(19) What are the plans for implementation of conservation on public lands? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . 
(20) What forms of support and guidance in conservation efforts on private land are 
provided? 
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
.......................
................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . 
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QUESTIONNAIRES FOR SCIENTISTS 
(1) Do you study land degradation in this area? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(2) If yes, what is the main type of land degradation? 
..... 1. soil erosion 
..... 2. soil salinity 
..... 3. soil acidity 
..... 4. depletion of soil organic matter 
..... 5. others (specify) 
(3) What do you think are the main causes for land degradation? 
..... 1. inappropriate irrigation and drainage patterns 
..... 2. slope length and steepness 
..... 3. tree density 
..... 4. rapid population growth 
..... 5. inappropriate farming practices 
..... 6. ill-specified land use rights 
..... 7. weakness of enforcement 
..... 8. climate change 
..... 9. others (specify) 
(4) How do water conditions affect the cropping patterns? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
( 5) What is the impact of chemical fertilisers and pesticides on water quality and 
agricultural land ? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
........................ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(6) What conservation practices have been applied by farmers? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
......................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(7) Are these conservation methods difficult for them to adopt? If so, why? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(8) What will determine farmers' decisions to adopt form of land improvement? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
.. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(9) What do you think are the significant constraints to adopting land conservation 
practices? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
.. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(10) Did you encourage farmers to use their traditional conservation techniques? 
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..........................
..........................
.............. ............
..........................
..........................
... 
(11) Have these techniques required high labour or capital inputs? 
(12) Have farmers been introduced to and trained in land conservation techniques? 
( 13) Do you have any measures for encouraging farmers to adopt conservation 
methods? 
..... 1. yes 
..... 2. no 
(14) What are these measures? 
(15) Have you set priorities for land development and matching land-use potential to 
conservation needs? 
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............................
.............. 
(16) Have you had programs of evaluation of conservation needs and technical support, 
extension, and implementation of conservation investment? 
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
297 
Appendix 5.1. The survey data on households composition of the four 
villages in North Vietnam 
5.1 a. Number of agricultural labourers 
r 1-2 3-4 5-6 Total 
,g 
Thuy Dien 7 6 2 
15 (100%) 
Bai Yen 6 5 1 
12 (100%) 
My Giang 6 7 2 
15 (100%) 
Co Cham 11 10 4 
25 (100%) 
Total 30 28 9 6
7 (100%) 
5.lb. Farm size (hectares) 
s 0.1 - 0.19 0.2 - 0.29 0.3 + 
g 
Thuy Dien 4 7 4 
Bai Yen 5 3 4 
My Giang 9 5 1 
Co Cham 9 11 5 
Total 27 26 14 
5.lc. Number offarm plots 
3-5 6 - 10 11- 15 16- 20 
Village i-
Thuy Dien 11 3 1 0 
Bai Yen 1 3 3 5 
My Giang 9 5 1 0 
Co Cham 9 16 0 0 
Total 30 27 5 5 
~1 d. Distance offurtherest plot from homestead (meters) 
 300 - 500 600 - 1000 1100 - 1500 1600 - 3000 Village 
Thuy Dien 5 6 4 0 
Bai Yen 0 10 2 0 
My Giang 2 1 1 2 0 
Co Cham 1 11 4 9 
Total 8 38 12 9 
-i_le. Income (USD per capita/year) 
~ < 80 80 - 150 > 150 Village 
Thuy Dien 5 (33%) 8 (53%) 2 (14%) 
Bai Yen 3 (25%) 5 (42%) 4 (33%) 
My Giang 5 (33%) 8 (53%) 2 (33%) 
Co Cham 5 (20%) 14 (56%) 6 (24%) 
Total 18 (26%) 35 (52%) 14 (22%) 
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Appendix 6.1. A Land-Use Rights Certificate of household in My Giang 
village 
Page 1. The land-use rights certificate 
Page 2. The Peoples Council of Phuc Tho district Certify 
the household of Do Tien Mieng in Group 2 has been granted the rights of using 1626 
m
2 of land at Tam Hiep commune, Phuc Tho district, Ha Tay province following the 
table below: 
The map No. Plot number Area (m2) 
4 1617 271 
4 1759 433 
4 1906 98 
4 1909 195 
4 1916 306 
4 1917 323 
Date Month Year 
President of the Peoples Council 
Book of land rights certificate: No 7 5 
Page 3. (Proposed for map of farm plots) 
Purposes of 
land use 
Cultivation 
Cultivation 
Cultivation 
Cultivation 
Cultivation 
Cultivation 
Page 4. The changes after granting the land use certificate 
Date, month, year Number and the content 
The holder of this certificate should pay attention: 
Expiry date Note 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 
2013 
Certification of local 
government 
1. A land user has rights and obligations following the rule of 73 , 74, 75, 76, 77, 78 of 
the 1993 Land Law. 
2. When the holder changes the use-scale, and purposes of land use, the holder must 
register with the local authority. 
3. The holder is not allowed to change the content of the certificate. If the certificate is 
lost the user must report the loss to the local government 
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Appendix 8.1. Investment and ac_cess to credit in rural areas of Vietnam 
Since the Vietnam Agriculture Bank established the program of providing · credit to 
. 
. farmers, about two million households had borrowed money from the banks at the end 
of 1993, and 26 per cent of the total farm-households had obtained credit from· the banks 
by the_ middle of 1994. These results show that farmers need credit for agricultural 
production. Most banks have improved their lending procedures, and they are using 
· land-use rights as collateral, and improving the availability of credit by -borrowing from , 
the central bank through the programs of poverty elimination, program of green cover 
on the barren hills, program of reforestation, and organising many small credit groups of 
farmers. 
However, the credit available for farmers is still limited. It is estimated that about 50 per 
cent of all fann-households which need access to credit cannot borrow money frorn the 
banks. In particular, the loans with longer term (2 :to 3 years) are few (only 8.9 per cent 
of the total) while many farmers need longer-term loans for developing plantations. 
Therefore, most farmers who have established plantations have used their O\Vn capital 
which was obtained fro1n off-farm incomes. For example, Mr Thiem Van Vu, a farmer 
living in Ly Thanh commune, Nghe An province, has established 80 hectares of 
eucalyptus, _4 hectares of fruit trees, and a covv herd. He said that he had used his own 
180 million VNdong (US$12000) vvhich he had saved fro1n the off-farm work of his 
family. He did not want to borrovv money from the banks because of the limited loan 
size Dnd Joan terms as vvell as the high interest rates of loans. 
Thus, in order to help farmers access credit for investments in agriculture, the banks 
1nust make several changes in policies such as improving lending procedures, reducing 
interest rates and providing adequate credit for farmers. 
Source: Tran D ( 1995). 
